THE ELECTION OF 1892 IN IOWA

Once in every four years the people of the United States elect their chief executive. Each party chooses its standard bearer, perfects its organizations, and bids for the support of the voters. Bitter rivalry and partisanship frequently arise, but once the canvass is over and the votes counted the nation quickly accepts the verdict of the majority and bitter feelings and partisan strife disappear. By these quadrennial contests we determine the course and personnel of our government.

A traditional feature of American politics has been the two-party system. Occasionally a third party arises, for a brief time threatens to usurp the place of one of the major parties, then usually fades away again. Since 1860, no third party has been able to win a national election, but many of the ideas advocated by these parties have been taken up by the major parties and incorporated in their platforms. Our party leaders are opportunists; they do not adopt a principle unless they think it will increase their strength. A third party will often adopt some principle and seek support from the voters on the strength of it. Attention is thus focused on the principle and if it finds support from the people, the minor party will increase in strength. Whenever the principle has secured the support of enough people one of the major parties will appropriate it. Thus the minor parties, although they do not attain power themselves, often have an important influence.

The election of 1892 marked the appearance of one of these ephemeral third parties — the People's party — in the presidential arena. While the People's party secured only twenty-two electoral votes in this election — most of

these were probably due to their fusion with the Democrats in certain Western States — they did succeed in focusing the attention of the voters on their major demand, the free and unlimited coinage of silver. Four years later, the Democratic party incorporated this demand in its national platform and the People's party, finding that the Democrats had stolen their thunder, fused with the latter. In the struggle between the East and the West, which was emphasized in 1892, the old Civil War sectionalism tended to disappear and to give way to a new sectionalism, based not on old traditions but on economic differences. After the election of 1892, it seems that the old Civil War traditions gradually disappeared and now live only in dusty magazines and newspapers or in monographs such as the present one.

The election of 1892 was one of the few national elections in the United States in which the tariff was a dominant issue. Four years before, by a narrow margin, the Republicans had won the national election on the tariff issue, but in 1892 they were decisively defeated on the same issue, the second defeat within two years. This election was probably the most clear-cut rejection of the protective tariff theory by the American people since the Civil War.

Iowa furnishes a good field for the study of this election. It was just on the border line between the new and the old West, and it furnishes a good location from which to study the activities and distribution of the People's party in the border region. It will be interesting to attempt to determine why Iowa did not give the People's party movement nearly as much support as it had given the Greenback movement twelve years before. There was an interesting sectionalism within the State, the northwestern part giving some support to the new party, while the eastern part was almost immune to the third party radicalism.

Iowa was still predominantly an agricultural State in 1892, and as such furnishes an index of the reactions of the farmers to the protective tariff. State issues were all subordinated in this election and emphasis was placed on the national issues. In Iowa also the Civil War traditions flourished long after the end of the war. The extension of this issue into the election of 1892 enables us to study this interesting Republicanism of Iowa. A movement arose in Iowa during the latter eighties which threatened for a time to change Iowa from a solid Republican to a doubtful State. The Democrats elected their candidate for Governor in 1889 and 1891 and secured six of the eleven Iowa Congressmen in 1890. The threatened revolt of the State collapsed in 1892 and had so far disappeared by the next year that the Republicans secured control of all the State offices in the election of 1893. When the election of 1896 arrayed the South and West against the East on the silver question, Iowa was found in the ranks with the East. Premonitions of this action can be readily seen as early as 1892.

THE ISSUES OF 1892

The tariff has frequently been an important issue in American politics, but it was not until the latter part of the "eighties" that its importance became so great that it dwarfed all other issues. Most of the credit for forcing the major parties to take a definite stand on the tariff question is due to President Cleveland. Cleveland devoted his annual message in December, 1887, entirely to tariff reform, and proposed a repeal of the "vicious, illegal, and inequitable tariff". He stated that the huge surplus which was then accumulating in the treasury drew too much money from circulation and led to governmental extravagance.[1]

[1] Richardson's *Messages and Papers of the Presidents,* Vol. VIII, pp. 589–591.

The Republicans gleefully accepted the challenge contained in Cleveland's message and came out in favor of protection, thus making the tariff the chief issue in the election of 1888. They won the election by a narrow margin and at once passed a high protective tariff measure. To reduce the surplus they taxed some commodities so heavily as to make it impossible to import them with profit, reduced the tariff on sugar, which had amounted to millions of dollars, and granted a bounty to the domestic producers of sugar. The remission of the duty on sugar was adopted as a means of gaining for the new tariff act the support of the West, where it was admitted by the tariff advocates it would be hard to present in an attractive light the higher duties on manufactured goods. In order to attain the same object the Senate, largely under the influence of James G. Blaine, inserted a reciprocity section in the bill, which gave the President power to impose by proclamation certain duties on sugar, molasses, tea, coffee, and hides, if he considered that any country exporting these commodities to the United States "imposes duties or other exactions on the agricultural or other products of the United States, which, in view of the free introduction of sugar, molasses, tea, coffee, and hides into the United States, he may deem to be reciprocally unjust or unreasonable".[2]

The tariff act of 1890 placed before the American people without disguise the question whether they wished a large extension of the protective system.[3] A decisive answer was given in the congressional elections, which came thirty days after the passage of the McKinley Bill; the Democrats won a decisive victory. "Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, Kansas, and Nebraska elected forty-four Democrats and Independents, and fifteen Republicans and eighteen Demo-

[2] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, pp. 4–23; Taussig's *A Tariff History of the United States,* pp. 256–278.

[3] Taussig's *A Tariff History of the United States,* pp. 277–283.

crats in 1888. The Democrats gained a majority even in New England''.[4]

The chief cause of this political revolution was the rise in prices of retail commodities at the moment when the tariff bill was passed. These increases were due partly to necessary readjustments in trade, partly to increased cost of production, and partly to a concerted scheme on the part of retailers to secure an exceptional temporary profit before the tariff went into effect. The increase in prices furnished the Democratic speakers abundant campaign material, and they laid heavy emphasis on the new burdens placed upon the laboring man by the tariff. The Republican discussion as to prices was contradictory, the old and traditional argument being that protection ultimately resulted in lower prices. Beginning with the campaign of 1888, however, the position was taken that prices might be too low, that cheap prices meant cheap men, and cheap men meant a cheap country. Some attempts were also made to show that the new tariff was not solely responsible for higher prices by explaining that the rise was caused by short crops and an increased demand for goods by business which was improved under the stimulus of the new law.[5]

The House, which was Democratic, did not attempt to adopt a general tariff measure, but instead passed a number of "popgun" bills which placed such articles as wool, cotton ties, and binding twine on the free list. These bills naturally died in the Republican Senate and were important only as an indication of the policy of the Democrats, if they should again gain full power.[6]

The tariff question was still unsettled in the spring of

[4] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897* (*The American Nation: A History*, Vol. XXIV), p. 181.

[5] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 179–181.

[6] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, pp. 206–212.

1892. A symposium appearing in *The North American Review* in March, 1892, on "Issues of the Presidential Campaign" contained articles written by seven of the prominent leaders of both parties. Each of these stated what he considered would be the most important issues in the coming campaign, each mentioned the tariff as an issue, and five of them considered it to be the paramount issue.[7]

The Republicans had suffered an overwhelming defeat on the issue of protection in 1890, but they were unwilling to give up their stand on the issue, for they believed that the election of 1890 had come too soon after the passage of the McKinley Bill to give the measure a chance to demonstrate its value. They won in a number of State elections in 1891 and were encouraged to think that the people might reverse the verdict of 1890 in the presidential election of 1892. The Democrats, on the other hand, were jubilant over their victory in 1890 and felt that they had an excellent chance to capture the entire national government in the next general election on the tariff issue.

The tariff had a direct relation to the political situation in Iowa, for the general tendency in each political campaign was to stress the tariff in the country as a whole rather than in a certain section which it might be expected to benefit particularly. The Republicans maintained that the tariff benefited the country as a whole and brought prosperous conditions to all, whereas the Democrats, as might have been expected, denied that the protective tariff system either caused an increase of wages or maintained the scale of wages, and denounced it as a tax the greater

[7] *The North American Review,* Vol. CLIV, pp. 257–280. The Democratic contributors were: W. C. P. Breckinridge, Representative from Kentucky; Richard P. Bland, Representative from Missouri; and Benton McMillan, Representative from Tennessee. The Republicans were: Eugene Hale, Senator from Maine; James McMillan, Senator from Michigan; Frank Hiscock, Senator from New York; and William R. Merriam, Governor of Minnesota.

part of which was paid indirectly to favored manufacturers. Certain sections of the McKinley Bill had been drawn up especially for the purpose of gaining support in the West; the reduction of the duty on sugar lowered the price of that commodity and proved popular with the consumer, while the reciprocity section was drawn up for the purpose of increasing farm markets and securing the support of the farmer. The claims for reciprocity were given a great impetus by the great increase in exports which took place immediately after the passage of the McKinley Bill.[8]

Another factor which must be considered in relation to the election of 1892 in Iowa is the Civil War issue. The Civil War traditions remained strong in Iowa long after the close of the war and were assiduously fanned by the partisan newspapers of the State. This issue played a considerable part in each presidential campaign and was said to have exerted an influence second only to the tariff in the presidential election of 1888 in Iowa.[9]

Indeed the soldier vote may have decided that election in the United States by swinging the doubtful States of Indiana and New York to Harrison, thus preventing the election of Cleveland,[10] who had aroused much opposition in Grand Army and partisan circles during his first term by his veto of the dependent soldiers' pension bill and hundreds of special pension acts and by his order restoring the Confederate battle flags to the South. The latter order had been withdrawn after intense opposition, but the bitter feeling aroused by this incident and the veto messages of Cleveland was so intense that he considered it inadvisable to address the Grand Army of the Republic in their next

[8] *United States Statistical Abstract,* 1900, p. 82.

[9] McMurry's *The Soldier Vote in the Election of 1888* in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. XVIII, pp. 4–24.

[10] Glasson's *Federal Military Pensions in the United States,* p. 225.

annual encampment for fear of being subjected to personal insult.[11] The record of Harrison, the Republican candidate in 1888, had furnished a marked contrast to Cleveland's record. Harrison was a Union veteran and had said in one of his campaign speeches that it was "no time to be weighing the claims of old soldiers with apothecary's scales." He was known to favor liberal pensions.[12]

When the Republicans came into power in 1889, they at once began to fulfil the promises which they had made to the soldiers during the campaign of 1888. President Harrison appointed a disabled veteran, James Tanner, as Commissioner of Pensions. Tanner had a reputation for personal honesty, but he was very enthusiastic about pensions and proceeded to distribute the surplus to the ex-soldiers on so liberal a scale that Secretary of Interior Noble halted his work. Tanner questioned Noble's control over him, but, upon being informed that he was insubordinate, resigned. Green R. Raum then succeeded Tanner as Commissioner of Pensions. Raum's low sense of official propriety was brought to light in the later investigations of the Pensions Bureau.[13] The scope and cost of soldier relief was further increased by the disability pension bill adopted by Congress, and signed by President Harrison on June 27, 1890, which required that pensions should be paid to all disabled men who had served three months or more in the Union army, regardless of whether they needed aid or not.[14]

[11] McElroy's *Grover Cleveland, the Man and the Statesman,* Vol. I, pp. 200–217.

[12] Editorial in the *Indianapolis Journal,* April 20, 1889, cited in Glasson's *Federal Military Pensions,* p. 224.

[13] Glasson's *Federal Military Pensions,* pp. 226–228.

[14] The total cost of pensions was slightly over eighty-two million dollars in 1888, but was raised to over one hundred and forty-four millions by 1891.—*Report of the Commissioner of Pensions,* 1917, pp. 20–30; Glasson's *Federal Military Pensions,* p. 273.

As the campaign of 1892 approached, it seemed probable that the soldiers as a class would tend to support the Republican party in return for its liberality in regard to pension appropriations, but it was also likely that others had begun to get disgusted with the scandals and extravagant expenditures of the Pensions Bureau and were ready to call a halt to further extension of pension relief. It was doubtful which party would profit from the pension policy of the Harrison administration. The Republicans would still have an opportunity to appeal to the other Civil War traditions and memories of the North in an effort to gain votes without danger of laying themselves open to charges of scandal or extravagance, as would be the case if they stressed the pension issue. These appeals had been used with considerable force in Iowa in previous elections and might be used again, for it was probably true that considerable war feeling still existed in the State.

The Republicans had always felt that they would gain political strength by virtue of the negro vote, and when they came into power in all the branches of the national government in 1889 for the first time since 1875, they attempted to pass a bill providing for Federal supervision and control over elections upon petition of five hundred voters in any local district.[15] This bill, though not sectional on the face of it, was really aimed at the South where the negroes were deprived of their ballot. The Democrats at once called this measure the "Force Bill". The South was bitterly opposed to the measure and as their opposition grew northern commercial interests which had invested considerable capital in the South became alarmed and used their influence against it. The bill passed the House but was allowed to die in the Senate.[16]

[15] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1890, p. 207.

[16] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* pp. 167–170.

The Force Bill gave the Democratic leaders a useful issue to hold the South, whose traditional adherence to the Democratic party was being threatened by the growth of the People's party in that section. It is probable that this issue had very little effect in the election in Iowa, since Iowa had very few negroes, and would not be likely to have more than a partisan interest in the measure.

Another important issue in the election of 1892 in Iowa was the prohibition question. This issue exercised considerable political influence in the State during the eighties and early nineties. The Republican party in 1879 adopted a plank calling for a State prohibitory amendment. When a constitutional amendment prohibiting the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors in the State, which had been passed by popular vote in 1882, was thrown out by the courts on the ground of defects in the legislative record and procedure, the Republican legislature passed a prohibitory law.[17]

The Democrats opposed this law and advocated a license system. As the prohibition law proved to be hard to enforce, the pendulum of public opinion swung gradually toward the Democratic view. When the Democrats elected Horace Boies Governor in 1889, the Republican newspapers with almost complete unanimity assigned prohibition as one of the leading causes for the Republican defeat, although the lack of popularity of Hutchinson, the Republican candidate, and the attitude of Governor Larrabee toward the railroads were mentioned as contributing factors.[18]

The reaction against the prohibitory law increased dur-

[17] Clark's *History of Liquor Legislation in Iowa* in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. VI, pp. 72–87.

[18] Clark's *History of Liquor Legislation in Iowa* in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. VI, pp. 563–575; Cole's *A History of the People of Iowa*, pp. 474–476.

ing the early nineties, but the Republicans blocked all action against the law during the first four years of the decade. The prohibitory question was again the leading issue in the State campaign of 1891, the Republicans standing for the enforcement of the law, the Democrats demanding a license system, and the newly formed People's party condemning both parties for "the constant effort to reopen the temperance question in this state, to the exclusion of the grave economic questions which now confront the people". The Prohibitionists also nominated a candidate and adopted a platform favoring both State and national prohibitory amendments, and the establishment of a State constabulary to enforce the prohibitory law in the rebellious counties which were not enforcing the law.[19] The Democrats won a more decisive victory than in 1889, electing their entire State ticket. Since the question of prohibition had been one of the chief issues of the campaign, the election clearly indicated that the people were becoming more dissatisfied with prohibition.[20] The Republican leaders again attributed their defeat to prohibition and began to wonder if it would not be advisable to drop an issue which had been repudiated by the people.[21] Following the election, a conference representing all factions of the party was held at Sioux City, and a movement was inaugurated to harmonize the party on the prohibition question. The conference favored a repeal of the prohibitory law and the passage of a local option law or a resubmission of prohibition to the vote of the people.[22]

Strenuous efforts were made to enact liquor laws in the

[19] *Iowa Official Register,* 1892, pp. 163, 164, 167, 172–175.

[20] Clark's *History of Liquor Legislation in Iowa* in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. VI, p. 587.

[21] Cole's *A History of the People of Iowa,* p. 48.

[22] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), November 27, 1891.

General Assembly in 1892, but little was done. A local option bill known as the "Gatch Bill" did pass the Senate but did not get through the House, where the Republicans had a majority and the prohibitory sentiment was stronger.[23] Opinion in the State was divided on the question of prohibition. While the legislature was still in session in 1892, an enthusiastic temperance meeting was held at Mount Pleasant, where strong opposition to the Gatch local option bill was expressed;[24] but a few weeks later, a conference of anti-prohibition Republicans met in Des Moines and appointed a committee to confer with the Republican House caucus and ask for a bill similar to the Gatch bill. Those attending the conference pledged themselves to "use every influence" to induce the Republican party to discontinue the policy of prohibition as a party measure.[25]

It is clear that the prohibition question was a troublesome one for the Republican party. They had lost the last two State elections on this issue, but they were still afraid that they would lose the support of the temperance element in their party if they abandoned the issue, for the State Temperance Union was active and would not hesitate to support a third party if the Republicans abandoned prohibition.

Civil service reform was an issue in the election of 1892 in Iowa, although a careful perusal of the Iowa newspapers leads to the conclusion that the issue did not play a very important part in the canvass in this State. Civil service reform seems to have been considered more or less of a "highbrow" movement which would attract certain circles in the East but did not appeal to the West.

[23] Clark's *History of Liquor Legislation in Iowa* in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. VI, pp. 588, 589.

[24] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 4, 1892.

[25] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), April 1, 1892.

The election of 1884 had brought out the existence of a small group of enthusiastic reformers who cared more for civil service reform than for party allegiance. These Mugwumps are credited by many with having in that year caused the election of Cleveland because they doubted the good faith of Blaine and considered Cleveland the more thorough reformer.[26] Cleveland's action in regard to civil service reform was not entirely satisfactory to the independents, reformers, and Mugwumps, and he received the support of only a part of them in 1888.[27]

President Harrison came into office on a platform which favored an extension of the reform system, but, like Cleveland, he found his intentions frustrated by the insatiable demands of office-seekers. He reorganized the system, however, and appointed Theodore Roosevelt, a vigorous fighter for reform, as chairman of the Civil Service Commission.[28] In 1891 he placed a portion of the Indian bureau and in 1892 the Fish Commission on the classified service list,[29] while Secretary of the Navy Tracy extended the reform to the skilled and unskilled workers of the navy yards.[30] On the other hand, President Harrison was accused of surrendering to such party bosses as Mathew S. Quay of Pennsylvania — who was supposed to have dictated the appointment of John Wanamaker as Postmaster General — Thomas C. Platt of New York, and William Mahone of Virginia. The appointment of James S. Clarkson of Iowa as First Assistant Postmaster General aroused

[26] Fish's *The Civil Service and the Patronage*, p. 222.

[27] Curtis's *Orations and Addresses*, Vol. II, p. 347; Foulke's *Fighting the Spoilsmen*, p. 47.

[28] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 147, 148.

[29] *Annual Report of the United States Civil Service Commission*, 1891, p. 3, cited in Fish's *The Civil Service and the Patronage*.

[30] Curtis's *Orations and Addresses*, Vol. II, pp. 503, 504.

suspicion which he quickly justified by changing thirty thousand officials in a single year, earning for himself the title of "headsman". Clarkson was soon dismissed from office, but removals did not entirely cease,[31] and by April, 1890, 35,800 removals had been made, about 15,000 more than in the previous administration.[32]

The reformers were less charitable to Harrison than to Cleveland because of his more explicit pledges to civil service reform, and they accused the Republicans of celebrating the success of their "party with a wild debauch of spoils in which their 'promises and pledges' were the meats and drinks which were consumed."[33] They were even less satisfied with Harrison's administration than with Cleveland's, and, while their strength was not numerically great, they constituted an important element in such doubtful States as New York and Indiana, where a few votes might decide the electoral votes. In 1892, therefore, the party which could secure the votes of this group would have an excellent chance to carry these doubtful States if the election should prove to be at all close.

Economic conditions have considerable influence on political events. If the country is prosperous, with high wages, plenty of work, and good prices for farm products, the average voter is likely to be satisfied with conditions as they are and will continue to support the party in power. If the reverse is true, the voter begins to look for the cause of the hard times and will often, justly or unjustly, attribute the bad economic conditions to the party in power and give his support to the opposing party. It will, therefore, be necessary to look at the economic conditions in Iowa just before the election of 1892 in order

[31] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 150–152.

[32] Fish's *The Civil Service and the Patronage*, p. 224.

[33] Curtis's *Orations and Addresses*, Vol. II, p. 503.

to understand the economic factors which affected the election.

The creation of various agrarian organizations such as alliances, wheels, and leagues, during the eighties showed that there was more underlying discontent among the farmers than was apparent to the superficial observer. These organizations were nonpolitical when formed, but they furnished the nucleus for the organization of a third party when the idea that a new political party was necessary to secure the demands of the agricultural class gained enough strength. Conditions gradually became more favorable for the forming of a new party, until the discontent burst out in the early nineties in the People's party.[34]

The chief cause of the agricultural discontent was the rapid decline in prices of agricultural products, which came as a result of the changes in methods of agriculture and manufacturing following the Civil War. The introduction of labor-saving machinery and the development of the railroads in the West which threw new land open to cultivation caused a rapid increase in the quantity of farm products and then a decline in prices.[35] The farmers attributed the results of this over production to other factors, such as transportation, land, and money. They considered the transportation rates so high that the railroads took the profits on their products and advocated legislation to control and regulate the railroads. The land policy was another grievance. The farmers were dissatisfied that much of the land was held by speculators who either held it for higher prices or sold part of it to the settler and kept the rest until its value was enhanced by the labor of the actual settler. The farmers also felt that interest rates

[34] Buck's *The Agrarian Crusade*, pp. 125–128.

[35] McVey's *The Populist Movement* in *Economic Studies of the American Association*, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 136.

were exorbitant and that there was not enough money. Short crops and low prices came together. The farmers, not considering how much more land was being cultivated each year, concluded that the railroads were getting the profits or else that money was so scarce that it became dear in terms of their products. They demanded railroad legislation or more money, either through the issuance of paper money or by the free and unlimited coinage of silver, or both railroad and financial legislation.[36]

Farm mortgages on western lands were constantly swelling during the eighties,[37] increasing the discontent among the farmers. Some of the more pessimistic felt that "the virgin soil of the West" was "rapidly ceasing to be the home and possession of the sturdy American freeman", who was becoming "but a tenant at will or a dependent upon the tender mercies of soulless corporations and absentee landlords".[38] Others pointed out that it was the mortgages that brought in the necessary capital for development and made it possible to settle the West so rapidly.[39] It was true that most of the Iowa mortgages were of the constructive and investment type and did not suggest either distress or frequent foreclosures.[40]

By the end of the eighties, Iowa had become a border State between the old and the new West, eastern Iowa being in the old and western Iowa in the new West. The discontent in the State as a whole was much less than in

[36] Woodburn's *Political Parties and Party Problems in the United States*, pp. 111, 112; Farmer's *The Economic Background of Frontier Populism* in *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. X, pp. 406–427.

[37] Mappin's *Farm Mortgages and the Small Farmer* in the *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. IV, p. 433.

[38] Goodloe's *Western Farm Mortgages* in *The Forum*, Vol. X, p. 255.

[39] Gleed's *Western Mortgages* in *The Forum*, Vol. IX, p. 105.

[40] Nixon's *The Economic Basis of the Populist Movement in Iowa* in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. XXI, p. 391.

States farther west.[41] In proportion to the value of farm products, the amount of real estate mortgage debts was much smaller in Iowa than in Kansas,[42] and the interest rates were also less than in the States farther west. The average rate of interest in Iowa in 1890 was 7.36 per cent, while that in Kansas was 8.15 per cent.[43] It seems probable that the most irritating feature of the mortgage system was the loan companies. "Companies located at St. Paul, Omaha, Des Moines, Kansas City, St. Joseph, Topeka, Denver, or Dallas, sometimes received as high as fifteen-per-cent commission on a five year loan, and for many years the home company never received less than ten per cent. The local agent exacted all he could above that amount".[44] A proof that Iowa was no longer a frontier State is found in the fact that during the decade of the eighties her population increased only 17.68 per cent, a per cent smaller than that of any other western or north central State except Ohio and Indiana.[45] During this period the increase of the population of Kansas was 43.27 per cent, of Nebraska 134.06, and of the Dakotas 278.41 per

[41] Mappin's *Farm Mortgages and the Small Farmer* in the *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. IV, p. 436.

[42] The real estate mortgage debt for Iowa was estimated to be $149,457,144 in 1890, while that of Kansas was estimated at $174,720,071.— *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Real Estate Mortgages, p. 59. The total value of Iowa farm products was estimated at $159,347,844 in 1889, and those of Kansas at $95,070,080.— *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Farms, Live Stock and Animal Products, p. 703.

[43] The average interest rate in Nebraska was 8.22, in Arizona 12.61, in California 8.78, in Colorado 9.23, in Idaho 10.55, in Minnesota 8.18, in Montana 10.97, in Nevada 9.63, in New Mexico 10.05, in North Dakota 9.54, in Oregon 9.06, in South Dakota 9.52, in Wyoming 10.92, and in the United States as a whole 7.07 per cent.— *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Farms and Homes, pp. 83, 84.

[44] Gleed's *Western Mortgages* in *The Forum,* Vol. IX, pp. 95, 96; Gladden's *The Embattled Farmers* in *The Forum,* Vol. X, p. 317.

[45] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Population, p. xxxviii.

cent. In Iowa the important gains in population were made in the western and northwestern counties of the State.[46] This section also witnessed the greatest increase in the amount of real estate mortgages during this decade.[47] It was also in this section that the Populists made the greatest gains.

Kansas was the stronghold of the People's party during this period. This State had undergone a tremendous speculative real estate boom during the first half of the eighties. Then came the usual depression, which left the State under a huge load of public and private debts. This economic burden furnished the motive which led many of the farmers to leave the old parties and support the new People's party. It is said that "there was a very definite relation between the weight of the mortgage burden of a given section and the interest which it took in the (People's) movement".[48]

As has been pointed out, economic conditions were less favorable for the growth of the new party in Iowa. Iowa had a real estate debt much smaller in proportion to the total value of her agricultural products than Kansas, her interest rates were lower than those of Kansas and other western States, land values and population had not increased rapidly during the previous decade and the secured mortgages were largely of an investment and constructive type. Iowa was no longer a frontier State subject to the radicalism of a frontier section.[49]

[46] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Population, pp. 143–160.

[47] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Real Estate Mortgages, pp. 431–436.

[48] Miller's *The Background of Populism in Kansas* in *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* Vol. XI, pp. 469–489; Farmer's *The Economic Background of Frontier Populism* in *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* Vol. X, pp. 406–427.

[49] For a more complete analysis of the economic conditions in Iowa during this period see Nixon's *The Economic Basis of the Populist Movement in*

Iowa was still predominantly an agricultural State in 1892. Her most valuable agricultural products were corn, oats, and wheat, their value being in the order named. The prices on these cereals were higher in the early nineties than they had been during most of the previous decade,[50] and the total value of these three cereals for the State was much greater than during the last of the eighties.[51] It would seem probable that the Iowa farmer had less reason to be dissatisfied with his lot in 1892 than a few years previously, since his cereals had been worth more in 1890 and 1891 than they had been in the two previous years. The average farmer probably gave little consideration to the fact that the increased prices which he received for his bumper crops in 1891 were due more largely to the crop failures in Russia and France than to the protective policy of the Republican party.[52] He usually gave little heed to the causes of economic events and frequently did not understand them, when he did consider them.

Iowa in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. XXI, pp. 373–396.

[50] The price of corn in Iowa, which had been $.24 in 1888 and only $.19 in 1889, rose to $.41 in 1890 and remained at $.30 and $.32 respectively in 1891 and 1892; the price of wheat, which had been $.61 in 1887, $.85 in 1888, and only $.63 in 1889, rose to $.80 in 1890, increased another cent in 1891, but dropped to $.60 in 1892.—*Annual Report of the Secretary of Agriculture*, 1889 (Prices for years up to and including 1889), pp. 262, 263; *Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture*, 1894, p. 545.

[51] The total value of the corn, oats, and wheat raised in Iowa in 1887 was estimated at $98,447,950; in 1888 at $100,760,280; in 1889 at $94,651,781; in 1890 at $137,664,190; in 1891 at $154,278,427; and in 1892 at $93,334,471.—*Annual Report of the Secretary of Agriculture*, 1888, pp. 428, 429, 1889, pp. 207, 211, 216, 225, 1890, pp. 297, 299, 301, 1891, pp. 120, 414, 417. It must be borne in mind that the 1892 crop was harvested only a short time before the election took place, and doubtless in many cases was not sold until after the election was over. The light crop and lower prices of that year would therefore be likely to have little influence on the election.

[52] Noyes's *Forty Years of American Finance*, pp. 161, 162.

Closely connected with the agrarian discontent in the Middle West was the currency question. This had not been a distinct issue in 1888, although the Republican platform declared in favor of the use of both gold and silver as money and condemned "the policy of the Democratic administration in its efforts to demonetise silver".[53] There was considerable support for the free and unlimited coinage of silver during this period, as is shown by the fact that bills providing for it were passed by the United States Senate at three different times during the period from 1889 to 1892 inclusive.[54] It was feared that the western silver men might refuse to agree to the McKinley tariff or, worse yet, desert the Republican party, unless granted some concessions. Accordingly the Republicans passed the compromise bill known as the Sherman Silver Purchase Act.[55] The new law was bound to be an embarrassment to commerce and to public finance, for it added a new form of treasury notes issued against the inert bullion in the treasury, and further muddled the already confused "hodge-podge of legal-tender greenbacks, gold certificates, silver certificates, national bank-notes, as well as gold and silver coin". At the same time, it did not affect the waning fortunes of silver, which continued to drop steadily.[56]

Within a year after the passage of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, the gold reserve in the Federal treasury dropped dangerously near the accepted minimum of $100,000,000. The act was partly responsible for this, but

[53] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1888, p. 185.

[54] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1890, pp. 148, 149, 1892, pp. 27–30, 217–219.

[55] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 226–228; Noyes's *Forty Years of American Finance*, pp. 141, 142.

[56] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 228–230.

other causes aided in lowering the gold reserve. Among these was the disturbance in the money markets of Europe caused by the collapse of Argentine credit in 1890 which forced foreign nations especially England to sell many of her securities in this country and demand payment for them in gold. Gold was constantly being exported in 1891 and 1892, with a corresponding decline in the treasury reserves.[57] To the above causes must be added the increased expenditures of the "billion-dollar" Congress, which aided in pushing the treasury nearer and nearer the danger line of an exhausted reserve.[58]

It was probably fortunate for the Republican party that the crop failures in France and Russia in 1891 forced them to buy American grain at a good price, for the supply of gold sent us in payment increased the gold in the country and prevented a run on the reserve in the treasury. If this crop failure had not occurred it is probable that the financial panic woud have come before the election, instead of in 1893.

PARTIES AND CONVENTIONS

For only two of the eight years prior to the election of 1892 were the presidency and both houses of Congress in the hands of the same party. The Democrats controlled both the presidency and the House of Representatives from 1885 to 1889, but were in the minority in the Senate; they lost control of all three branches in 1889, but regained control of the House in 1891. In 1892 the Republicans controlled the presidency and the Senate, but were greatly in the minority in the House.[59] Both parties seemed

[57] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 252, 253; Noyes's *Forty Years of American Finance*, pp. 161, 162.

[58] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, p. 182.

[59] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1886, pp. 130–132, 1888, pp. 89–91, 1890, pp. 245, 248, 1892, pp. 194–196.

hopeful of success in 1892, but neither seemed entirely satisfied with the men who had headed their national tickets in 1888.

Attention has been called to the fact that Harrison's administration had not found favor with either the civil service reformers or the politicans in the Republican party. The leader who had won the support of these politicians was James G. Blaine. It is probable that Blaine could have had the nomination of his party in 1888 if he had wished it, but since he had declined to be a candidate, Harrison had been nominated. Blaine had been selected by Harrison as Secretary of State in 1889 and conducted the business of that department during the first three years of Harrison's administration. As the time for the presidential nomination for 1892 approached, rumors that the President and his Secretary of State were not in accord were common, and by 1891 there were signs that an effort would be made in the convention to nominate Blaine for President.[60]

The drama of 1888 was repeated. Mr. Blaine in a letter to James S. Clarkson, chairman of the Republican National Committee, dated February 6, 1892, announced that he was not a candidate for the Republican nomination and that his name would not appear before the nominating convention.[61] Different interpretations were placed on this letter. The Iowa Democratic papers at once announced that this letter put Blaine out of the race and predicted that Harrison would secure the nomination,[62] but many of

[60] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* pp. 238, 239.

[61] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* February 11, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), February 11, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly), February 12, 1892.

[62] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), February 17, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* February 18, 1892.

the Iowa Republican papers were not willing to admit the defeat of the Blaine boom.[63] There was a feeling that Blaine should be nominated for President and it was evident to his friends that this must be done in 1892, if he were ever to secure the honor.[64] But it seemed doubtful if he would secure the nomination unless he made a hard fight for it, and this Blaine would not do.

The Iowa Republican State Convention to select delegates to the national convention was held at Des Moines on March 16, 1892.[65] A. B. Cummins, who had stood aloof from his party on the prohibition issue, was selected by Clarkson for temporary chairman of the convention. His appointment was bitterly opposed by the Prohibitionists and some regular Republicans,[66] and anti-Cummins delegates were chosen to the State convention by the Republicans of Polk County.[67] Isaac S. Struble, "A pronounced, conspicnous, and uncompromising prohibitionist", was chosen permanent chairman of the convention.[68] The State convention adopted a platform endorsing Harrison's administration, protection, reciprocity, and the maintenance of a sound currency, and chose four delegates at large to the

[63] "The Iowa Sentiment is almost unanimously for Blaine".— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 4, 1892. Blaine "is the only man for the Republican party to nominate".— *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), February 11, 1892. *The Iowa State Register* estimated that Blaine would poll 10,000 more votes in Iowa than any other candidate and that he would poll about that number of votes more than any other man in all the other States.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 4, 1892.

[64] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 238, 239; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), June 2, 1892.

[65] *The Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), March 23, 1892.

[66] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, January 14, 1892.

[67] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, March 17, 1892.

[68] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), August 17, 1892.

national convention,[69] all of whom were uninstructed.[70] Delegates were also chosen in the congressional district conventions, and in a number of cases were instructed for Harrison.[72]

On June 4, 1892, three days before the gathering of the Republican National Convention, which was held at Minneapolis, Blaine resigned his secretaryship. No explanation for his action was given in his curt note of resignation, and Harrison's acceptance of his resignation was equally curt. Friends of the Secretary attributed his resignation to ill-health, to unjust criticism heaped upon him, to disagreement with the President over questions of public policy. Others construed the resignation as a sign that he was willing to accept the nomination untrammelled by considerations of loyalty to the President.[73]

As the time for the meeting of the convention approached, it was still doubtful who would be nominated for the presidency. Chairman Clarkson worked for the nomination of Blaine,[74] and filled the convention hall with plumes and banners in the hope of stampeding the delegates to Blaine,[75] while Marcus A. Hanna opened head-

[69] The delegates at large were John S. Gear, E. E. Mack, D. C. Chase, and J. S. Clarkson.— *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), March 23, 1892.

[70] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 25, 1892.

[71] *Spirit Lake Beacon,* May 27, 1892.

[72] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* pp. 240, 241.

[73] Dunning's *Record of Political Events* in *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. VII, p. 764; Rhodes's *History of the United States from Hayes to McKinley, 1877–1896,* pp. 380–382.

[74] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* June 1, 1892.

[75] Muzzey's *The United States of America,* Vol. II, p. 238. Clarkson claimed after the convention was over, that they could have beaten Harrison, if they had had positive assurance that Mr. Blaine would accept the nomination, or if he had not resigned from the cabinet. He states that they did not have positive assurance that Blaine would accept the nomination, until the

quarters for McKinley at his own expense, in a hotel close by.[76] When the time came for the nomination, it took only one ballot to choose Harrison as the Republican candidate for the presidency, the vote standing Harrison, 535 5/6; Blaine, 182 1/6; McKinley, 182; Reed, 4; and Robert Lincoln, 1. The Iowa delegation gave 20 votes to Harrison, 5 to Blaine, and 1 to McKinley. Whitelaw Reid of New York was then nominated for Vice President by acclamation.[77]

The Democrats were also divided at the beginning of the canvass for the nomination. The leading candidates were Ex-President Grover Cleveland and Senator David B. Hill of New York. Cleveland had returned to the practice of law after his defeat in 1888. His popularity increased during this period as he from time to time by letter and by speech expressed his opinions on political questions. Despite differences within his party he never varied from his previous convictions either as to silver or the tariff.[78] Agitation for his renomination began as early as 1889 and was given a powerful impetus by the congressional elections of 1890, which were won on Cleveland's tariff issue.[79] Cleveland's availability, however, was questioned early in 1891, after the publication of his Ellery Anderson letter, in which he sharply denounced "the dangerous and reckless experiment of free, unlimited, and independent silver coinage". This letter caused a storm of denunciation for a short

Saturday preceding the nomination, and it was then too late.— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* June 15, 1892.

[76] Muzzey's *The United States of America,* Vol. II, p. 238; Croly's *Marcus Alonzo Hanna, Life and Work,* pp. 165, 166.

[77] *Proceedings of the Tenth Republican National Convention,* pp. 3–141, 148; *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia,* 1892, pp. 749, 750.

[78] Peck's *Twenty Years of the Republic,* pp. 252–257; Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* p. 241.

[79] Parker's *Recollections of Grover Cleveland,* pp. 128, 132.

time,[80] but the defeat of the Democrats in Ohio and other States in 1891, where silver coinage was made the leading issue, made it clear that if the Democrats were to win in 1892, it must be on the issue of tariff reform, and on this issue Cleveland stood supreme. On silver "we believe him to be wrong", said Senator Vest, "but honestly wrong, and he has as much right to his opinion as we have to ours. He can be elected on the issue of tariff reform; every Democrat should be willing to postpone the silver question to prevent Republican success."[81]

Cleveland's chief opponent, Senator Hill, had been favored by a record of seven successive victories, although his progress had been difficult. He was an extreme partisan, constantly engaged in political warfare in his own State, and his dependence upon Tammany Hall awakened distrust and convinced many that he was insincere. Moreover, he had been accused of "stealing" the State Senate by coercing county clerks to return fraudulent certificates of election. Hill displayed unexampled adroitness in his efforts to retain control of the machine in New York.[82] He was accused of using questionable methods in securing the New York delegation for himself; he called the State convention of the Democratic party in New York, in February, 1892, far in advance of the usual time in order to take the supporters of Cleveland by surprise, and to influence the action of delegate conventions in other States. His plan was successful so far as the New York delegates were concerned, but the Cleveland supporters held a convention of

[80] Parker's *Recollections of Grover Cleveland,* pp. 151, 152.

[81] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* p. 243.

[82] *The American Review of Reviews,* Vol. V, pp. 26–36; Anan's *Another View of Mr. Hill* in *The Nation,* Vol. LIV, p. 26, passim; Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* pp. 241, 242.

their own and chose Cleveland delegates. While these delegates were not recognized in the national convention, they showed that Hill's method had aroused opposition in his own State.[83] In spite of the methods used by Hill to secure the New York delegation, some seemed to think that Cleveland's candidacy was doomed since his own State had not declared for him. Henry Watterson, editor of the *Louisville Courier Journal,* and one of the influential Democratic leaders of the time, wrote that the selection of Cleveland "as the Democratic standard-bearer, if such a thing were under the circumstances conceivable, would be, on the part of National Democracy, an act of deliberate suicide."[84] Other men who were frequently mentioned for the nomination were Horace Boies, who had been twice elected Governor of the Republican State of Iowa and would go well in the silver States of the West,[85] and Senator Arthur P. Gorman of Maryland.

The Iowa Democratic State Convention to select delegates to the national convention was held at Sioux City on May 11, 1892. John C. Bills, a man who had recently deserted the Republican party, was temporary chairman.[86] The Iowa delegates were instructed to work for the nomination of Horace Boies, and were given no second choice. The platform adopted declared that tariff reform was the

[83] Coudert's *The Democratic Revolt in New York* in *The Forum,* Vol. XIII, pp. 167–178; Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* p. 242.

[84] *The Editorials of Henry Watterson; Compiled with an Introduction and Notes by Arthur Krock,* p. 72. Watterson held that both Cleveland and Hill should stand aside, because Cleveland was weak in New York and strong elsewhere, while Hill was strong in New York and weak elsewhere. He favored Senator Carlisle of Kentucky.— Editorials in *Louisville Courier Journal,* quoted in *The Editorials of Henry Watterson; Compiled with an Introduction and Notes by Arthur Krock.*

[85] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* May 26, 1892, passim.

[86] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), May 19, 1892.

fundamental issue of the campaign, but it also placed the party on record as favoring equal free bimetallic coinage.[87]

The Democratic National Convention met at Chicago, Illinois, on June 21st. Cleveland, Hill and Boies were nominated on the floor of the convention. The Hill men carried the fight to the bitter end and pleaded from the floor of the convention for recognition of the claims of the Democrats of New York. The Iowa delegates worked hard in an effort to secure the nomination of Boies, but Cleveland was nominated on the first ballot, receiving 613 1/3 votes to Hill's 114 and Boies's 103, with the other 75 1/6 votes scattered among a number of candidates. Cleveland's vote was only 10 2/3 above the necessary two-thirds majority. Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois was nominated for Vice President on the second ballot.[88]

The People's party was also an important factor in the election of 1892. The agrarian discontent and the unrest which had been gathering during the eighties had found expression in the political campaign of 1890. The Farmers' Alliances took considerable part in this campaign, suiting their political activities to local necessities. In many southern States, Alliance men took possession of the Democratic conventions and forced both the incorporation of their demands in the platforms and the nomination of candidates who agreed to support these demands. They were fairly successful in the South in 1890, securing control of five legislatures, and electing three Governors, one United States Senator, and forty-four Congressmen — including the fourteen elected in Missouri on the Union-Labor ticket. In the West, the Alliance men worked by themselves and

[87] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), May 20, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), May 19, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, June 25, 1892.

[88] *Official Proceedings of the National Democratic Convention*, 1892, pp. 27, 59; *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1892, pp. 750–753.

created a new party. In 1890 they secured control of two State legislatures and elected two United States Senators and eight Congressmen.[89]

Five conventions were connected with the early history of the People's party. The first was held at St. Louis and accomplished a union between the farmers' organizations and the Knights of Labor under the name of the Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union; the second was at Ocala, Florida, on December 7, 1890; and a third convention, held at Cincinnati, Ohio, on May 19, 1891, saw the launching of the new party. This convention was attended by 1400 delegates, three-fourths of whom were from Kansas, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Nebraska. The "People's Party of the United States" was formed, and resolutions were adopted calling for a conference of "all progressive organizations" at Cincinnati on February 22, 1892. A national committee was authorized "if no satisfactory coalition with other reform organizations could be affected, to call a convention of the People's party for the nomination of a President, to be held not later than June 14, 1892". The platform adopted was similar to those adopted at the St. Louis and Ocala conventions.[90] The fourth convention was held at St. Louis on February 22, 1892. This was the preliminary convention for the selection of a national committee with the power to call a national convention to nominate candidates for President and Vice President. The convention was featured by a contest for supremacy be-

[89] Buck's *The Agrarian Crusade,* pp. 133–138; Drew's *The Present Farmers Movement* in the *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. VI, p. 307; *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia,* 1890, p. 301; Haynes's *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War,* p. 237.

[90] *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia,* 1892, p. 832; Haynes's *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War,* p. 247; McVey's *The Populist Movement* in *Economic Studies of the American Economic Association,* Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 136–139; Buck's *The Agrarian Crusade,* pp. 140, 141.

tween the southern Alliance and some of the northern members, which ended in victory for the northern faction.[91]

The Iowa People's party held their State convention to choose delegates to the national convention at Des Moines on June 7th. The backward spring interfered with the attendance, for many of the farmers were busy. Only about two hundred and fifty attended, one hundred of whom were from Des Moines. Among the prominent men in attendance were General James B. Weaver and J. F. Willits, national lecturer of the Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union. A platform was adopted and General Weaver was recommended to the Omaha convention for the Populist nomination for President.[92]

The first national nominating convention of the People's party was held at Omaha on July 2, 1892. Thirteen hundred and sixty-six delegates attended the convention. Nominations were postponed for a number of hours until definite word could be secured from Judge Walter Q. Gresham, a prominent Republican, whom Hayes and Powderly, of the Knights of Labor, hoped to nominate. He had gained poularity with the Populists because of a number of railroad decisions. When he refused to accept a nomination under any terms, the convention proceeded to nominate a candidate. General Weaver and Senator James H. Kyle were placed in nomination. The balloting was "a struggle between the 'new blood', represented by Senator Kyle of South Dakota, and the 'old guard' of the Greenbackers represented by General Weaver". Weaver was

[91] McVey's *The Populist Movement* in *Economic Studies of the American Economic Association*, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 140; Haynes's *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War*, p. 257; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 4, 1892; *Clinton Weekly Age*, February 26, 1892.

[92] J. Belangee was temporary chairman and F. F. Roe permanent chairman. — *Clinton Weekly Age*, June 10, 1892; *Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), June 10, 17, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, June 9, 1892.

nominated with 995 votes to 265 for Kyle. New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Maryland, and South Carolina were not represented in the balloting. General James G. Field of Virginia was nominated for Vice President over Ben Terrill of Texas.[93] The nomination of Weaver was probably an error on the part of the Populists, since he had been connected with unsuccessful third party movements for so long that his nomination did not excite much hope or enthusiasm.[94]

The Prohibition party was also active in Iowa during this election. At the sixteenth annual meeting of the Iowa State Temperance Alliance held at Des Moines in the spring of 1892, the Gatch bill was roundly scored. President Harvey of the State Alliance made a speech in which he attributed the Republican defeat in the State election of 1891 to their indifference on the prohibition question.[95] The State Prohibition party held its annual State convention at Des Moines on June 1, 1892. One hundred delegates representing forty counties were reported present. Pledges were taken for carrying on the expense of the coming campaign and about $600 was raised. A platform was adopted, delegates were chosen to the national convention, and State candidates were nominated.[96] The Prohibition national convention was held at Cincinnati, Ohio, on June 29th. John Bidwell of California was nominated for President on the

[93] Haynes's *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War,* pp. 261, 262; *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia,* 1892, p. 753; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 8, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 7, 1892; McVey's *The Populist Movement* in *Economic Studies of the American Economic Association,* Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 143–150; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, pp. 269–272.

[94] Buck's *The Agrarian Crusade,* pp. 145, 146; Haynes's *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War,* p. 264.

[95] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 4, 1892.

[96] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* June 9, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), June 3, 1892.

first ballot, and J. B. Cranfill of Texas for Vice President on the second ballot.[97]

The Socialist labor party also placed a ticket in some States, but did not develop very much strength in the country as a whole, and did not seem even to have placed their candidates on the ballot in Iowa.[98]

An analysis of the various platforms brings out the principal issues of the campaign. The Republicans and Democrats considered the tariff as the principal issue. The Democratic platform denounced "Republican protection as a fraud, a robbery of the great majority of the American people for the benefit of the few", and asserted that the Federal government had no constitutional power to levy tariff duties, "except for the purpose of revenue only". The McKinley tariff was denounced as "the culminating atrocity of class legislation" which had resulted in the reduction of wages and the mortgaging of the farms and homes of the country. Reciprocity was favored, but "the sham reciprocity" of the McKinley bill was denounced. Trusts and combinations were described by the Democrats as a natural consequence of the protective tariff, and further legislation for their control was demanded.[99]

The Republican platform took an opposite stand and re-

[97] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, pp. 271, 272; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 8, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* July 6, 1892; *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia,* 1892, p. 754.

[98] Eight delegates of the party representing the five States — New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania — met for their national convention in New York on August 28th and nominated Simeon Wing, a tailor from Massachusetts, for President and a Mr. Matchett, a carpenter of Brooklyn, for Vice President. A platform was drawn up.— *The Quarterly Review of Current History,* Vol. II, pp. 276, 277. The party polled only 21,534 votes in the country as a whole in November.— McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1894, p. 272.

[99] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* pp. 160–162; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, pp. 264, 265.

affirmed "the American doctrine of protection". Duties "equal to the difference between wages abroad and at home" should be levied on "all imports coming into competition with the products of American labor", but all articles which could not be produced in the United States, except luxuries, should be admitted free. Reciprocity was declared a success, and it was affirmed that "our present laws will eventually give us control of the trade of the world." Trusts and combinations of capital were denounced and laws for their regulation were demanded.[100]

The minor platforms laid less stress on the tariff. The platform of the People's party denounced both major parties for proposing "to drown the outcries of a plundered people with a sham battle over the tariff",[101] while the Prohibition platform affirmed that a "tariff should be levied only as a defense against foreign governments which levy tariff upon or bar out our products from their markets, revenue being only incidental".[102]

There was no clear cut issue between the two major parties in regard to the currency question. They were both badly split on this issue, for each had a strong silver wing and a strong gold wing. The Democrats could not consistently endorse free silver with Cleveland, who opposed the free coinage of that metal, as their candidate, while the Republicans feared they would lose the support of the western States if they adopted an out and out gold platform. So each party adopted a plank which was designed

[100] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* pp. 173, 174; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, p. 261.

[101] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* p. 167; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, p. 269.

[102] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* p. 170; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, p. 271. The Socialist Labor platform is omitted, since that party did not enter the contest in Iowa. For their platform see Porter's *National Party Platforms,* pp. 177–180.

to hold both elements in line. The Democrats denounced the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890, but did not say what they would put in its place. They declared "for the coinage of both gold and silver without discriminating against either metal", but added that "the dollar unit of coinage of both metals must be of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value", to be adjusted through international agreement or legislation if necessary. They also recommended the repeal of the 10 per cent tax on State bank notes.[103] The Republican platform declared that "the Republican party demands the use of both gold and silver as standard money, with such restrictions and under such provisions, to be determined by legislation" as will maintain the parity of the two metals. The steps already taken by the government to call an international monetary conference were commended.[104] Thus, the two parties favored the use of both gold and silver as money, but insisted that the parity of each must be maintained, and since the two metals would not remain at par in case of free coinage of silver, it was difficult to determine just what the platforms did favor.

The minor parties did not straddle this issue. The People's party platform called for the "free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold at the legal ratio of 16 to 1", and the increase of the circulating medium to "not less than $50 per capita". They also demanded a sub-treasury or a better plan of giving the people credit, and the establishment of postal savings banks. The Prohibition platform called for the issue of more money and demanded that

[103] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* p. 174; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, p. 261.

[104] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* p. 174; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, p. 261.

"the money of the country should consist of gold, silver, and paper".[105]

The war issues were still given a place in the rival platforms. The Democratic platform denounced the Force Bills as an "outrage of the electoral rights of the people in the several States", which if "sanctioned by law, would mean the dominance of a self-perpetuating oligarchy of office-holders". The Republican platform demanded "that every citizen of the United States shall be allowed to cast a free and unrestricted ballot in all public elections", which ballot "shall be counted and returned as cast". The political outrages in some of the Southern States were also denounced. The platform of the People's party stated that "the civil war is over and . . . . every passion and resentment which grew out of it must die with it", and included a statement opposing Federal control of elections in the States.[106]

The Republican platform pledged the party to a "watchful care and recognition" of the just claims of Union veterans, but the Democratic platform while expressing an appreciation "of the patriotism of the soldiers and sailors of the Union" and favoring "just and liberal pensions for all disabled Union soldiers, their widows and dependents", insisted that "the work of the Pension Office" should "be done industriously, impartially, and honestly", and denounced the Republican "administration of that office as incompetent, corrupt, disgraceful and dishonest." The supplementary platform of the People's party pledged the support of that party "to fair and liberal pensions to ex-Union soldiers and sailors", while the Prohibition party

[105] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 169, 170; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, p. 271.

[106] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 159, 160, 167, 174; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, pp. 261, 262, 264, 269, 270.

platform pledged that party to "grant just pensions to disabled veterans of the Union army and navy, their widows and orphans".[107]

All the party platforms mentioned the subject of civil service reform, but they were all so nearly alike in regard to this subject, that it is probable the only part that this issue played in the election was determined by candidates of the respective parties. The Democratic platform declared that "public office is a public trust" and called for the honest enforcement of all civil service laws, while the Republican platform commended "the spirit and evidence of reform in the civil service and the wise and consistent enforcement by the Republican party of the laws regulating the same. The Democratic platform declared that Federal office-holders had a practice of usurping the control of party conventions in the States and denounced this practice. The aid of the Federal office-holders in renominating Harrison at the Republican convention was also condemned.[108] The People's party platform stated that the party would favor a constitutional amendment placing all government employees under civil service to prevent the power of the national government from increasing, in case the government took over the ownership and management of the railroads.[109] The Prohibition platform denounced the records of both major parties and declared that each "protests when out of power against the infraction of the

[107] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 171, 177; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, pp. 262, 263, 270, 272. A supplementary platform was adopted by the People's party, the resolutions not being considered a part of the platform, but merely as resolutions expressive of the sentiment of the convention.— McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, p. 270.

[108] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 163, 176; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, pp. 262, 265.

[109] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 168, 169; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, p. 270.

civil-service laws, and each when in power violates those laws in letter and spirit''.[110]

The major party platforms contained the usual number of minor planks placed there as bait to attract certain small groups of voters. Each condemned the persecution of Jews and Lutherans in Russia, professed sympathy for the Irish in their struggle for home-rule, and favored the building of the Nicaragua Canal, the appropriation of money by Congress to support the World's Fair, and the passage of legislation restricting immigration to prevent the entrance of criminal, pauper, or contract labor. The Democratic platform favored excluding the Chinese. Both favored admitting the Territories to statehood at the earliest practicable moment, the Democrats stating that New Mexico and Arizona were ready for admission. Both endorsed legislation by Congress and the States to protect the lives and limbs of railway employees. The Republicans went further and urged the enactment of State laws protecting employees engaged in State commerce, mining, or manufacturing. The Democratic platform favored State laws abolishing convict labor, and prohibiting sweating systems and the employment of children under fifteen years of age. Both favored freedom of education; and the Democrats, probably having in mind the opposition to anti-parochial school laws in such States as Illinois and Wisconsin during the preceding few years, declared for no ''State interference with parental rights and rights of conscience in the education of children''. The Democratic platform also condemned all sumptuary laws, while the Republicans expressed sympathy ''with all wise and legitimate efforts to lessen and prevent the evils of intemperance and promote morality''. The Democratic platform denounced the Repub-

[110] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, p. 172; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, p. 272.

licans for having given away the people's lands to the railroads and other corporate interests, and approved of Federal aid for rivers and harbors, while the Republicans favored rural free delivery and one cent postage.[111]

The People's party platform, besides containing the planks mentioned above, contained a scathing arraignment of the old parties, which were declared to be proposing "to sacrifice our homes, lives, and children, on the altar of mammon; to destroy the multitude in order to secure corruption funds from the millionaires". The nation, it was asserted, was on "the verge of moral, political, and material ruin", with corruption everywhere, its newspapers "largely subsidized or muzzled", its "public opinion silenced, business prostrated, homes covered with mortgages, labor impoverished, and the land concentrating in the hands of capitalists". The platform demanded "the union of the labor forces of the United States", and declared that "wealth belongs to him who creates it", and that "every dollar taken from industry without an equivalent is robbery". It demanded government ownership and management of the railways, telephones, and telegraphs. Alien ownership of land should be prohibited, and all lands owned by aliens should be reclaimed and kept for actual settlers. The supplementary platform of the party contained a number of additional planks, such as a demand for a graduated income tax, a single term for the President and Vice President and the direct election of United States Senators. The ineffective laws against "contract labor", the hiring of standing armies like the Pinkertons, and the granting of any subsidy or "national aid to any private corporation for any purpose", were condemned.[112]

[111] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 163–165; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, pp. 262–266.

[112] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 166–169; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, pp. 269–271.

The Prohibition platform, in addition to denouncing "the liquor traffic as a foe to civilization, the arch enemy of popular government and a public nuisance", which should be abolished, declared for a number of other changes: woman suffrage; government control of railways, telegraphs, and telephones; a revision of our immigration laws; the prohibition of the ownership of land by aliens; the suppressing of mob law; the granting to every man of "one day of rest in seven"; arbitration in settling national differences; the suppression of speculating in margins; and the prohibition of the "appropriation of public funds for sectarian schools".[113] Emphasis was, of course, placed upon the opposition to the liquor traffic.

After the candidates had been nominated, and the national platforms adopted, the parties began to perfect their organizations for the campaign. Since Clarkson, who was chairman of the Republican National Committee, had worked for the nomination of Blaine instead of Harrison in the convention at Minneapolis, it was perhaps natural that Harrison should favor another man for the Republican campaign leader. At any rate when the Republican National Committee met at Washington on June 28th, Mr. Clarkson declined reëlection as chairman, presumably as a result of his conference with the President just before the meeting. The committee chose William J. Campbell of Chicago chairman, M. H. DeYoung of California as vice chairman, Thomas H. Carter of Montana as secretary, and Cornelius N. Bliss of New York treasurer.[114] Campbell served only a few weeks, and when he found it necessary to resign, Thomas H. Carter was elected to his place, Ex-Con-

[113] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* pp. 170–172; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, pp. 271, 272.

[114] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 1, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* June 30, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), July 6, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* July 2, 1892.

gressman McComas of Maryland being chosen to take Carter's place as secretary.[115]

The Iowa Republican State Convention assembled on June 29th in Des Moines. The platform adopted endorsed the national declaration of principles. The avoidance of any recognition of State issues, notably of the prohibition question, was the keynote of the convention. Candidates for the State offices which were to be filled in 1892 were W. M. McFarland for Secretary of State, Byron A. Beeson for Treasurer, John Y. Stone for Attorney General, C. G. McCarthy for Auditor, and G. W. Perkins for Railway Commissioner. To conciliate both Prohibitionists and anti-Prohibitionists, the electors at large were chosen from both factions, A. B. Cummins representing the "wets" and Milton Remley the prohibitionists.[116] James E. Blythe of Mason City, who had represented the Fourth District in the State Central Committee for many years, was appointed the new chairman of the Republican State Committee.[117]

One of the means used to arouse interest during the campaign was the organization of numerous Republican clubs throughout the State. A convention of the Republican clubs, which formed the Iowa Republican League, was called at Des Moines for June 28, 1892, while another meet-

[115] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 21, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* July 23, 1892. Carter had lived for a time in Iowa. It was claimed by the *Iowa State Press* that his past life contained a number of doubtful episodes.— *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), August 2, 1892.

[116] *Clinton Weekly Age,* July 1, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* July 2, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), August 17, 1892. McFarland, Beeson, and Stone were renominated for office.— *Iowa Official Register,* 1892, pp. 5–7.

[117] *Spirit Lake Beacon,* July 8, 1892.

[118] *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* June 13, October 22, November 5, 1892. It was announced that the Hon. R. M. LaFollette of Wisconsin, "the brilliant young orator who had made for himself a national reputation in the last Congress" would address the meeting, but his name is not included in the *Herald's* account of the meeting.

ing was called and met at Cedar Rapids on November 2, 1892. Johnson Brigham, president of the League, stated during his address at this meeting that the Iowa League of Republican Clubs had 20,000 members.[118] That the organization of the foreign voters was not entirely neglected is shown by the organization of a "Swedish Republican Political Club" at Clinton.[119] Candidates for the eleven congressional seats were nominated at the various Republican district conventions. The Republican congressmen in the third, seventh, tenth, and eleventh districts were renominated.[120]

The Democratic National Committee was also active. W. F. Harrity of Pennsylvania was chairman and S. P. Sheerin of New York secretary. The twenty-five members of the executive committee and the nine members of the campaign committee were appointed by Chairman Harrity on July 29th. Among the members of the executive committee was J. J. Richardson of Iowa.[121] On September 1st, representatives on the Democratic National Committee from Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin held a conference with Don M. Dickinson, chairman of the Campaign Committee, to lay plans for the Democratic "campaign of education" in the West.[122]

The Democrats of Iowa had been ably led for a number

[119] *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* October 22, 1892.

[120] *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, pp. 193–198. The Republican candidates were as follows: First District, John H. Gear; Second, John H. Munroe; Third, David R. Henderson; Fourth, Thomas Updegraff; Fifth, Robert G. Cousins; Sixth, John F. Lacey; Seventh, John A. Hull; Eighth, William P. Hepburn; Ninth, A. A. Hager; Tenth, J. P. Dolliver; and Eleventh, George R. Perkins.

[121] *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia,* 1892, p. 755; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* August 6, 1892.

[122] *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* September 3, 1892.

of years. A prominent Republican, writing in April, 1892, tells us that "the old 'bourbons' of the party have been retired and the young men have become leaders. Recruits from the Republican party have been given the places of honor. At the last state election (1891) the candidates for governor, lieutenant-governor, and supreme judge on the Democratic ticket were all men who had in recent years been Republicans".[123]

The Iowa Democratic State Convention met at Davenport on August 18th. A platform was adopted endorsing the Democratic national platform, and containing additional planks expressing sympathy with workingmen but denouncing violence. The platform favored popular election of United States Senators, denounced all societies which bring religious questions into politics, and reiterated the party's support of license and local option in regard to the prohibition question. The candidates selected for State offices were J. J. McConlogue for Secretary of State, S. P. Vandike for Auditor of State, Charles Ruegnitz for Treasurer, Ezra Willard for Attorney General and William G. Kent for Railway Commissioner. Charles Ruegnitz, the Democratic candidate for Treasurer, was a German, a fact which may have had some effect on the voters of that nationality. The chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee was Chas. D. Fullen and the secretary was J. E. Seevers.[124] The Democratic Congressmen in the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Districts were re-

[123] Irwin's *Is Iowa a Doubtful State?* in *The Forum*, Vol. XIII, pp. 257–264. Irwin was a prominent Iowa Republican. He had been Territorial Governor of Idaho and Mayor of Keokuk and was Governor of Arizona at the time this article was written.

[124] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, August 24, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, August 25, September 8, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald*, August 20, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), August 24, 31, 1892; *Iowa Official Register*, 1893, pp. 105, 106.

nominated for office.[125] In the Eleventh District, the Democratic congressional convention met at Cherokee on August 25th and endorsed the nomination of Daniel Campbell, who had been nominated by the People's party for the same office on the previous day.[126]

Like their chief opponents, the Democrats seemed to have realized the utility of organized clubs. The Danes of Clinton are reported to have held a Democratic rally on October 18th while the Democratic clubs of that city held a rally a few weeks later.[127] It is probable that similar rallies were held in other cities.

The national committee of the People's party organized at Omaha on July 5th. A list of the members of the executive committee shows the nation-wide scope of the party. H. E. Taubeneck of Illinois was selected chairman, M. C. Rankin of Indiana treasurer, J. H. Turner of Georgia secretary, and Lawrence McFarland of New York assistant secretary. The other members of the executive committee were Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota, G. F. Washburn of Massachusetts, J. H. Davis of Texas, V. O. Strickler of Nebraska, and G. F. Gaither of Alabama. The question of financing the new party required careful consideration, and before adjournment, the committee adopted resolutions requesting the reform press to urge that on or before July 24th "all clubs and labor organizations meet and collect campaign funds, and then adjourn to meet August 16th",

[125] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* September 8, 1892; *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, pp. 193–198. The Democratic nominees for Congress were as follows: First District, John J. Seerley; Second, Walter I. Hayes; Third, James H. Shields; Fourth, W. H. Butler; Fifth, John T. Hamilton; Sixth, F. E. White; Seventh, Joseph A. Dyer; Eighth, Thomas L. Maxwell; Ninth, John F. McGee; and Tenth, J. J. Ryan.

[126] *Spirit Lake Beacon,* September 2, 1892; *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, p. 198.

[127] *The Clinton Weekly Age,* October 14, 28, 1892.

and collect funds again. It was "ordered that country meetings" should "be held at 10 a. m. and village and city meetings at 8 p. m." All money collected was to be sent to M. C. Rankin, Terre Haute, Indiana. It was requested that "a finance committee should be appointed to canvass the locality" at the meeting of each club. It was "further suggested that four funds be established the 'Ten Dollar' fund, the 'Five Dollar' fund, the 'One Dollar' fund, and the 'Fifty Cent' fund". All solicitors were to send the names and contributions to Rankin to be published in the reform press. Contributions payable in monthly installments were allowed. Speakers were also requested to take up collections and the women in sympathy with the party were also urged to make themselves "collecting agents for funds". The leaders of the committee announced that the party could win if means were provided. "A resolution was adopted asking the women to organize and help the cause". The women attending the People's party national convention also issued an appeal to the "true women of the north and west" asking them to "rejoice at the sublime outlook for the cause of the great plain people" and to join the party and help save "this glorious nation from the wicked clutch of plutocracy". This appeal was signed by forty women including Mrs. J. B. Weaver and Mrs. Mary E. Lease.[128]

The Iowa People's party held their State convention at Des Moines on August 11, 1892. The platform adopted was "like most other Alliance platforms", but it included a plank demanding the repeal of all State laws which permitted the existence of private corporations organized for pecuniary profit. The electors at large and the nominees for State officers were chosen. Some difficulty was experienced in getting candidates for State offices since a number

[128] *The Clinton Weekly Herald*, July 9, 1892.

of the members declined nomination on the grounds of poverty. The nominees were E. H. Gillette of Des Moines for Secretary of State, A. J. Blakely of Newton for Auditor, Justin Wells of Eldora for Treasurer, Charles MacKenzie of Denison for Attorney General, and James H. Barnette of Indianola for Railroad Commissioner. The convention was described as being overwhelmingly against fusion and a proposal to endorse S. H. Taft, the Prohibitionist candidate for Secretary of State, was voted down by a heavy majority.[129] The chairman of the State Central Committee of the Iowa People's party was R. G. Scott, the secretary was J. Belangee, and the treasurer was E. B. Gaston.[130] The People's party entered candidates for Congress in every district except the Third and Fourth.[131]

The Iowa State Prohibition party held only one State convention, nominating their State candidates at the same time they elected their delegates to the national convention. This convention was held at Des Moines on June 1st, and nominated S. H. Taft for Secretary of State, A. B. Whitmore for Treasurer, and R. M. Dihel for Auditor.[132] Later in the campaign William Orr was nominated for Attorney General and Malcolm Smith for Railroad Commissioner.[133] The chairman of the Prohibition State Central Committee was Isaac T. Gibson, the secretary R. S. Beall.[134] Con-

[129] *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* August 13, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* August 18, 1892.

[130] *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, p. 113.

[131] Their candidates were Thomas J. Sater for the First District; Charles Dalton, Second; Thos. E. Mann, Fifth; E. S. Owens, Sixth; Ed. A. Ott, Seventh; Walter S. Scott, Eighth; F. W. Myers, Ninth; John E. Anderson, Tenth; and Daniel Campbell, Eleventh.—*Iowa Official Register,* 1893, pp. 193–198.

[132] *Clinton Weekly Age,* June 3, 1892.

[133] *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, p. 117.

[134] *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, p. 118.

gressmen were nominated at the various conventions, the Eleventh Congressional District being the only Iowa district in which the Prohibition party did not enter a candidate.[135]

THE CANVASS FOR VOTES

The paramount issue of the presidential campaign of 1892 in Iowa was the tariff. While some time on the platform and some space in the press was devoted to the discussion of minor issues, the major emphasis was placed upon either protection or tariff reform. The campaign textbooks of the Republican and Democratic parties show the importance which these parties attached to this issue; nearly one-half of the space in the Republican campaign textbook and over a third of the space in the Democratic was devoted to a discussion of the tariff. Each party considered the tariff the most important issue and spent most of its efforts in proving its side of the question.[136]

During the campaign, there was considerable dispute as to what the Democratic position on the tariff was. The Republicans maintained that the Democratic platform favored free trade and that "tariff reform is only another name for free trade",[137] while the Democrats themselves were not in agreement on this question. Cleveland denounced the protective tariff but insisted that the Democratic policy was not a destructive one and would not

[135] Their congressional candidates were S. B. Glasgow for the First District; S. A. Gilley, Second; Lindsey Jessup, Third; Jacob W. Rogers, Fourth; J. J. Milne, Fifth; J. C. Reese, Sixth; D. M. Haggard, Seventh; David Dodds, Eighth; John Pennington, Ninth; and Thomas C. Griffith, Tenth.— *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, pp. 193–198.

[136] *Republican Campaign Textbook,* 1892; *Democratic Campaign Textbook,* 1892.

[137] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* April 27, 1892; *Republican Campaign Textbook,* 1892, pp. 108–112; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 21, 1892.

abandon American interests.[138] Other Democrats maintained that "there is no such thing as free trade suggested in the Democratic platform. The sum and substance of the views of the Democratic party on the tariff are that it favors a tax for revenue only."[139] Not all the Democrats feared to be classed as free traders, for some came out for free trade, and stated that it would be a beneficial policy for the country to follow.[140]

There was also considerable discussion over the question as to whether the tariff is a tax. The Democrats insisted that the tariff was a tax "to the extent of the difference in the value of the article as between this and a foreign country", and that this tax was paid by the consumer and not by the producer.[141] This was denied by the Republican papers, which insisted that the price of articles was fixed by the cost of production, and cited the fact that the price of many articles was less than the duty imposed on them. It was also maintained that the foreigner paid the duty.[142] The Democrats frequently attacked the tariff on the grounds that it built up trusts and monopolies, and that it aided some "industries at the expense of others", or at the expense of the people.[143] *The Iowa City Republican* denied that the tariff had any effect on trusts and monopolies and

[138] Cleveland's speech accepting the Democratic nomination at New York, July 20, 1892.— *Democratic Campaign Textbook,* 1892, p. 17.

[139] *The Clinton Weekly Age,* July 26, 1892.

[140] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 14, 28, 1892.

[141] *The Clinton Weekly Age,* September 9, 1892; speech of Governor Boies at the Fort Dodge fairgrounds on October 7, 1892, printed in the *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 13, 1892.

[142] *Protection and Reciprocity,* October, 1892, appearing as a supplement to the *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 13, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* September 10, 1892.

[143] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* February 18, August 25, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* April 6, 1892.

pointed out that trusts had grown up in such fields as petroleum, which was not protected by a duty, and that they also existed in free trade England.[144]

A widely debated question during the campaign was the effects of the McKinley tariff on wages and the cost of living. The Democrats maintained that "the McKinley Bill had greatly retarded the decline of prices" for "while products had been getting cheaper for years, the McKinley Bill held them nearly stationary", and had raised prices on certain articles such as tinware. There had been a drop in prices in certain commodities, but the Democrats declared that this decline was the result "of modern inventions and not by reason of protection". The Republicans insisted that the McKinley tariff had lowered prices and decreased the cost of living.[145]

In addition to the discussion over the general effects of the McKinley tariff, there was much dispute over certain sections of the bill, especially over those relating to tin plate and wool. The McKinley bill had laid a heavy duty upon tin plates, the manufacture of which had not been begun in the United States up to 1890, for the "purpose of

[144] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* April 6, 1892.

[145] *Democratic Campaign Textbook,* 1892, pp. 85–89; Governor Boies's speech at the Fort Dodge fairgrounds, October 7, 1892, printed in the *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 13, 1892; Senator Allison's speech at Waverly, Iowa, on August 31, 1892, printed in the *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), September 15, 1892; Milton Remley's speech at Iowa City, October 11, 1892, extracts printed in *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 12, 1892. Never before, said a Republican paper, has there been "such great decline in prices of the necessities of life as has taken place within the past year". Coffee has dropped 24.3%, kerosene 13%, sugar (Refined) 2.8%, cotton 16.8%. As a result "the laboring men can live much cheaper".—*The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* June 1, 1892. The Democrats maintained that the Republican position was inconsistent in regard to this matter; they maintained that if the protective tariff raised the price of farm products, it must also raise the cost of living.— *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* September 15, 1892.

stimulating the introduction of this industry.'' The tinware men and the canners at once claimed that the new tariff would ruin their business and used it as an excuse to raise the prices on canned goods and tinware beyond any figure justified by the slight rise in the cost of tinware which resulted from the duty. This rise in prices in anticipation of the tariff had much to do with the overwhelming defeat suffered by the Republican party in the congressional elections of 1890.[146]

The Democrats continued their assault on the tin plate duties in 1892. They maintained that the duty had not only raised the price of cans and thus lowered the returns which the farmers received for their crops, but also harmed labor by harming the can producing plants, and added that ''with free tin plates a business revolution among the canneries would take place, the farmers would get 25 per cent of this tariff tax added to the price of his tomatoes; the laborer could get 25 per cent of this tariff tax added to his labor; consumers would get 50 per cent of the tax through a reduction in the cost of canned food. This reduction in prices would increase their consumption 25 per cent, which means a larger home market and more acreage for the farmer''.[147]

The Republicans defended the duty on tin plate. They said that ''the Welsh tin plate industry was being ruined by American competition and the McKinley Tariff''. The United States was making no tin plate when the McKinley bill was passed but there would be about fifty tin plate mills operating in the United States by January 1, 1892. The Americans had been paying ''Great Britain'', said one newspaper, ''from $15,000,000 to $20,000,000 per year for tin plate'', but ''if Democratic free traders let this industry

[146] Stanwood's *American Controversies,* pp. 264, 290–294.

[147] *Democratic Campaign Textbook,* 1892, pp. 103–113; *Iowa State Press* (Iowa City), September 21, 1892.

alone, it will soon save the people of this country more than $20,000,000 yearly which they have been sending abroad for the products of British labor''. The Republicans also maintained that tin plate was slightly cheaper than it had been when the McKinley bill was passed.[148]

The duties on wool were also attacked by the Democratic press which asserted that the tariff raised the price of clothing and caused the use of ''shoddy''. ''If it costs a young man one hundred dollars for clothing,'' said the *Clinton Weekly Age,* ''he is paying fifty dollars tax.'' It was asserted that there were 94 shoddy mills in successful operation in the country, producing over 125,000 pounds of shoddy annually. Thus, said *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* the Republican policy means that ''the poor must wear the renovated rags of the rich''. The same paper added that ''the tariff on wool has not benefited the wool trust as much as they have desired for it has raised the price of its raw materials and has destroyed part of the home market. The price of woolens have gone up and the laborer has been unable to pay the increased price thus the sale has decreased''.[149]

The Republican newspapers defended the duty on wool. The *Iowa State Register* printed a list of clothes needed by the average working man with the price of each to bring out the low cost of working clothes. ''Free traders'', said this paper, ''cannot make much headway in howling about the tax upon the laboring man's clothes when he can purchase an entire suit, including everything that is necessary for him to wear, for less than $5.00.''[150]

[148] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 13, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* July 13, 1892; *Republican Campaign Textbook,* 1892, pp. 136, 137.

[149] *The Clinton Weekly Age,* November 4, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* March 24, 1892; *Democratic Campaign Textbook,* 1892, pp. 90–95.

[150] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 22, 1892.

The reciprocity section of the McKinley bill also came in for its share of attention. The Democrats claimed that Mr. Blaine's reciprocity was "the opposite of the McKinley idea. McKinleyism aids to build up the home market and has no use for a foreign market. Mr. Blaine's plan, on the other hand, aims to open the foreign markets to American foodstuffs and American goods". The fact that the Republicans had negotiated "reciprocity treaties only with agricultural countries", who "may bring any and all their products to this country free, if they will open their ports to the manufacturers, who are always republican favorites", was also criticised.[151] The Republicans, in reply, stated that "reciprocity had worked well", and were able to point to the fact that "these treaties have saved American consumers 2 or 3 cents per pound on sugar or about $75,000,000 per year".[152] Other articles on which the price had fallen after the enactment of the McKinley bill were used by the Republicans in their attempt to prove that the tariff had lowered prices on the necessities of life.[153]

The effect of the tariff on wages was also a mooted question. The Republican position was that the McKinley tariff not only reduced the cost of living but that it raised wages. They constantly referred to the well known fact that wages were higher in the United States than in free-trade England and maintained that the reason for this difference in wages was due to the protective tariff, which "levied duties

[151] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, February 11, April 28, 1892.

[152] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 27, 1892.

[153] Wire nails, which are frequently used by the farmers, furnish an example of this. "A few years ago", said one paper, "wire nails were so dear farmers could not afford to own them but now, under protection, they have fallen in price until they are sold for less than the tariff on the imported article, and consumers get home made nails which are not only low in price, but the best in quality of any made in the world".— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, June 1, 1892.

equal to the difference between wages abroad and at home''. The protective tariff, they affirmed, guaranteed that ''the low wage scale and low conditions of life abroad'' should not become a factor in prices or wages here.[154] The Democrats denied that the McKinley tariff raised wages. Wages, they said, are regulated by supply and demand, and American wages are higher than European on account of our cheap lands and because our labor is more productive than European. The American worker receives more wages per week but he receives less per article produced. The fallacy of the Republican argument that American wages were higher than English wages, because ''we were blessed with a protective tariff'' while England was not, was shown by bringing out the ''fact that wages in Germany and in other European countries'', which had a protective tariff were lower than in ''free trade England''.[155]

The prevalence of labor disputes following the enactment of the McKinley tariff made it difficult for the Republicans to prove that the tariff raised wages. *The Democratic Campaign Textbook* devoted eight pages to a discussion of ''Specimen Strikes, Lockouts, and Wage Reductions in Protected Industries following the Passage of the McKinley Bill, October 4, 1890'' and gave a list of two hundred

[154] Senator Allison's speech at Waverly, Iowa, on August 31, 1892, printed in the *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), September 15, 1892; Milton Remley's speech at Iowa City on October 11, 1892, extracts printed in *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 12, 1892. *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 29, 1892, contains the report of a Senate Investigating Committee which reported that wages had gone up since 1890. See also the *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), August 18, October 27, 1892.

[155] *Democratic Campaign Textbook,* 1892, pp. 78, 79. Frequent quotations from Shoenhof's *Economy of High Wages* are printed in the *Campaign Textbook* to substantiate the Democratic position. See also *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), September 21, October 5, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 28, 1892.

and ninety-two strikes and lock-outs, which occurred between October 4, 1890, and July 10, 1892.[156] In this contention, the Democrats were aided considerably by the prevalence of serious labor disputes in 1892. Rioting and bloodshed took place at a number of places. Conspicuous disputes occurred at Homestead, Pennsylvania, and Coeur D'Alene, Idaho, in July, 1892, near Nashville, Tennessee, and on the Erie and Lehigh Valley Railroads in August, 1892.[157]

The most violent of these was the one at Homestead, an industrial suburb of Pittsburgh.[158] The Democrats did not overlook the opportunity to make political capital out of the Homestead riots. Democratic papers repeatedly insisted that the riots demonstrated the fact that protection does not help labor. "The Homestead contest", said one paper, is an object lesson on the tariff — " a lesson that the Republican party cannot afford to have continued much longer. Every day it demonstrates the rottenness of protection. . . . The increase of the tariff has been accompanied by increased labor troubles". They asserted that the tariff had been used by the Republican party "to en-

[156] *Democratic Campaign Textbook*, 1892, pp. 61–68.

[157] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, July 20, 27, August 17, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, August 18, 1892; Bridge's *The Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Company*, pp. 203–223.

[158] The immediate causes of this affair seem rather trivial. The Carnegie Company notified the workers of a reduction of wages and of their refusal in the future "to recognize the Amalgamated Association of Steel and Iron Workers". The wage reductions affected only a few hundred of the employees, but the workmen felt that H. C. Frick, the general manager of the works, was intending to destroy their union, so they rejected the terms. The company, considering the protection given by the sheriff and local officers inadequate, sent in a large body of Pinkerton detectives, and when these forces endeavored to enter the mills, the strikers fired upon them. There was actual warfare for several days, until the State militia appeared on the scene and stopped trouble.— Bridge's *The Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Company*, pp. 204, 213–223; Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 247, 248.

hance the market price of iron for the benefits of those engaged in the industry''. ''The riots'', said one paper, ''are a direct result of a failure to divide the spoils. Carnegie has no more moral right to the millions of the plunder which he owns than have the strikers, but he has possession and refuses to 'divvy'. The people, the consumers, have been robbed, and now the robbers are fighting to retain the booty. With free trade the workers would have had a much bigger share and the consumers would have had the benefit of cheaper iron''.[159]

The Republican papers attempted to make the best of a bad situation. They denounced ''the Democratic demogogues'' for trying to make political capital out of the Homestead trouble, and claimed that the bloodshed was chargeable to ''the imbecile Democratic governor of Pennsylvania'', who had delayed in calling out the militia. The tariff, it was asserted, had ''actually reduced the duties on nearly every article manufactured at Homestead and especially on structural steel, the principal output of these mills'', while the wages paid by the Carnegie company were very high.[160] It was difficult, however, for the Republican papers to demonstrate how the protective tariff aided the working men, when 150,000 men in Pennsylvania were out of work ''because they would not submit to a reduction in wages in the highly protected industry of the manufacture of iron'',[161] and numerous strikes were going on in other parts of the country. The Homestead strike was

[159] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 14, 1892. ''The bloodshed and murder and riot at Homestead is the logical result of a protective tariff'', said another paper, ''Carnegie and Phipps go to Europe and order wages reduced and ''the nation plundered behind the tariff wall''.—*Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), July 13, 1892.

[160] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* July 20, 27, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 15, 22, 1892.

[161] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 7, 1892.

one of the most important factors in the campaign,[162] and probably had considerable effect on the labor vote, but it is doubtful if this issue had as great an influence on the results of the election in an agricultural State like Iowa, as in some of the industrial States.

Another indication of the importance that was attached to the labor vote by the rival parties is clearly shown by publicity, which was given to statements from T. V. Powderly, General Master Workman of the Knights of Labor. Powderly had taken a prominent part in the organization of the People's party and denounced both the Republican and Democratic parties. Each side printed those statements of Powderly attacking the opposition party, but failed to include the statements attacking its own position.[163]

A report issued by the Labor Commissioner of New York State, a Democrat named Peck, furnished the Republicans with a talking point in their attempts to prove that the

[162] Bridge's *The Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Company*, pp. 247–249, 277. Chauncey Depew, one of the prominent Republican leaders of the time, stated that "the Homestead Strike was one of the most important factors in the presidential contest, and led to a distinct issue in the campaign." Bridge suggests that the farming vote was adversely affected by the broadcast publication of the high wages paid to the Homestead workers "under a protective regime which left the agriculturist on the outside", but a careful study of the newspapers of the time leads to the conclusion that such was not the case in Iowa.

[163] The Republican newspapers printed Powderly's denunciation of Cleveland's position on silver, his opposition to the "wildcat currency" plank in the Democratic platform, and especially stressed a statement, in which he said, "the Democratic party is the party of the poor man and if he continues to vote the ticket he will never be anything else than a poor man".— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), September 30, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 13, 1892. The Democratic papers stressed Powderly's denunciations of the tariff. Powderly maintained that "the workman had not been protected from competition by the government", but that foreign competition was "largely attracted by our delusive tariff laws".— *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), October 5, 1892.

tariff aided the laborers. This report declared that wages had increased during the previous year. The Republicans insisted that this report proved conclusively that the tariff aided the laborers, and laid especial stress upon the fact that it was issued by a Democratic official.[164] A similar report issued by the Labor Commissioner of Massachusetts, which appeared a few weeks later, was also used by the Republican papers in an effort to gain the votes of labor.[165]

The Democrats at once questioned the authenticity of Peck's report. Commissioner Peck was called upon for copies of the reports sent to his office by the manufacturers, but he refused to present them, claiming that they were confidential. Court proceedings were then instituted to compel their presentation, and when Peck admitted the reports had been burned upon his order, he was arrested and placed under bond. This gave an opening for an attack on the whole report, which the Democrats did not neglect. They asserted that Peck had destroyed the papers because they did not sustain the results he had given in his report. It was also charged that "Peck asked only such manufacturers who would be interested in saying the tariff aided them", for they had made millions from the tariff.[166]

[164] Peck had secured reports from sixty-seven wholesale manufactories of New York and totaled the results presumedly for the purpose of discovering the effects of the tariff on wages and production. His report, which was published early in September, 1892, showed that in "the wholesale manufactories of New York State the wages paid for the year ending August 31, 1892, showed an increase over the wages paid during the year ending August 31, 1890, of $6,377,925" while the net increase of production was given as $31,315,130.08. Of the 67 industries investigated, 77 per cent showed an increase in wages, or production, or both.— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* September 7, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), September 2, 9, 16, 1892. These figures, said an Iowa paper, are "a deathblow to free trade Democracy".— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 12, 1892.

[165] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), September 23, 1892.

[166] "Men do not burn documents that support their position in important public questions and without which they are left unsupported", asserted one

Even if the wage increase found by this report were true, it was asserted that the increase was less than the annual increase during the decade 1880-1890.[167] It is doubtful if the Republicans gained much from this report. Upon first appearance, it must have seemed damaging to the Democratic contention as regards the tariff, but the destruction of the data upon which it was based by Commissioner Peck placed its validity in doubt and largely destroyed its value as a campaign document.

A discussion, which must have been of more interest to the Iowa farmers than the continual wrangling over the "Homestead Trouble" and "Peck's Report", took place over the effects of the tariff on the prices of farm products. The fact that our exports of agricultural products were much greater than they had been in any previous year[168] furnished the Republicans with valuable campaign arguments. Republican papers ran frequent reports pointing out that trade conditions were excellent, and that the United States was exporting much more than it was importing.[169] *The Iowa State Register* asserted that "the exports of bread-stuffs gained nearly $100,000,000 during the first year of the McKinley Tariff", and claimed that "the new tariff is responsible for the higher prices of the farmers products and the largely increased foreign demand for

paper.— *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), September 21, 1892. See also *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, September 15, 1892.

[167] For figures see *The Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), September 21, October 12, 1892.

[168] *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1900, p. 187. Our exports of agricultural products were $532,141,490 in 1889; $629,820,808 in 1890; $642,751,490 in 1891; and $798,328,232 in 1892.

[169] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), January 15, 1892, ff.; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican* and *The Spirit Lake Beacon*, September 16, 1892; *The Saturday Evening Post* (Weekly, Burlington), September 3, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), January 22, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 6, 1892.

them during 1891". "Our protective tariff", said the *Fort Dodge Messenger,* "is a 'persuader' which is bringing factories to this country by the score", with the result that the foreign manufacturer "brings over his workers to eat American products".

The Democrats pointed out the fallacy of the Republican argument that the increased amount of exports was due to the McKinley tariff by calling attention to the fact that "this increase consisted wholly of exports of wheat and corn to the famine-smitten regions of Europe, and the exports of nearly all other American staples have seriously declined under the operation of the McKinley tariff." They declared that there would have been a dull market for the bumper crops of 1892 if the harvests of Russia and other parts of Europe had not failed, and insisted that "the McKinley tariff had signally failed to produce the 'home market' for our products which the protectionists claimed was one of the strongest arguments for protection".[170] They not only denied that the protective tariff raised the prices of farm products, but insisted that it narrowed the market for our agricultural products and thus caused lower prices. The United States produced a surplus of agricultural products that must be exported; the tariff did not get rid of this surplus, but merely prevented the farmer "from buying the products where they were the cheapest".[171]

It is of course impossible to determine with absolute ac-

[170] *Philadelphia Record,* April 29, 1892, quoted in *The Literary Digest,* May 7, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* January 7, 1892.

[171] *The Clinton Weekly Age,* November 4, 1892. Governor Boies wrote that "every obstacle which is thrown in the way of the importation of foreign merchandise, deprives our farmers of so much custom for their wheat, corn, or cotton."— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* November 2, 1892. Another paper pointed out that "America must take in exchange, in large part, the products of other countries, if she will sell her products".— *The Clinton Weekly Age,* June 24, 1892.

curacy just what influence this discussion over the tariff had on the electorate. Professor Taussig's statement that "there was little in public discussion to indicate that the true question at issue was fairly before the public mind" is probably true, but, he adds, there was "a vague uneasiness about trusts and monopolies, which the protective duties were supposed to promote", which "clearly had much effect in strengthening the hands both of Democrats and of Populists", although "the comparatively simple questions which at the bottom were involved by the protective controversy were obscured by a cloud of talk about pauper wages and monopolist manufacturers, British free trade and American patriotism".[172]

The fact that the prices of grain had gone up was a distinct advantage to the Republicans. The Democrats explained that these high prices were not the result of the McKinley tariff and pointed to the crop failures in Europe as the cause of the rise in prices, but it is probable that many of the farmers did not understand either side of the controversy; they were getting a better price for their crops than they had been getting for a number of years prior to the enactment of the McKinley law.[173] The Republicans pointed to the improved agricultural conditions, claimed that they were due to the protective system, and asserted that these conditions would pass away if the Democrats won the election. They made ample use of the arguments furnished by the prosperous conditions of the country and frequently cited instances of manufacturers, who were going to enlarge their business just after election if the protective policy won, and of foreign manufacturers who were going to bring their factories over here

[172] Taussig's *Tariff History of the United States* (Sixth Edition), pp. 285, 286. Taussig's statement was probably true for Iowa.

[173] See above, note 51.

in case free trade failed.[174] The prosperity argument was especially stressed during the last few weeks of the campaign and editorials under such headings as "Let Prosperity Alone", "America's Great Prosperity", and "Prosperity or Hard Times",[175] were run in the Republican papers just before the election.

Although the Civil War had ended twenty-seven years before the campaign of 1892, the Republicans again revived the traditions of that struggle in an attempt to prove the disloyalty of the Democratic party. The Republican newspapers were almost unanimous in attacking the war records of Cleveland and Stevenson. The former had sent a substitute to take his place in the Union army, while the latter was charged with having been "a member of the Knights of the Golden Circle", a "treasonable organization" bitterly opposed to the war.[176] Both were described as "too cowardly to go in the rebel ranks" but, it was said, they "skulked in the rear and aided the rebellion all they could".[177] An indication of the importance placed upon this issue is shown by the space given to it by the Republican papers of Iowa. *The Iowa State Register* which was edited by the brother of James S. Clarkson, devoted over

[174] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* July 13, November 2, 1892.

[175] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 27, 1892; *Saturday Evening Post* (Weekly, Burlington), November 5, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), November 4, 1892.

[176] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 1, 15, September 9, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), June 30, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* July 13, 1892.

[177] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 1, 1892. This issue of *The Register* contained many similar charges. "Cleveland refused to accept Governor Gray as running mate in 1888, because he was a Union soldier and true Union soldiers, Col. Gray, Col. Mitchell, and Allen B. Morse were defeated by Stevenson. No Union soldier need to apply to the Democrats for office". Cleveland's record is spoken of in detail—"he hired a substitute when he was drafted, hanged Irishmen when he was sheriff, and vetoed pension bills of Union soldiers when he was president".

one-fourth of the space of its front page in its first weekly issue following the Democratic convention to a discussion of the war records of the Democratic candidates. Two weeks later the same paper again denounced the Democrats for "defeating Union soldier candidates for president and vice president, and then nominating copperheads and conscripts for both positions", and suggested that the "ticket was made to please the Southern bulldozers."[178] Curiously enough, the Democratic papers paid very little attention to the Republican attacks upon the war records of Cleveland and Stevenson, perhaps feeling that they had a better chance to win the election by discussing issues rather than personalities. They did, however, deny the charge that Stevenson was a member of the "Knights of the Golden Circle" and insisted that he had always loyally "supported the Union cause".[179] The Republican papers accused Cleveland of "brutal utterances concerning some of the old soldiers who sought pensions at the hands of congress" in his veto messages to Congress,[180] and it was frequently asserted that the Democratic party was hostile to the Union veterans. When the Democratic appropriations committee of the national House of Representatives reduced the amount of the pension appropriations, it was asserted that "the 'grays are on deck again' in the Democratic house",[181] while the ill-treatment of General James

[178] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 1, 15, 1892. A few weeks later, this paper stated that "when the Democratic party nominated two copperhead conscripts as its candidates, and adopted the Confederate States constitution as its platform, it revived the 'war issues'; and the Union soldiers are swinging into line to again 'drive the rebel crew from the land we love the best' ".— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 29, 1892.

[179] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* June 30, 1892.

[180] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), September 2, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 26, 1892.

[181] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 11, 1892. This

B. Weaver during his campaign trip in Georgia led to the assertion that this act "shows the Northern soldier that there is still a rankling hatred of Union soldiers" in the South.[182] An editorial in a North Carolina paper, *The Durham Globe,* which denounced the Union soldiers as "murderers and thieves", furnished the Republican papers with material to prove that the South was still bitterly antagonistic to the North and especially to the northern soldiers. This editorial was reprinted in most of the Republican papers.[183] *The Iowa State Press* insisted that this editorial did not represent southern sentiment and added that *The Durham Globe* was financed by a Republican national committee for the purpose of inciting northern sentiment against the Democrats and discrediting their patriotism.[184]

The Republicans also attempted to show that many of the Democratic veterans were not supporting Cleveland. Two prominent Democrats, General Henry W. Slocum and General Daniel E. Sickles, were said to have advised the veterans attending the Grand Army Reunion, held at Washington, D. C., in September, 1892, not to forget that Harrison was a Civil War veteran and Cleveland was

charge was repeated in May, when Congress attempted to pay southern war claims.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), May 20, 1892.

[182] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 11, 1892.

[183] "Between Harrison and Cleveland", wrote the editor of *The Globe,* "first, last and all the time — I am for the brave Buffalo man, who slapped the dirty pensioners, who, for the most part, are beggars, in the face . . . They were dirty and lousy rascals who came into this country and who abused women; who burned homes; who stole all that was in sight, and today; without an honorable scar, are bleeding this country, and I am helping to pay for it. Let the hired Yankees howl. I am of the South and for the South; and until my blood is cold I shall fight honestly and for a white man's country". — *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 14, 1892. See also the *Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 26, 1892, and *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* November 5, 1892.

[184] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), October 26, 1892.

not.[185] These statements were reprinted in most of the Republican papers,[186] but the truth of them was questioned by some of the opposition papers, which maintained that General Sickles was supporting Cleveland.[187]

The Iowa Republican campaign leaders probably used good strategy when they placed considerable emphasis on the "war issues" and laid little stress on pensions. If they had stressed the pension question, they would have laid themselves open to attack on the grounds of scandal, for the administration of the pension office by Tanner and Raum was certainly open to attack. The Democrats did not have a very effective reply, when their opponents pressed the "war issues" since Union sentiment was strong in Iowa, and many voters could easily have been alienated if an unwise attack had been made on the Republicans. The Democrats were probably wise in minimizing this issue, and laying more stress on less dangerous questions such as the tariff.

A favorite device of the Republican papers was to print the pension veto record of Cleveland's first administration to show that Cleveland had vetoed nearly four times as many pension bills as all the Presidents before him, while

[185] General Slocum was said to have advised the veterans not to forget that "of the candidates of the two great parties in this Presidential contest now in progress one was your comrade, who went faithfully to the front when his country needed his services, and the other was a man who did not go as a volunteer and refused to go and sent a substitute when he was drafted".— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 7, 1892. General Sickles was credited with having given the same advice and to have added that "the people of the United States will see that no man is ever elected to an office of profit and trust in this country who opposes the payment of pensions to the soldiers of the Union".— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 7, 1892.

[186] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 12, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 6, 20, 1892.

[187] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), October 26, 1892; *Clinton Weekly Age,* October 28, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* October 13, 1892.

Harrison had vetoed none.[188] The Democratic papers laid even less stress on the pension issue than their Republican opponents, but they did point out that while President Cleveland had vetoed more pension bills than any previous President, he had signed 1825 pension bills, which was more than twice as many as any of his predecessors had signed. Cleveland, they insisted, had only vetoed pension bills, "after close examination of each case and to save the pension list from becoming a roll of dishonor".[189] The Democratic papers occasionally mentioned the investigation which was going on in regard to the conduct of the Pension Office under Commissioner Raum,[190] but they made little attempt to make political capital out of the scandals which had taken place under Commissioners Tanner and Raum.

Just before the election, the Republican papers contained special appeals to the soldier voters, *The Iowa State Register,* in its last issue prior to the election, ran a special editorial on the front page entitled "Union Soldiers and Politics" for the purpose of influencing the soldier vote. "VOTE AS YOU SHOT — Next Tuesday", said the editorial, "and keep shooting until the last rebel is dead". "Any comrade who votes the Democratic ticket dishonors the cause for which he fought in 1862-1865." "Remember Cleveland's pension vetoes".[191] The *Fort Dodge Messenger* again printed the quotations from General Sickles and General Slocum and appealed to the young men not

[188] Cleveland, they said, had vetoed 524 bills, whereas all Presidents before him had vetoed only 133, and Harrison had vetoed none.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 22, 1892 ff.; *The Clinton Daily Herald,* July 30, 1892.

[189] *The Clinton Weekly Age,* October 28, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), August 10, 1892.

[190] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 14, 1892.

[191] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), November 4, 1892.

"to vote for a man whom the soldiers so unanimously protest against".[192] A Union Veterans League, organized in Iowa a short time before the election, purported "to be nonpartisan" but supported Harrison and Reid. The League sent campaign circulars to many of the old soldiers "quoting alleged utterances of General Daniel E. Sickles," and extracts from *The Durham Globe*.[193] It is impossible to know just how much effect these last minute appeals to the soldier vote had, but as in the case of similar appeals to the same element during the entire campaign, it would seem probable that they did help in lining up the soldiers and their sympathizers for Harrison in spite of dissatisfaction with the Republican program in other lines.

Neither of the major parties paid much attention to civil service reform during the Iowa campaign of 1892. The reformers may have constituted a considerable part of the electorate in some of the eastern States, but they were not very numerous in Iowa. The Democrats, however, launched some attacks against Harrison's use of Federal office-holders to secure the Republican nomination.[194] It was also charged that office holders were "pulling the strings to bring female influence into the campaign",[195] but the Democrats paid little attention to the investigations going on during this period of "the alleged violations of the civil service law by federal officials in Baltimore", under the direction of Civil Service Commissioner Roosevelt.[196] It seems probable that civil service

[192] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 20, 1892.

[193] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, October 13, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), October 26, 1892.

[194] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), May 25, 1892.

[195] It was charged that Mrs. Judith E. Foster, the wife of one of the office-holders, "was organizing women's republican clubs".— *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), July 20, 1892.

[196] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, June 1, 1892.

reform was more or less of a "highbrow" movement, which as yet had little support in Iowa.

The prohibition question did not play as prominent a part in the Iowa election of 1892 as it had in the State elections of 1889 and 1891. The action of the Republican party in refusing to endorse prohibition[197] caused "six members of the executive committee of the Iowa State Temperance Alliance" to issue a proclamation asserting that the alliance would "not support the Republican party openly as they had done in past campaigns". These members were accused of having "sold out the 'third party Prohibition' cause in Iowa to Democracy".[198] Their purpose, the Republicans claimed, was to defeat if possible the Republican State ticket and electoral ticket.[199] As early as April, 1892, *The Iowa City Republican* denounced "the 1500 Prohibitionists who signed a pledge to vote against the Republican party" as "a handful of malcontents who have done more harm to prohibition than its avowed enemies". A few months later, the same paper announced that "every vote for Bidwell is indirectly a vote for Cleveland".[200]

The Democratic press was opposed to prohibition. *The Des Moines Leader* asserted that "whenever and wherever tried, prohibitory legislation has proved to be a farce and

[197] The Republican State convention had refused to pass a resolution endorsing prohibition, maintaining that the question was a State issue and should not be brought into a national campaign. They had also placed an uncompromising opponent of prohibition, A. B. Cummins, at the head of the electoral ticket.

[198] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 28, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, November 23, 1892. *The State Register* asserted that these members had received $3,500 from the Democrats for their action.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), November 4, 1892.

[199] *The Saturday Evening Post* (Weekly, Burlington), November 5, 1892.

[200] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, April 20, August 7, November 2, 1892.

a fraud'' and ''has manufactured criminals by the wholesale, and has in no respect lessened drunkenness''. The way to end this farce was to defeat the Republican party. The Republican charge that the Democrats controlled and financed the prohibition campaign was denounced as ''a malicious falsehood'',[201] but the Democrats were willing that the supporters of prohibition should vote for the Prohibition party candidates, for they knew that such action would draw votes away from the Republicans. Prohibitionists were told that they would have to vote against the Republicans if they did not wish to lose the support of the Republicans for their program, for if the Republicans won in this election without prohibition, they would decide that they were stronger without prohibition than with it and would discard it.[202] Prohibitionists were urged not to vote for a party which was ''a coward, a hypocrite, and a deceiver''. It (the Republican party) ''pretends to be good when it is not. It pretends to favor prohibition but in this campaign has repudiated prohibition''.[203]

It is probable that the Republicans gained by repudiating the prohibition issue in this campaign. They had supported this issue in 1889 and 1891 and had met defeat in both cases, and were therefore justified in thinking that the people of Iowa were no longer in favor of the issue. Although many of the votes which the Prohibition party secured were undoubtedly from the Republican ranks, it is likely that the number of voters which came back to the Republican party as a result of the dropping of prohibi-

[201] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, September 8, 22, November 3, 1892.

[202] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, August 25, 1892. ''The Iowa Prohibitionists'', said another paper, ''will have the same opportunity to vote their sentiments as other parties have'' for their ticket will appear alongside of the tickets of the other parties.— *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), August 10, 1892.

[203] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, October 27, 1892.

tion was much greater than the comparative few who voted for Bidwell, the Prohibition candidate.

The campaign conducted by the People's party in Iowa did not excite as much notice from the newspapers, as might have been expected from the fact that James B. Weaver, the candidate for President, was a native of Iowa, and had polled over ten per cent of the vote of the State while running on the Greenback ticket in 1880. *The Iowa State Register* announced early in June that it was not going to take the People's party seriously, or "take issue with any of the things done or said, because those who did them were either insincere, like Weaver, or deluded, like about all the rest who met in the convention." The members of the new party were denounced as "Calaminites" and "stool-pigeons".[204] This paper nicknamed the August convention of the People's party "the Calamity Convention" and said that it "was the same old gathering of Greenbackers". "Politically unbalanced men, with the strangest and wildest ideas, and most impracticable views predominated. In the whole gathering there was not a single man who was capable of looking at a political, or economic question, calmly or in a business-like way".[205]

Another Republican paper described this convention as "A spiritless and insignificant affair". "There were only a hundred members of the convention, and with the exception of Judge Cole the crowd was made up of the same old lot of fossils that have figured for years as Anti-monopolists, Greenbackers, or some other of various ists or ers".[206] *The Register* predicted that "the ticket nominated will poll some votes — the Leonard Browns, the Bellangees, and others whose political sanity would not stand

[204] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), June 10, 1892.

[205] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), August 19, 1892.

[206] *The Clinton Weekly Herald*, August 13, 1892.

a very severe test, will here and there find a fellow spirit and a vote''.[207] The Democratic papers were more lenient in their characterization of the new party, probably feeling that they might lose less by its inauguration than the Republicans. *The Des Moines Leader* said that both the Democratic and the People's parties agreed ''that the policies of the republican party are ruinous to the country'', but that the ''former are conservative while the latter are fanatical'', and later added that ''while the populistic paternalists and plutocratic paternalists are waging a war to determine whether the millionaires or the tramps shall hereafter be the beneficiaries of class legislation, democracy will repeal all class legislation''.[208]

The Iowa State Register stated in August that ''the entire Democratic vote of Iowa will be cast for 'Calamity Jim' and the People's state ticket'', but it changed its mind in November and predicted that ''all the Democrats in Iowa will vote for Cleveland'', as the People's party was being used solely as a ''stool pigeon'' for Republican voters.[209] A few days before the election, a partisan paper predicted that the ''only hope of success the Democrats have is that Weaver may get enough Western States to prevent an election by the people and throw the decision into the hands of Congress''.[210]

The Republican papers frequently asserted that the People's party claimed they could break up the ''Solid South'', but that their purpose was merely to deceive the northern Republicans, and by dividing the North elect a

[207] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), August 19, 1892.

[208] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* June 2, October 20, 1892.

[209] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), August 5, November 4, 1892. ''Fusion of all ins and isms against Republicanism is the mongrel order of this year's campaign in Iowa'', said this paper.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), August 5, 1892.

[210] *Iowa City Weekly Republican,* November 1, 1892.

Democratic President.[211] Additional proof for the Republican contention that the South was still solid was found when General Weaver and Mrs. Lease were forced to drop their campaigning in the South, due to mob violence. According to the Republican papers, General Weaver, himself, said that Cleveland would lose votes in the North as a result of "the intolerance of the South", while Mrs. Lease declared: "the South will be solid for Cleveland" and the North "should be solid for Harrison".[212]

Neither party stressed the currency issue, during this campaign in Iowa, both probably fearing that they would lose the support of some of their members if they said much on the question. The People's party, which expected to secure most of its support from the South and West, where inflation sentiment was strong, was not confronted with such a dilemma, and could stress the silver issue during the campaign. The Democrats were suspected of being more friendly to the free coinage of silver than the Republicans, but Cleveland's opposition to such action probably destroyed any benefit which they might derive from this fact. The Republicans were in a slightly more favorable position. Harrison had not definitely committed himself on the issue,

[211] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* April 20, August 10, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 14, 1892.

[212] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 14, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 19, 1892. *The Des Moines Leader* (Democratic) also mentions the fact that Mrs. Lease was trying to elect Harrison and Reid and stated that "when it comes to a 'showdown' on any test of principle, the plutocratic paternalists and the philanthropic paternalists are one and the same party".— *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* October 27, 1892. *The Register* at about the same time asserted that Mrs. Lease and General Weaver spoke in Polk County, so it seems probable that Mrs. Lease continued to support Weaver.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 21, 1892. It was also stated that General Weaver's treatment had "turned thousands of People's party men in Kansas back into the Republican party".— *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 13, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 19, 1892.

but was thought to be opposed to free coinage, unless the leading nations of the world should decide in favor of bimetalism. He had called an international monetary conference and his invitation was accepted by the leading nations of Europe.[213] This invitation which was issued during the campaign, gave the Republican papers an opportunity to urge silver men to vote for Harrison, since the widest coinage of silver had been obtained through the Republican party and that "party was committed to free coinage if the international silver conference succeeds".[214]

While neither the Republicans nor the Democrats paid much attention to the silver question, the Democratic plank recommending the repeal of the ten per cent tax on state bank issues attracted much more attention. The Republicans greeted this recommendation as an attempt to secure the return of State "wild cat" banking, and frequently printed accounts and cartoons describing the uncertainty of the value of money during the period of our "State Bank System" in an effort to frighten the voters away from their allegiance to the Democratic party.[215] The Republicans did not fail to point out that while prices had decreased during the previous fifteen years "the per capita amount of money" had increased and quoted from the reports of the Secretary of the Treasury to prove their con-

[213] *The Nation,* Vol. LV, p. 1.

[214] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), November 4, 1892. A bill providing for the free coinage of silver had passed the Republican Senate of the Fifty-second Congress twice but each time failed to secure the concurrence of the Democratic House.— Rhodes's *History of the United States,* Vol. VIII, p. 370.

[215] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 21, 28, November 7, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 5, 26, November 9, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 20, 1892. It was announced that Fred White, the Democratic candidate for Congress in the Sixth Iowa District had repudiated "the 'wild cat' currency plank of the National Democratic platform".— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* August 21, 1892.

tention.[216] They asserted that the adoption of "the People's party plank calling for an issue of currency up to $50 per capita by Congress would lead to speculation and unrest."[217] Thus it is evident that the Democratic proposal for the repeal of the State bank tax was the only phase of the currency question that attracted much attention on the part of the Iowa voters, and the effects of this issue were probably rather insignificant, when compared with the tariff or "war traditions".

In the election of 1890, the Democrats had been able to use the appropriation record of the previous House of Representatives against the Republicans, but when they secured control of the House, they proceeded to spend more money than their predecessors, and thus laid themselves open to the same charge of extravagance. The opposition press duly emphasized this fact.[218] Some of the Republican papers, on the other hand, accused the Democrats of "baleful economy". It was pointed out that "the reduction by the Democratic House of nearly one-half of the appropriation to prevent the spread of contagious diseases is seriously embarrassing the Treasury Department" in its attempts to check the invasion of Asiatic cholera and that as a result of this false economy "the capital may be invaded by cholera and public business deranged".[219]

The voters seemed to be entirely unaware of the real conditions of the treasury, and did not realize that the gold reserve in the treasury was rapidly shrinking. The Democratic papers, however, must have printed some rumors

[216] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), April 29, 1892.

[217] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 27, 1892.

[218] *Spirit Lake Beacon* (Weekly), May 20, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), January 29, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), July 28, 1892.

[219] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, September 21, 1892.

that the treasury was "on the verge of bankruptcy", for *The Iowa State Register* denied these rumors and insisted that since "the Republicans are pledged to reduce the surplus and keep the money in circulation. . . . They are doing it".[220]

The two major parties made strenuous efforts to secure the support of the foreign voters. The tariff furnished a convenient issue for the Republicans to use as an appeal for Irish votes, since the majority of the Irish were bitterly opposed to England. Quotations, taken from English papers stating that the McKinley tariff was ruining the industries of England, were frequently run in the Republican papers.[221] The Irish, it was said, should vote against the Democratic party, which stood for "English free trade" and prosperity for England.[222] *The London Times* was quoted as having said that "one Irishman in the United States wearing English broadcloth and voting free trade is worth more to England than fifty Irishmen at home". This statement was frequently reprinted in the Republican papers.[223] The Democrats tried to counteract this propaganda by denouncing the "Anglo-mania" of the Republican papers and insisting that free trade was not an English doctrine, and that it would not aid England, but would enable us to destroy the English carrying monopoly.[224]

[220] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), April 15, 1892.

[221] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), May 6, June 17, 1892, quoted extracts from the *London Engineering News.* The reciprocity clause, said another paper, is "taking the South American trade from England".—*Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 6, 1892.

[222] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 6, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), January 1, 15, May 20, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* November 5, 1892.

[223] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), January 1, 15, February 5, 26, March 18, 1892.

[224] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* August 18, 1892.

Moreover, it was declared, we should not pay any attention to British opinion as "we are intelligent enough to decide for ourselves what we want".[225] It is perhaps questionable whether this Republican propaganda had much effect on the Irish voters, who are usually Democratic.

Both parties angled for the German vote. The Germans — especially the German Lutherans — in the nearby States of Wisconsin and Illinois, had deserted the Republicans because they disliked certain features of the compulsory education laws in their respective States, and had aided in electing the Democratic State ticket in both of these Republican States. The Democrats appreciated the value of these voters and placed a plank satisfying them in the Democratic national platform. They insisted that this issue was still alive and would cost the Republicans many votes.[226] The Republicans insisted that the German Lutherans had changed their political sentiment since 1892 and would again vote Republican. They seemed to get considerable encouragement from the fact that the *Germania* of Milwaukee, the organ of the German Lutherans of Wisconsin, had come back to the support of the Republican ticket.[227] While Iowa did not have a school question

[225] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), October 26, 1892.

[226] Porter's *National Platforms*, pp. 163–165; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, August 1, October 27, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), July 29, September 28, 1892. The Republicans seem to have been worried over the defection of the Lutherans. *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, May 25, 1892, maintained that "the German Lutheran leaders of Illinois are making a serious mistake in declaring in favor of the Democratic party", and later tried to minimize the German defection, declaring that while "the appeal of Carl Schurz and other German Democrats in the East for Democratic votes may possibly have some effect upon the New York Germans . . . . it will have little or no weight with the German-American Republicans in the West". — *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, August 21, 1892. The Democrats made frequent appeals to the German voters.— *Clinton Weekly Age*, July 26, September 2, 9, 1892.

[227] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 14, 1892; *The*

like Illinois and Wisconsin, it is probable that the Germans in Iowa sympathized with their kinsmen in Illinois and Wisconsin, and would therefore be more likely to vote Democratic because of this issue.

Little attention seems to have been paid in Iowa to the matter of President Harrison's Indian policy,[228] which was said to have cost the Republicans thousands of Catholic votes, although the *Iowa City Weekly Republican* denounced the Democrats for "making attempts to stir up religious prejudices between Protestants and Catholics" by making "political capital out of previous difficulties which arose between Indian Commissioner Morgan and the Catholic Church over Indian schools".[229]

Iowa City Weekly Republican, October 26, November 9, 1892. The Republicans maintained that the Germans would vote Republican because they favored protection and honest money.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), April 8, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, August 3, 1892.

[228] For years the government had maintained what were known as contract Indian schools, the contracts providing that the churches educate the children. While all churches had an equal opportunity to secure these schools, the Catholic church had obtained a larger per cent of them. The American Protective Association (an anti-Catholic organization) directed a fight against these schools. When General Thomas J. Morgan, a Baptist minister, was appointed Indian Commissioner by President Harrison, he at once began to abolish contract schools. His drastic policy aroused a strong protest from the Catholic church, but Harrison, fearing criticism from other denominations, did not remove him. Father Stephan, a priest who had spent much time among the Indians, now secured letters from prominent Catholic prelates, and went out and told leading Catholics what the Harrison administration had done in regard to these schools. His work had considerable influence wherever he went. At the same time, Illinois and Wisconsin had passed laws which were obnoxious to both Catholics and Lutherans.— Dunn's *From Harrison to Harding*, pp. 82–84, 98.

[229] It was stated that a circular had been sent out to Catholic priests "trying to besmirch the Indian office" but that the charges were really groundless, since Archbishop Ireland of St. Paul had approved of the change made by Commissioner Morgan and other prelates would also approve it when they understood the truth of the matter.— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, August 31, 1892.

There were a few charges of fraud mentioned, but largely of occurrences in other States which were reprinted in Iowa for their news value or political effects. The Democratic press frequently mentioned the work of Dudley and his "blocks of five" in the election of 1888, evidently endeavoring to show that the Republican leaders would not hesitate at bribery in order to win the election.[230]

A number of Republican State officials, including the Secretary of State, Treasurer, and Attorney General, had been guilty of nepotism. The Democratic papers published the facts of their actions during the fortnight before the election and contended that these officials deserved no sort of charity or mercy from the State of Iowa for such "salary grabs".[231] *The Iowa State Register* asserted that these officials were economical and stated that "there had been nothing in the transactions of the various state officials as far as finances are concerned, upon which a candidate or set of candidates can be elected. . . . It is a desperate and losing cause whose devotees begin to rake up filth and filth at that which exists only in their own rattled brains". It was also asserted that Governor Boies and other Democratic officials had hired relatives, a procedure which was perfectly proper since there was no law against it.[232] It is doubtful if this last minute raking up of scandals really

[230] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, September 29, October 20, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, July 27, August 10, October 26, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), October 12, 1892. The Democrats also charged that money was being used in a brazen effort to elect the Republican congressional candidate in the Sixth District.— *Des Moines Weekly Leader*, September 24, 1892.

[231] A number of relatives of these officials held office, but were said to do little or no work.— *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, October 27, November 3, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), November 2, 1892; *Clinton Weekly Age*, November 4, 1892.

[232] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 28, November 4, 1892.

aided the Democrats very much, since the election seems to have been fought out largely on national issues.

The central committees of the various parties arranged for and held a good many rallies and speeches in the State. Among the prominent Republicans, who spoke in Iowa were Senator William B. Allison,[233] Governor William McKinley, Governor Joseph B. Foraker, Senator William P. Frye, and Congressman Thomas B. Reed of Maine.[234] Republicans representing the various foreign elements also spoke in the State. Among these were Marcus Kavanaugh, an Irishman of Chicago, and Rudolph Blankenburg, a German importer of Philadelphia.[235] Governor Horace Boies took an active part in the Democratic campaign in the State.[236] A series of joint debates were arranged by the chairmen of the Republican and Democratic State committees, each side being represented by a speaker.[237] General Weaver and Mrs. Lease spoke in Iowa for the People's party.[238]

Some complaints were made prior to the election that the Australian ballot used during this election lacked definiteness, and it was asserted after the election "that be-

[233] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* September 7, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* September 3, 1892.

[234] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* September 14, November 9, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* August 6, October 8, 1892.

[235] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 19, November 2, 1892.

[236] *Clinton Weekly Herald,* September 17, 1892.

[237] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* September 8, 1892. For examples of debates see above, also *Spirit Lake Beacon,* August 19, 26, September 9, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 20, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* October 8, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 12, 1892.

[238] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* September 7, 1892. This paper quotes the *Omaha Bee* as saying that "Mrs. Lease's fog-horn voice is resounding in Iowa these days, reminding the people of that State that they are miserable and down-trodden, even if they do have money in the banks, own their own homes, and are educating their children at college".

tween 4,000 and 5,000 ballots in Iowa were thrown out because they were not properly marked''.[239] The Australian ballot, however, had the advantage of making bribery difficult, for the voter was enabled to keep his vote secret.

Both the Democratic and Republican newspapers stated that the campaign had been very quiet; many voters felt that the results in New York would decide the election, and it was therefore useless to do much in other States.[240]

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Both major parties seem to have had hopes of winning the election, but the national results were so decisive that they probably surprised the victors nearly as much as the vanquished. Cleveland not only carried the doubtful States of New York, Indiana, New Jersey, and Connecticut, but also carried the hitherto supposedly solid Republican States of Illinois, Wisconsin, and California, and came so near to carrying Ohio, that one of his electors slipped in over the lowest Republican elector. Cleveland received a total of 277 electoral votes, Harrison 145, and Weaver 22. The popular vote was Cleveland 5,556,543, Harrison 5,175,582, and Weaver 1,040,886.[241]

The Republicans were more successful in Iowa. They carried the State by a plurality only 7,756 votes less than their 1888 plurality. The Republicans elected all of their

[239] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), November 9, 1892; *The Weekly Iowa City Republican,* November 23, 1892.

[240] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 26, 1892; *Clinton Weekly Age,* November 4, 1892.

[241] Stanwood's *A History of the Presidency,* pp. 515–517; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1894, pp. 272, 273. The popular vote given is taken from Stanwood and differs slightly from that given in McPherson. It must be borne in mind that the Democratic vote is understated, and the People's vote overstated as a result of the fusion in a number of the Western States. A similar fusion in some Southern States affected the results of the People's party and Republican votes in these States.

State officers and all of their Congressmen except one — Walter I. Hayes of the Second District was the only Democratic Congressman elected. The Republican vote for President in Iowa was 219,795, the Democratic 196,367, the People's party 20,595, and the Prohibitionists 6,402.[242]

As soon as election was over the various Iowa editors began to give their explanations for the tremendous defeat suffered by the Republicans in the national contest. *The Clinton Weekly Herald* attributed the defeat to the vote suppression in the South, Tammany Hall, the Chicago anarchists who went to the polls to support Governor Altgeld, the People's party, and the school laws in Illinois and Wisconsin, which caused the German Lutherans and other Germans of these two States to support the Democratic ticket almost in a body.[243]

In the opinion of *The Iowa State Register*, the Republican defeat was due to "the enormous corruption funds" which backed the Democrats, added to the fraud and intimidation in the South.[244] Most of the editors considered the protective tariff as one of the most important if not the chief reason for the defeat of the Republicans: the people had demanded a reversal of the protective policy.[245]

One Iowa paper attributed the Republican defeat to the fact that the people had become suspicious of the party. That party, it said, "had been suspected of consorting with designing men" for twenty years. "Its great strength had gone out in a sinful and lustful way to combinations of capital. . . . The country was and is wonderfully pros-

[242] *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, pp. 193–198, 203, 204.

[243] *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* November 12, 1892.

[244] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), November 11, 1892. This paper added that Democratic free trade had triumphed for the time.

[245] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* November 16, 1892; *Spirit Lake Beacon,* November 18, 1892; *Clinton Weekly Age,* November 11, 1892.

perous. The public, however, decided to entertain the suspicion that all of this great prosperity was too one-sided in its application, the bulk of it going to the few and the modicum to the many. . . . It has temporized too long with men and measures, and combinations that were not clean, wholesome or inspired by patriotism''.[246] It seems probable that the protective tariff policy of the Republican party was the chief cause of its defeat. The dissatisfaction of certain classes with the distribution of wealth, and the economic policy of the country reacted against the party in power, especially since many of the voters considered that party closely connected with the corporate interests. Certain other factors such as the Homestead riots, the Wisconsin and Illinois school question, and Harrison's Indian policy all aided in making the Republican defeat more decisive.

A number of the editors endeavored to explain why Iowa had not drifted toward the Democratic party like most of the other States. The *Fort Dodge Messenger* claimed that the reason Iowa went Republican "is found in the universal prosperity which is enjoyed in Iowa. The cries of the calamity howlers were unavailing against the positive knowledge that times were never so prosperous before".[247] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican* attributed the Republican victory in Iowa to the fact that "the tariff question was

[246] *The Saturday Evening Post* (Weekly, Burlington), November 12, 1892. *The Review of Reviews* gave a similar opinion. It attributed the Republican defeat to the fact that the voters considered the Republican party too favorable toward the corporate interests and the concentration of wealth. "The trouble at Homestead created a widespread feeling among working men that the Republican party was not sincere in urging protection as a means of maintaining American wages. . . . This campaign involved to some extent a movement of the poor against the rich, and that the Republican party was more generally thought to stand for the rich".— *The American Review of Reviews,* Vol. VI, pp. 517–519.

[247] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), November 17, 1892.

fairly and squarely placed before the people by the Republican papers and speakers and the McKinley measure was endorsed. There was no school or silver question to embarrass the Republicans as in some other States''.[248]

Governor Boies claimed that ''minor issues'' were responsible for the Democratic defeat in Iowa, while other Democrats claimed that the free silver Democrats had voted for Weaver.[249] An analysis of the vote by counties brings out the fact that the People's party probably injured the Democratic party fully as much as it did the Republican.[250]

It is probable that the higher prices of farm products during 1891-1892 added to the Republican votes. Iowa was comparatively prosperous in comparison with some of the States farther west, while she had no industrial population to be affected by such industrial riots as the Homestead strikes. The ''war traditions'' must also not be overlooked, for they undoubtedly aided considerably in keeping the soldier voters and their sympathizers in the Republican ranks. The average Iowa voter had been in the habit of voting Republican and since there was no very pressing reason during this election to make him change his vote, he voted for the ''grand old party''.

[248] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* November 23, 1892.

[249] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* November 23, 1892.

[250] Of the 37 counties in which the People's party vote was over 5 per cent of the total vote, the Democratic vote was proportionately larger in 1892 than in 1888 in 10 counties and smaller in 26, the Republican vote was larger in only 1 and smaller in 36, while in the 62 counties with less than 5 per cent Populist votes, the Democratic vote was proportionally larger in 46 counties and smaller in 10, the Republican larger in 2 counties and smaller in 58. It appears that in this election the People's party drew more votes from the Republican party than from the Democratic, but that while in some counties the dissatisfied voters voted Populist, in others they voted Democratic. Had there been no third party in the field, the majority of these voters would probably have voted Democratic. The Democrats probably lost nearly as many votes because of the third party as the Republicans did.

The foreign vote had always been a numerous and important part of the Iowa electorate. A careful study of the results of the election of 1892 gives an index of how these citizens cast their votes. In 1890, the German-born males over 21 years of age numbered over 15 per cent of the total number of males in 22 counties. The Democrats carried 15 of these 22 counties in 1892, while they carried only 13 of the other 77 counties of the State. Thus it appears that the Germans as a whole voted Democratic much more frequently than their neighbors. A study of the vote in the different counties in the State from 1880 to 1892 also shows that the drift of German voters from the Republican to the Democratic party was more rapid than that of the other voters of the State.

The explanation of this drift toward the Democratic party is probably found largely in the opposition of the Germans to prohibition, which had been supported by the Republicans during this period, although the school issues in the neighboring States of Wisconsin and Illinois probably aided somewhat in influencing them toward the Democratic party.

In the eleven Iowa counties in which the census of 1890 reported 15 per cent of the males of 21 or over born in Scandinavian countries, the Republicans were victorious, as they had been in all three of the previous State elections. The trend was away from the Republican party, however, for in all but three of these counties, the Republican vote reached its lowest level for these four elections, although the Democratic vote was smaller than in 1884 in all but two of these counties.

In the election of 1892 the Republicans carried eight of the ten counties which had the smallest percentage of foreign-born residents in 1890. There seemed to be a slight trend toward the Democratic party during this period on

the part of the native-born voters, but this was much less than among the Germans, and slightly less than among the Scandinavians. The Scandinavians appear to have been strongly Republican, the native-born citizens while usually Republican were frequently Democratic, while the Germans were oftener Democratic than Republican.

Although the Democratic party elected their presidential candidate and secured control of both houses of Congress in 1892, the People's party also derived some comfort from the election. As one paper put it: "A party that can carry four or five States in a presidential election certainly has reason to hope. When all of the nondescript elements that properly belong with that party get safely marshalled under its banners, and they will all now go to it then it will have good fighting strength. . . . We think it probable that the People's party will advance to second place by the action of the farmers, who will not ally themselves to any extent with the Democratic populations of the city. It looks now as if the readjustment of political lines might divide the city from the country and deliver the cities into the keeping of the Democratic party".[251] Another Republican paper of the time spoke less optimistically of the future of the new party, characterizing it as "a nine days' wonder that will pass away and be known only as a memory, along with the Greenback, Anti-Monopoly, and various other crazes that have come and gone".[252]

There was much discussion as to the future of the new party. Would the party increase in strength and ultimately take the place of the Republican party? Or on the other hand, would the new party follow the example begun in 1892, and fuse with one of the major parties either partially or completely? The party ultimately followed the latter

[251] *The Saturday Evening Post* (Weekly, Burlington), November 12, 1892.

[252] *Clinton Weekly Herald*, November 12, 1892.

alternative, captured the Democratic party in 1896, wrote an endorsement of "the free and unlimited coinage of silver", the chief issue of the People's party, in the Democratic platform, endorsed William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic candidate, and made silver the paramount issue of the campaign. Certain of the demands of the People's party such as the direct election of the United States Senators, a graduated income tax, and postal savings banks have since been written into the national statute books, while other reforms like the initiative and referendum have been adopted by many of the States.

The Populist vote was comparatively small in Iowa. They polled slightly less than 5 per cent of the total vote of the State for their presidential candidate in 1892 or slightly less than half as large a percentage of the total vote as the Greenback party drew in 1880. They did not even keep their ratio in the counties in which the Greenback vote had been strong.[253] While the Populists did not in the majority of cases keep up their ratio in the counties in which the Greenback vote had been large, they did draw their chief strength from these counties. It was only in the northern and far western part of the State that the Populists made important gains over the Greenback vote of 1880.[254] The frontier had moved westward during the twelve years from 1880 to 1892, and the tide of radicalism had gone with it.

The People's party appears to have gained little support from the German voters in Iowa. Bremer was the only

[253] Of the 33 counties in which the Greenbackers received 10 per cent or more of the popular vote in 1880, the Populists kept their ratio in 11, and drew less than 2½ per cent in 10 of them.

[254] Notably Lyon, Sioux, Osceola, O'Brien, Dickinson, Clay, Buena Vista, Pocahontas, Winnebago, Hancock, Worth, Cerro Gordo, and Floyd in the North. It will be noticed that none of these counties are in the northeast where in 1880 the Greenbackers received a considerable vote.

county with a heavy German population which had given the Greenback party as large a vote as their Statewide average, while over half of the German counties gave them less than 30 per cent of their State average. The People's party did not fare much better, getting as large a percentage as their State average in only one county, Muscatine, and securing less than 3 per cent of the vote in 19 of the 22 German counties. The German voters, it appears, would not vote for a third party, but when they became dissatisfied with the Republican party went over to the Democrats.

The People's party gained only slightly more support from the Scandinavian voters. The Greenback party had drawn over 10 per cent of the vote in three of the eleven Scandinavian counties, Story, Webster, and Hamilton, but the voters in these counties seemed to have gone back to the old parties by 1892, the People's party vote being less than 5 per cent in each of these counties. The People's party vote did increase in a few of the Scandinavian counties, notably in Winnebago.

It was among the counties which had a very small foreign element that the third parties drew their largest vote. Eight of the ten counties with the smallest percentage of foreign-born citizens,[255] had given the Greenback party over 10 per cent of its vote in 1880 — in one of the other two it was over 8 per cent and in the other nearly 6 per cent. The People's party vote was also strong in these counties. There was also a strong sectional bias in the third party vote, the Greenback-Populist stronghold being in the south central part of the State.[256]

The election results in Iowa were not very encouraging

[255] Less than 10 per cent of the males of 21 or over in 1890 were born in a foreign country.

[256] Haynes's *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War*, p. 326.

for the new party. The small percentage of their total vote and the fact that the foreign voters would not support them to any great extent made it improbable that the People's party would ever develop much strength in the State. Iowa, it appeared, was no longer a frontier State, subject to frontier third-party movements.

The chief issue of the campaign had been the protective policy of the Republican party, and while the nation as a whole had rejected it, Iowa had endorsed it. It was evident that neither the People's party or the anti-prohibition movement toward the Democratic party during the later eighties and early nineties would succeed in wresting Iowa from the Republican party. As was forecast by their action in 1892, the Republicans dropped prohibition in the next State election and won the election by an increased majority.[257] Iowa has never since elected a Democratic Governor.

Finally, the election of 1892 marked the first election in which the Democrats secured control of both Houses of Congress and the presidency since the administration of James Buchanan. Cleveland's election in 1884 rested on a slender majority in New York, which was probably due to Burchard's unfortunate remarks in New York and could be considered accidental, but in 1892 the Democratic victory was complete and decisive.

THE FOREIGN VOTE

The foreign vote constituted a numerous and important element of the Iowa electorate in 1892. In 1890, 16.95 per cent of the inhabitants of the State were foreign born and 26.84 per cent more had one or both parents foreign born.[258] Of the 324,069 foreign born inhabitants of Iowa,

[257] Cole's *A History of the People of Iowa*, pp. 483, 484.

[258] *Eleventh Census of the United States*, 1890, Population, Pt. I, p. 88.

136,902 were Germans (including Austrians and Dutch), 72,873 were Scandinavians, 37,560 were British (including Scotch and Welsh), and 37,353 were Irish.[259] An analysis of the foreign element by counties furnishes some interesting sidelights as to how the various foreign elements tended to vote in the presidential elections from 1880 to 1892. In some parts of the State, especially in the southern counties, the foreign element made up only a very small portion of the total population. In ten of these less than ten per cent and in twenty-seven less than twenty per cent of the males over twenty-one years of age, in 1890, were foreign born. In other counties the foreign born were in the majority or else constituted a strong minority of the total inhabitants. In two counties over sixty per cent, in six counties over fifty per cent, and in nineteen counties over forty per cent of the males over twenty-one in 1890 were foreign born.[260]

The largest group of foreign born voters in Iowa were the Germans. In twenty-two counties fifteen per cent or more of the males were German born.[261] The Republicans carried nineteen of these German counties in 1880, eleven in 1884, eleven in 1888, and only seven in 1892, the Demo-

This total of 43.79 per cent foreign born or born of foreign parents was less than half the similar element of North Dakota, only slightly over half as large as that of Minnesota, Wisconsin, or South Dakota, and less than that of Michigan or Illinois.

[259] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Pt. II, Population, pp. 628–630.

[260] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Population, Pt. I, pp. 777, 778.

[261] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Population, Pt. I, pp. 777, 778, Pt. II, pp. 628–630. In five counties — Jackson, Benton, O'Brien, Cedar, and Hardin — the percentage of German born of all ages was less than 15 per cent of the total population, but this estimate is conservative for the percentage of males over twenty-one was about double the percentage of the foreign born of all ages, most of the children being native born.

crats in each case carrying all the others. In only one of these counties — Lee — was the Republican vote as great in 1884 as it had been in 1880, while the Democrats gained in every county.[262] It appears that there was a marked drift of the German voters from the Republican to the Democratic party in these twenty-two German counties in 1884. The Republican vote in 1888 was less than that in 1884 in fourteen counties, and more in eight, even gaining over 1880 in two counties — Clayton and Lee. The Democrats in 1888 just about held what they had won in 1884, gaining in eleven counties and losing in eleven. In 1892 the Republicans lost in every county except Dubuque, while the Democrats gained in nineteen counties and held their own in the other three — Lee, Jackson, and Des Moines. From 1880 to 1892, the Republican vote in the State as a whole decreased six per cent, while in fifteen of these German counties it decreased over ten per cent and in only four did it decrease less than six per cent. During these twelve years, the Democrats increased their vote in the State as a whole over eleven per cent,[263] and in fourteen of these German counties, the Democratic gain was greater than eleven per cent, while in Scott County their gain was thirty per cent. The Germans as a group seemed to have left the Republican party in greater numbers than the average voters of Iowa. This change may have been due to the attitude of the Republicans on Prohibition.[264]

[262] The term gain as used here is made to apply to proportional gain. The returns from elections are figured in percentages and these percentages compared. The Republican vote in Sioux County was 65 per cent of the total in 1880, 60 per cent in 1884, 57 per cent in 1888, and 52 per cent in 1892.

[263] The fact that the Democrats gained more than the Republicans lost is explained by the fact that the Greenback party in 1880 polled over twice as large a percentage of the total vote as the People's party did in 1892.

[264] For election returns for 1880–1892, see the following: *American Almanac*, 1885, pp. 216, 217; *Iowa Official Register*, 1889, pp. 76–192, 1893, pp. 119–203.

In eleven counties of Iowa over fifteen per cent of the male residents over twenty-one in 1890 were born in one of the Scandinavian countries.[265] The Republican party carried all of these counties in each presidental election from 1880 to 1892 inclusive. In 1880 and 1884 in ten of these counties and in 1888 and 1892 in all eleven of them, the Republican vote was proportionally greater than the Republican vote in the State as a whole. Winnebago, which had the largest percentage of Scandinavian voters in the State, gave nearly eighty-eight per cent of her vote to the Republican party in 1880, nearly seventy-six per cent in 1884, nearly seventy-nine per cent in 1888, and over sixty-seven per cent in 1892.[266] As was the case in most of the counties of the State, the proportion of Republican votes to the total vote declined considerably in the Scandinavian counties between 1880 and 1884, but while the Republican vote in Iowa declined still more from 1884 to 1888, it increased in nearly all the Scandinavian counties, though it did not reach the level of 1880. Since the Republican vote in 1888 in the Scandinavian counties increased over the total vote four years before, while their vote in the State at large declined, it would seem probable that most of the Scandinavian voters who had left the Republican party in 1880 had returned by 1888. The fact that the Republican vote did not reach the 1880 level is explained by the fact that the other voters in these counties had not all returned to the party. The Republican vote in these counties was proportionally smaller in 1892 than in 1888, and in all but three reached the lowest level of any of these four elections.

The Democratic vote in each of these Scandinavian

[265] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Population, Pt. I, pp. 777, 778, Pt. II, pp. 628–630.

[266] Winnebago County gave the Populist party over 10 per cent of her vote in 1892, which explains most of the Republican loss.

counties increased in 1884 as compared with 1880. While the Greenback-Democratic fusion in that year explains part of the Democratic gain, the fact remains that in each county, Cleveland drew a larger percentage of votes than the Greenback and Democratic total in 1880. In 1888 the Democratic vote declined over four years before but was greater than it had been in 1880, showing that although the Scandinavians were gradually returning to the Republican party, they had not all returned. In 1892, the Democrats again gained in eight of these counties and lost in three, although they reached their high water mark in 1884 in only two counties. The above figures bring out the fact that the Scandinavians as a group were strongly Republican and during this period did not swing toward the Democratic party as their German neighbors did.

It will be worthwhile to compare the returns from the foreign counties with those from the counties which had a very small foreign element. It must be borne in mind, however, that part of the difference between the political affiliations of the native born citizen and the foreign born may have been due to geographic influences, since the native born element was strongest in the south-central part of the State, while the Germans and Scandinavians were mostly in the northern part of the State or along the extreme southeast or southwest of the State.

In 1890 ten counties of Iowa reported less than ten per cent of their male residents born in a foreign country. The Republicans carried nine of these counties in 1880, seven in 1884, eight in 1888, and eight in 1892; the Greenbackers carried one in 1880; the Democrats carried three in 1884, two in 1888, and two in 1892. Although the Republican vote in the State as a whole declined 4 1/2 per cent between 1880 and 1884, that party gained in five of these counties, held their own in two more, and lost in only three, and in

no case was their loss over three per cent. It seems that the Republicans gained somewhat in this election as a result of the Greenback-Democratic fusion. Apparently some of the Greenbackers refused to be delivered to the Democrats by the fusion of 1884.

The Democrats, probably due to their fusion with the Greenback party, increased the proportion of their vote in nine of these ten counties in 1884 and lost in only one, but were not so fortunate in the next election, gaining over 1884 in only one county and losing in nine. In 1892, they increased their vote over 1888 in only two counties and lost in eight. In only one county was their vote greater than in 1884. The rise of the Populists probably had something to do with the fact that the Democrats did not gain in 1892, since the new party secured considerable support in these counties.

The above statistics seem to point out that although a considerable number of the native born Americans voted the Greenback ticket in 1880, they did not all go over to the Democrats in the fusion of 1884, while some that voted Democratic in 1884 went over to the Republicans in 1888.

By 1892 the Germans as a group seemed to be oftener Democratic than Republican, the Scandinavians were still very strongly Republican, while the native born citizens of Iowa, while voting Republican more than Democratic, did not support the Republicans in as large a proportion as did the Scandinavians.

WALTER ELLSWORTH NYDEGGER

WHEATON COLLEGE
WHEATON ILLINOIS

THE ELECTION OF 1892 IN IOWA

Once in every four years the people of the United States elect their chief executive. Each party chooses its standard bearer, perfects its organizations, and bids for the support of the voters. Bitter rivalry and partisanship frequently arise, but once the canvass is over and the votes counted the nation quickly accepts the verdict of the majority and bitter feelings and partisan strife disappear. By these quadrennial contests we determine the course and personnel of our government.

A traditional feature of American politics has been the two-party system. Occasionally a third party arises, for a brief time threatens to usurp the place of one of the major parties, then usually fades away again. Since 1860, no third party has been able to win a national election, but many of the ideas advocated by these parties have been taken up by the major parties and incorporated in their platforms. Our party leaders are opportunists; they do not adopt a principle unless they think it will increase their strength. A third party will often adopt some principle and seek support from the voters on the strength of it. Attention is thus focused on the principle and if it finds support from the people, the minor party will increase in strength. Whenever the principle has secured the support of enough people one of the major parties will appropriate it. Thus the minor parties, although they do not attain power themselves, often have an important influence.

The election of 1892 marked the appearance of one of these ephemeral third parties — the People's party — in the presidential arena. While the People's party secured only twenty-two electoral votes in this election — most of

these were probably due to their fusion with the Democrats in certain Western States — they did succeed in focusing the attention of the voters on their major demand, the free and unlimited coinage of silver. Four years later, the Democratic party incorporated this demand in its national platform and the People's party, finding that the Democrats had stolen their thunder, fused with the latter. In the struggle between the East and the West, which was emphasized in 1892, the old Civil War sectionalism tended to disappear and to give way to a new sectionalism, based not on old traditions but on economic differences. After the election of 1892, it seems that the old Civil War traditions gradually disappeared and now live only in dusty magazines and newspapers or in monographs such as the present one.

The election of 1892 was one of the few national elections in the United States in which the tariff was a dominant issue. Four years before, by a narrow margin, the Republicans had won the national election on the tariff issue, but in 1892 they were decisively defeated on the same issue, the second defeat within two years. This election was probably the most clear-cut rejection of the protective tariff theory by the American people since the Civil War.

Iowa furnishes a good field for the study of this election. It was just on the border line between the new and the old West, and it furnishes a good location from which to study the activities and distribution of the People's party in the border region. It will be interesting to attempt to determine why Iowa did not give the People's party movement nearly as much support as it had given the Greenback movement twelve years before. There was an interesting sectionalism within the State, the northwestern part giving some support to the new party, while the eastern part was almost immune to the third party radicalism.

Iowa was still predominantly an agricultural State in 1892, and as such furnishes an index of the reactions of the farmers to the protective tariff. State issues were all subordinated in this election and emphasis was placed on the national issues. In Iowa also the Civil War traditions flourished long after the end of the war. The extension of this issue into the election of 1892 enables us to study this interesting Republicanism of Iowa. A movement arose in Iowa during the latter eighties which threatened for a time to change Iowa from a solid Republican to a doubtful State. The Democrats elected their candidate for Governor in 1889 and 1891 and secured six of the eleven Iowa Congressmen in 1890. The threatened revolt of the State collapsed in 1892 and had so far disappeared by the next year that the Republicans secured control of all the State offices in the election of 1893. When the election of 1896 arrayed the South and West against the East on the silver question, Iowa was found in the ranks with the East. Premonitions of this action can be readily seen as early as 1892.

THE ISSUES OF 1892

The tariff has frequently been an important issue in American politics, but it was not until the latter part of the "eighties" that its importance became so great that it dwarfed all other issues. Most of the credit for forcing the major parties to take a definite stand on the tariff question is due to President Cleveland. Cleveland devoted his annual message in December, 1887, entirely to tariff reform, and proposed a repeal of the "vicious, illegal, and inequitable tariff". He stated that the huge surplus which was then accumulating in the treasury drew too much money from circulation and led to governmental extravagance.[1]

[1] Richardson's *Messages and Papers of the Presidents,* Vol. VIII, pp. 589–591.

The Republicans gleefully accepted the challenge contained in Cleveland's message and came out in favor of protection, thus making the tariff the chief issue in the election of 1888. They won the election by a narrow margin and at once passed a high protective tariff measure. To reduce the surplus they taxed some commodities so heavily as to make it impossible to import them with profit, reduced the tariff on sugar, which had amounted to millions of dollars, and granted a bounty to the domestic producers of sugar. The remission of the duty on sugar was adopted as a means of gaining for the new tariff act the support of the West, where it was admitted by the tariff advocates it would be hard to present in an attractive light the higher duties on manufactured goods. In order to attain the same object the Senate, largely under the influence of James G. Blaine, inserted a reciprocity section in the bill, which gave the President power to impose by proclamation certain duties on sugar, molasses, tea, coffee, and hides, if he considered that any country exporting these commodities to the United States "imposes duties or other exactions on the agricultural or other products of the United States, which, in view of the free introduction of sugar, molasses, tea, coffee, and hides into the United States, he may deem to be reciprocally unjust or unreasonable".[2]

The tariff act of 1890 placed before the American people without disguise the question whether they wished a large extension of the protective system.[3] A decisive answer was given in the congressional elections, which came thirty days after the passage of the McKinley Bill; the Democrats won a decisive victory. "Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, Kansas, and Nebraska elected forty-four Democrats and Independents, and fifteen Republicans and eighteen Demo-

[2] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, pp. 4–23; Taussig's *A Tariff History of the United States,* pp. 256–278.

[3] Taussig's *A Tariff History of the United States,* pp. 277–283.

crats in 1888. The Democrats gained a majority even in New England''.[4]

The chief cause of this political revolution was the rise in prices of retail commodities at the moment when the tariff bill was passed. These increases were due partly to necessary readjustments in trade, partly to increased cost of production, and partly to a concerted scheme on the part of retailers to secure an exceptional temporary profit before the tariff went into effect. The increase in prices furnished the Democratic speakers abundant campaign material, and they laid heavy emphasis on the new burdens placed upon the laboring man by the tariff. The Republican discussion as to prices was contradictory, the old and traditional argument being that protection ultimately resulted in lower prices. Beginning with the campaign of 1888, however, the position was taken that prices might be too low, that cheap prices meant cheap men, and cheap men meant a cheap country. Some attempts were also made to show that the new tariff was not solely responsible for higher prices by explaining that the rise was caused by short crops and an increased demand for goods by business which was improved under the stimulus of the new law.[5]

The House, which was Democratic, did not attempt to adopt a general tariff measure, but instead passed a number of "popgun" bills which placed such articles as wool, cotton ties, and binding twine on the free list. These bills naturally died in the Republican Senate and were important only as an indication of the policy of the Democrats, if they should again gain full power.[6]

The tariff question was still unsettled in the spring of

[4] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897* (*The American Nation: A History*, Vol. XXIV), p. 181.

[5] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 179–181.

[6] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, pp. 206–212.

1892. A symposium appearing in *The North American Review* in March, 1892, on "Issues of the Presidential Campaign" contained articles written by seven of the prominent leaders of both parties. Each of these stated what he considered would be the most important issues in the coming campaign, each mentioned the tariff as an issue, and five of them considered it to be the paramount issue.[7]

The Republicans had suffered an overwhelming defeat on the issue of protection in 1890, but they were unwilling to give up their stand on the issue, for they believed that the election of 1890 had come too soon after the passage of the McKinley Bill to give the measure a chance to demonstrate its value. They won in a number of State elections in 1891 and were encouraged to think that the people might reverse the verdict of 1890 in the presidential election of 1892. The Democrats, on the other hand, were jubilant over their victory in 1890 and felt that they had an excellent chance to capture the entire national government in the next general election on the tariff issue.

The tariff had a direct relation to the political situation in Iowa, for the general tendency in each political campaign was to stress the tariff in the country as a whole rather than in a certain section which it might be expected to benefit particularly. The Republicans maintained that the tariff benefited the country as a whole and brought prosperous conditions to all, whereas the Democrats, as might have been expected, denied that the protective tariff system either caused an increase of wages or maintained the scale of wages, and denounced it as a tax the greater

[7] *The North American Review,* Vol. CLIV, pp. 257–280. The Democratic contributors were: W. C. P. Breckinridge, Representative from Kentucky; Richard P. Bland, Representative from Missouri; and Benton McMillan, Representative from Tennessee. The Republicans were: Eugene Hale, Senator from Maine; James McMillan, Senator from Michigan; Frank Hiscock, Senator from New York; and William R. Merriam, Governor of Minnesota.

part of which was paid indirectly to favored manufacturers. Certain sections of the McKinley Bill had been drawn up especially for the purpose of gaining support in the West; the reduction of the duty on sugar lowered the price of that commodity and proved popular with the consumer, while the reciprocity section was drawn up for the purpose of increasing farm markets and securing the support of the farmer. The claims for reciprocity were given a great impetus by the great increase in exports which took place immediately after the passage of the McKinley Bill.[8]

Another factor which must be considered in relation to the election of 1892 in Iowa is the Civil War issue. The Civil War traditions remained strong in Iowa long after the close of the war and were assiduously fanned by the partisan newspapers of the State. This issue played a considerable part in each presidential campaign and was said to have exerted an influence second only to the tariff in the presidential election of 1888 in Iowa.[9]

Indeed the soldier vote may have decided that election in the United States by swinging the doubtful States of Indiana and New York to Harrison, thus preventing the election of Cleveland,[10] who had aroused much opposition in Grand Army and partisan circles during his first term by his veto of the dependent soldiers' pension bill and hundreds of special pension acts and by his order restoring the Confederate battle flags to the South. The latter order had been withdrawn after intense opposition, but the bitter feeling aroused by this incident and the veto messages of Cleveland was so intense that he considered it inadvisable to address the Grand Army of the Republic in their next

[8] *United States Statistical Abstract,* 1900, p. 82.

[9] McMurry's *The Soldier Vote in the Election of 1888* in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. XVIII, pp. 4–24.

[10] Glasson's *Federal Military Pensions in the United States,* p. 225.

annual encampment for fear of being subjected to personal insult.[11] The record of Harrison, the Republican candidate in 1888, had furnished a marked contrast to Cleveland's record. Harrison was a Union veteran and had said in one of his campaign speeches that it was "no time to be weighing the claims of old soldiers with apothecary's scales." He was known to favor liberal pensions.[12]

When the Republicans came into power in 1889, they at once began to fulfil the promises which they had made to the soldiers during the campaign of 1888. President Harrison appointed a disabled veteran, James Tanner, as Commissioner of Pensions. Tanner had a reputation for personal honesty, but he was very enthusiastic about pensions and proceeded to distribute the surplus to the ex-soldiers on so liberal a scale that Secretary of Interior Noble halted his work. Tanner questioned Noble's control over him, but, upon being informed that he was insubordinate, resigned. Green R. Raum then succeeded Tanner as Commissioner of Pensions. Raum's low sense of official propriety was brought to light in the later investigations of the Pensions Bureau.[13] The scope and cost of soldier relief was further increased by the disability pension bill adopted by Congress, and signed by President Harrison on June 27, 1890, which required that pensions should be paid to all disabled men who had served three months or more in the Union army, regardless of whether they needed aid or not.[14]

[11] McElroy's *Grover Cleveland, the Man and the Statesman,* Vol. I, pp. 200–217.

[12] Editorial in the *Indianapolis Journal,* April 20, 1889, cited in Glasson's *Federal Military Pensions,* p. 224.

[13] Glasson's *Federal Military Pensions,* pp. 226–228.

[14] The total cost of pensions was slightly over eighty-two million dollars in 1888, but was raised to over one hundred and forty-four millions by 1891.—*Report of the Commissioner of Pensions,* 1917, pp. 20–30; Glasson's *Federal Military Pensions,* p. 273.

As the campaign of 1892 approached, it seemed probable that the soldiers as a class would tend to support the Republican party in return for its liberality in regard to pension appropriations, but it was also likely that others had begun to get disgusted with the scandals and extravagant expenditures of the Pensions Bureau and were ready to call a halt to further extension of pension relief. It was doubtful which party would profit from the pension policy of the Harrison administration. The Republicans would still have an opportunity to appeal to the other Civil War traditions and memories of the North in an effort to gain votes without danger of laying themselves open to charges of scandal or extravagance, as would be the case if they stressed the pension issue. These appeals had been used with considerable force in Iowa in previous elections and might be used again, for it was probably true that considerable war feeling still existed in the State.

The Republicans had always felt that they would gain political strength by virtue of the negro vote, and when they came into power in all the branches of the national government in 1889 for the first time since 1875, they attempted to pass a bill providing for Federal supervision and control over elections upon petition of five hundred voters in any local district.[15] This bill, though not sectional on the face of it, was really aimed at the South where the negroes were deprived of their ballot. The Democrats at once called this measure the "Force Bill". The South was bitterly opposed to the measure and as their opposition grew northern commercial interests which had invested considerable capital in the South became alarmed and used their influence against it. The bill passed the House but was allowed to die in the Senate.[16]

[15] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1890, p. 207.

[16] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* pp. 167–170.

The Force Bill gave the Democratic leaders a useful issue to hold the South, whose traditional adherence to the Democratic party was being threatened by the growth of the People's party in that section. It is probable that this issue had very little effect in the election in Iowa, since Iowa had very few negroes, and would not be likely to have more than a partisan interest in the measure.

Another important issue in the election of 1892 in Iowa was the prohibition question. This issue exercised considerable political influence in the State during the eighties and early nineties. The Republican party in 1879 adopted a plank calling for a State prohibitory amendment. When a constitutional amendment prohibiting the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors in the State, which had been passed by popular vote in 1882, was thrown out by the courts on the ground of defects in the legislative record and procedure, the Republican legislature passed a prohibitory law.[17]

The Democrats opposed this law and advocated a license system. As the prohibition law proved to be hard to enforce, the pendulum of public opinion swung gradually toward the Democratic view. When the Democrats elected Horace Boies Governor in 1889, the Republican newspapers with almost complete unanimity assigned prohibition as one of the leading causes for the Republican defeat, although the lack of popularity of Hutchinson, the Republican candidate, and the attitude of Governor Larrabee toward the railroads were mentioned as contributing factors.[18]

The reaction against the prohibitory law increased dur-

[17] Clark's *History of Liquor Legislation in Iowa* in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. VI, pp. 72–87.

[18] Clark's *History of Liquor Legislation in Iowa* in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. VI, pp. 563–575; Cole's *A History of the People of Iowa*, pp. 474–476.

ing the early nineties, but the Republicans blocked all action against the law during the first four years of the decade. The prohibitory question was again the leading issue in the State campaign of 1891, the Republicans standing for the enforcement of the law, the Democrats demanding a license system, and the newly formed People's party condemning both parties for "the constant effort to reopen the temperance question in this state, to the exclusion of the grave economic questions which now confront the people". The Prohibitionists also nominated a candidate and adopted a platform favoring both State and national prohibitory amendments, and the establishment of a State constabulary to enforce the prohibitory law in the rebellious counties which were not enforcing the law.[19] The Democrats won a more decisive victory than in 1889, electing their entire State ticket. Since the question of prohibition had been one of the chief issues of the campaign, the election clearly indicated that the people were becoming more dissatisfied with prohibition.[20] The Republican leaders again attributed their defeat to prohibition and began to wonder if it would not be advisable to drop an issue which had been repudiated by the people.[21] Following the election, a conference representing all factions of the party was held at Sioux City, and a movement was inaugurated to harmonize the party on the prohibition question. The conference favored a repeal of the prohibitory law and the passage of a local option law or a resubmission of prohibition to the vote of the people.[22]

Strenuous efforts were made to enact liquor laws in the

[19] *Iowa Official Register,* 1892, pp. 163, 164, 167, 172–175.

[20] Clark's *History of Liquor Legislation in Iowa* in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. VI, p. 587.

[21] Cole's *A History of the People of Iowa,* p. 48.

[22] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), November 27, 1891.

General Assembly in 1892, but little was done. A local option bill known as the "Gatch Bill" did pass the Senate but did not get through the House, where the Republicans had a majority and the prohibitory sentiment was stronger.[23] Opinion in the State was divided on the question of prohibition. While the legislature was still in session in 1892, an enthusiastic temperance meeting was held at Mount Pleasant, where strong opposition to the Gatch local option bill was expressed;[24] but a few weeks later, a conference of anti-prohibition Republicans met in Des Moines and appointed a committee to confer with the Republican House caucus and ask for a bill similar to the Gatch bill. Those attending the conference pledged themselves to "use every influence" to induce the Republican party to discontinue the policy of prohibition as a party measure.[25]

It is clear that the prohibition question was a troublesome one for the Republican party. They had lost the last two State elections on this issue, but they were still afraid that they would lose the support of the temperance element in their party if they abandoned the issue, for the State Temperance Union was active and would not hesitate to support a third party if the Republicans abandoned prohibition.

Civil service reform was an issue in the election of 1892 in Iowa, although a careful perusal of the Iowa newspapers leads to the conclusion that the issue did not play a very important part in the canvass in this State. Civil service reform seems to have been considered more or less of a "highbrow" movement which would attract certain circles in the East but did not appeal to the West.

[23] Clark's *History of Liquor Legislation in Iowa* in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. VI, pp. 588, 589.

[24] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 4, 1892.

[25] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), April 1, 1892.

The election of 1884 had brought out the existence of a small group of enthusiastic reformers who cared more for civil service reform than for party allegiance. These Mugwumps are credited by many with having in that year caused the election of Cleveland because they doubted the good faith of Blaine and considered Cleveland the more thorough reformer.[26] Cleveland's action in regard to civil service reform was not entirely satisfactory to the independents, reformers, and Mugwumps, and he received the support of only a part of them in 1888.[27]

President Harrison came into office on a platform which favored an extension of the reform system, but, like Cleveland, he found his intentions frustrated by the insatiable demands of office-seekers. He reorganized the system, however, and appointed Theodore Roosevelt, a vigorous fighter for reform, as chairman of the Civil Service Commission.[28] In 1891 he placed a portion of the Indian bureau and in 1892 the Fish Commission on the classified service list,[29] while Secretary of the Navy Tracy extended the reform to the skilled and unskilled workers of the navy yards.[30] On the other hand, President Harrison was accused of surrendering to such party bosses as Mathew S. Quay of Pennsylvania — who was supposed to have dictated the appointment of John Wanamaker as Postmaster General — Thomas C. Platt of New York, and William Mahone of Virginia. The appointment of James S. Clarkson of Iowa as First Assistant Postmaster General aroused

[26] Fish's *The Civil Service and the Patronage*, p. 222.

[27] Curtis's *Orations and Addresses*, Vol. II, p. 347; Foulke's *Fighting the Spoilsmen*, p. 47.

[28] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 147, 148.

[29] *Annual Report of the United States Civil Service Commission*, 1891, p. 3, cited in Fish's *The Civil Service and the Patronage*.

[30] Curtis's *Orations and Addresses*, Vol. II, pp. 503, 504.

suspicion which he quickly justified by changing thirty thousand officials in a single year, earning for himself the title of "headsman". Clarkson was soon dismissed from office, but removals did not entirely cease,[31] and by April, 1890, 35,800 removals had been made, about 15,000 more than in the previous administration.[32]

The reformers were less charitable to Harrison than to Cleveland because of his more explicit pledges to civil service reform, and they accused the Republicans of celebrating the success of their "party with a wild debauch of spoils in which their 'promises and pledges' were the meats and drinks which were consumed."[33] They were even less satisfied with Harrison's administration than with Cleveland's, and, while their strength was not numerically great, they constituted an important element in such doubtful States as New York and Indiana, where a few votes might decide the electoral votes. In 1892, therefore, the party which could secure the votes of this group would have an excellent chance to carry these doubtful States if the election should prove to be at all close.

Economic conditions have considerable influence on political events. If the country is prosperous, with high wages, plenty of work, and good prices for farm products, the average voter is likely to be satisfied with conditions as they are and will continue to support the party in power. If the reverse is true, the voter begins to look for the cause of the hard times and will often, justly or unjustly, attribute the bad economic conditions to the party in power and give his support to the opposing party. It will, therefore, be necessary to look at the economic conditions in Iowa just before the election of 1892 in order

[31] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 150–152.

[32] Fish's *The Civil Service and the Patronage*, p. 224.

[33] Curtis's *Orations and Addresses*, Vol. II, p. 503.

to understand the economic factors which affected the election.

The creation of various agrarian organizations such as alliances, wheels, and leagues, during the eighties showed that there was more underlying discontent among the farmers than was apparent to the superficial observer. These organizations were nonpolitical when formed, but they furnished the nucleus for the organization of a third party when the idea that a new political party was necessary to secure the demands of the agricultural class gained enough strength. Conditions gradually became more favorable for the forming of a new party, until the discontent burst out in the early nineties in the People's party.[34]

The chief cause of the agricultural discontent was the rapid decline in prices of agricultural products, which came as a result of the changes in methods of agriculture and manufacturing following the Civil War. The introduction of labor-saving machinery and the development of the railroads in the West which threw new land open to cultivation caused a rapid increase in the quantity of farm products and then a decline in prices.[35] The farmers attributed the results of this over production to other factors, such as transportation, land, and money. They considered the transportation rates so high that the railroads took the profits on their products and advocated legislation to control and regulate the railroads. The land policy was another grievance. The farmers were dissatisfied that much of the land was held by speculators who either held it for higher prices or sold part of it to the settler and kept the rest until its value was enhanced by the labor of the actual settler. The farmers also felt that interest rates

[34] Buck's *The Agrarian Crusade*, pp. 125–128.

[35] McVey's *The Populist Movement* in *Economic Studies of the American Association*, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 136.

were exorbitant and that there was not enough money. Short crops and low prices came together. The farmers, not considering how much more land was being cultivated each year, concluded that the railroads were getting the profits or else that money was so scarce that it became dear in terms of their products. They demanded railroad legislation or more money, either through the issuance of paper money or by the free and unlimited coinage of silver, or both railroad and financial legislation.[36]

Farm mortgages on western lands were constantly swelling during the eighties,[37] increasing the discontent among the farmers. Some of the more pessimistic felt that "the virgin soil of the West" was "rapidly ceasing to be the home and possession of the sturdy American freeman", who was becoming "but a tenant at will or a dependent upon the tender mercies of soulless corporations and absentee landlords".[38] Others pointed out that it was the mortgages that brought in the necessary capital for development and made it possible to settle the West so rapidly.[39] It was true that most of the Iowa mortgages were of the constructive and investment type and did not suggest either distress or frequent foreclosures.[40]

By the end of the eighties, Iowa had become a border State between the old and the new West, eastern Iowa being in the old and western Iowa in the new West. The discontent in the State as a whole was much less than in

[36] Woodburn's *Political Parties and Party Problems in the United States*, pp. 111, 112; Farmer's *The Economic Background of Frontier Populism* in *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. X, pp. 406–427.

[37] Mappin's *Farm Mortgages and the Small Farmer* in the *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. IV, p. 433.

[38] Goodloe's *Western Farm Mortgages* in *The Forum*, Vol. X, p. 255.

[39] Gleed's *Western Mortgages* in *The Forum*, Vol. IX, p. 105.

[40] Nixon's *The Economic Basis of the Populist Movement in Iowa* in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. XXI, p. 391.

States farther west.[41] In proportion to the value of farm products, the amount of real estate mortgage debts was much smaller in Iowa than in Kansas,[42] and the interest rates were also less than in the States farther west. The average rate of interest in Iowa in 1890 was 7.36 per cent, while that in Kansas was 8.15 per cent.[43] It seems probable that the most irritating feature of the mortgage system was the loan companies. "Companies located at St. Paul, Omaha, Des Moines, Kansas City, St. Joseph, Topeka, Denver, or Dallas, sometimes received as high as fifteen-per-cent commission on a five year loan, and for many years the home company never received less than ten per cent. The local agent exacted all he could above that amount".[44] A proof that Iowa was no longer a frontier State is found in the fact that during the decade of the eighties her population increased only 17.68 per cent, a per cent smaller than that of any other western or north central State except Ohio and Indiana.[45] During this period the increase of the population of Kansas was 43.27 per cent, of Nebraska 134.06, and of the Dakotas 278.41 per

[41] Mappin's *Farm Mortgages and the Small Farmer* in the *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. IV, p. 436.

[42] The real estate mortgage debt for Iowa was estimated to be $149,457,144 in 1890, while that of Kansas was estimated at $174,720,071.— *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Real Estate Mortgages, p. 59. The total value of Iowa farm products was estimated at $159,347,844 in 1889, and those of Kansas at $95,070,080.— *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Farms, Live Stock and Animal Products, p. 703.

[43] The average interest rate in Nebraska was 8.22, in Arizona 12.61, in California 8.78, in Colorado 9.23, in Idaho 10.55, in Minnesota 8.18, in Montana 10.97, in Nevada 9.63, in New Mexico 10.05, in North Dakota 9.54, in Oregon 9.06, in South Dakota 9.52, in Wyoming 10.92, and in the United States as a whole 7.07 per cent.— *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Farms and Homes, pp. 83, 84.

[44] Gleed's *Western Mortgages* in *The Forum,* Vol. IX, pp. 95, 96; Gladden's *The Embattled Farmers* in *The Forum,* Vol. X, p. 317.

[45] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Population, p. xxxviii.

cent. In Iowa the important gains in population were made in the western and northwestern counties of the State.[46] This section also witnessed the greatest increase in the amount of real estate mortgages during this decade.[47] It was also in this section that the Populists made the greatest gains.

Kansas was the stronghold of the People's party during this period. This State had undergone a tremendous speculative real estate boom during the first half of the eighties. Then came the usual depression, which left the State under a huge load of public and private debts. This economic burden furnished the motive which led many of the farmers to leave the old parties and support the new People's party. It is said that "there was a very definite relation between the weight of the mortgage burden of a given section and the interest which it took in the (People's) movement".[48]

As has been pointed out, economic conditions were less favorable for the growth of the new party in Iowa. Iowa had a real estate debt much smaller in proportion to the total value of her agricultural products than Kansas, her interest rates were lower than those of Kansas and other western States, land values and population had not increased rapidly during the previous decade and the secured mortgages were largely of an investment and constructive type. Iowa was no longer a frontier State subject to the radicalism of a frontier section.[49]

[46] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Population, pp. 143–160.

[47] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Real Estate Mortgages, pp. 431–436.

[48] Miller's *The Background of Populism in Kansas* in *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* Vol. XI, pp. 469–489; Farmer's *The Economic Background of Frontier Populism* in *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* Vol. X, pp. 406–427.

[49] For a more complete analysis of the economic conditions in Iowa during this period see Nixon's *The Economic Basis of the Populist Movement in*

Iowa was still predominantly an agricultural State in 1892. Her most valuable agricultural products were corn, oats, and wheat, their value being in the order named. The prices on these cereals were higher in the early nineties than they had been during most of the previous decade,[50] and the total value of these three cereals for the State was much greater than during the last of the eighties.[51] It would seem probable that the Iowa farmer had less reason to be dissatisfied with his lot in 1892 than a few years previously, since his cereals had been worth more in 1890 and 1891 than they had been in the two previous years. The average farmer probably gave little consideration to the fact that the increased prices which he received for his bumper crops in 1891 were due more largely to the crop failures in Russia and France than to the protective policy of the Republican party.[52] He usually gave little heed to the causes of economic events and frequently did not understand them, when he did consider them.

Iowa in THE IOWA JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICS, Vol. XXI, pp. 373–396.

[50] The price of corn in Iowa, which had been $.24 in 1888 and only $.19 in 1889, rose to $.41 in 1890 and remained at $.30 and $.32 respectively in 1891 and 1892; the price of wheat, which had been $.61 in 1887, $.85 in 1888, and only $.63 in 1889, rose to $.80 in 1890, increased another cent in 1891, but dropped to $.60 in 1892.—*Annual Report of the Secretary of Agriculture*, 1889 (Prices for years up to and including 1889), pp. 262, 263; *Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture*, 1894, p. 545.

[51] The total value of the corn, oats, and wheat raised in Iowa in 1887 was estimated at $98,447,950; in 1888 at $100,760,280; in 1889 at $94,651,781; in 1890 at $137,664,190; in 1891 at $154,278,427; and in 1892 at $93,334,471.—*Annual Report of the Secretary of Agriculture*, 1888, pp. 428, 429, 1889, pp. 207, 211, 216, 225, 1890, pp. 297, 299, 301, 1891, pp. 120, 414, 417. It must be borne in mind that the 1892 crop was harvested only a short time before the election took place, and doubtless in many cases was not sold until after the election was over. The light crop and lower prices of that year would therefore be likely to have little influence on the election.

[52] Noyes's *Forty Years of American Finance*, pp. 161, 162.

Closely connected with the agrarian discontent in the Middle West was the currency question. This had not been a distinct issue in 1888, although the Republican platform declared in favor of the use of both gold and silver as money and condemned "the policy of the Democratic administration in its efforts to demonetise silver".[53] There was considerable support for the free and unlimited coinage of silver during this period, as is shown by the fact that bills providing for it were passed by the United States Senate at three different times during the period from 1889 to 1892 inclusive.[54] It was feared that the western silver men might refuse to agree to the McKinley tariff or, worse yet, desert the Republican party, unless granted some concessions. Accordingly the Republicans passed the compromise bill known as the Sherman Silver Purchase Act.[55] The new law was bound to be an embarrassment to commerce and to public finance, for it added a new form of treasury notes issued against the inert bullion in the treasury, and further muddled the already confused "hodge-podge of legal-tender greenbacks, gold certificates, silver certificates, national bank-notes, as well as gold and silver coin". At the same time, it did not affect the waning fortunes of silver, which continued to drop steadily.[56]

Within a year after the passage of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, the gold reserve in the Federal treasury dropped dangerously near the accepted minimum of $100,000,000. The act was partly responsible for this, but

[53] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1888, p. 185.

[54] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1890, pp. 148, 149, 1892, pp. 27–30, 217–219.

[55] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 226–228; Noyes's *Forty Years of American Finance*, pp. 141, 142.

[56] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 228–230.

other causes aided in lowering the gold reserve. Among these was the disturbance in the money markets of Europe caused by the collapse of Argentine credit in 1890 which forced foreign nations especially England to sell many of her securities in this country and demand payment for them in gold. Gold was constantly being exported in 1891 and 1892, with a corresponding decline in the treasury reserves.[57] To the above causes must be added the increased expenditures of the "billion-dollar" Congress, which aided in pushing the treasury nearer and nearer the danger line of an exhausted reserve.[58]

It was probably fortunate for the Republican party that the crop failures in France and Russia in 1891 forced them to buy American grain at a good price, for the supply of gold sent us in payment increased the gold in the country and prevented a run on the reserve in the treasury. If this crop failure had not occurred it is probable that the financial panic woud have come before the election, instead of in 1893.

PARTIES AND CONVENTIONS

For only two of the eight years prior to the election of 1892 were the presidency and both houses of Congress in the hands of the same party. The Democrats controlled both the presidency and the House of Representatives from 1885 to 1889, but were in the minority in the Senate; they lost control of all three branches in 1889, but regained control of the House in 1891. In 1892 the Republicans controlled the presidency and the Senate, but were greatly in the minority in the House.[59] Both parties seemed

[57] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 252, 253; Noyes's *Forty Years of American Finance*, pp. 161, 162.

[58] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, p. 182.

[59] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1886, pp. 130–132, 1888, pp. 89–91, 1890, pp. 245, 248, 1892, pp. 194–196.

hopeful of success in 1892, but neither seemed entirely satisfied with the men who had headed their national tickets in 1888.

Attention has been called to the fact that Harrison's administration had not found favor with either the civil service reformers or the politicans in the Republican party. The leader who had won the support of these politicians was James G. Blaine. It is probable that Blaine could have had the nomination of his party in 1888 if he had wished it, but since he had declined to be a candidate, Harrison had been nominated. Blaine had been selected by Harrison as Secretary of State in 1889 and conducted the business of that department during the first three years of Harrison's administration. As the time for the presidential nomination for 1892 approached, rumors that the President and his Secretary of State were not in accord were common, and by 1891 there were signs that an effort would be made in the convention to nominate Blaine for President.[60]

The drama of 1888 was repeated. Mr. Blaine in a letter to James S. Clarkson, chairman of the Republican National Committee, dated February 6, 1892, announced that he was not a candidate for the Republican nomination and that his name would not appear before the nominating convention.[61] Different interpretations were placed on this letter. The Iowa Democratic papers at once announced that this letter put Blaine out of the race and predicted that Harrison would secure the nomination,[62] but many of

[60] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* pp. 238, 239.

[61] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* February 11, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), February 11, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly), February 12, 1892.

[62] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), February 17, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* February 18, 1892.

the Iowa Republican papers were not willing to admit the defeat of the Blaine boom.[63] There was a feeling that Blaine should be nominated for President and it was evident to his friends that this must be done in 1892, if he were ever to secure the honor.[64] But it seemed doubtful if he would secure the nomination unless he made a hard fight for it, and this Blaine would not do.

The Iowa Republican State Convention to select delegates to the national convention was held at Des Moines on March 16, 1892.[65] A. B. Cummins, who had stood aloof from his party on the prohibition issue, was selected by Clarkson for temporary chairman of the convention. His appointment was bitterly opposed by the Prohibitionists and some regular Republicans,[66] and anti-Cummins delegates were chosen to the State convention by the Republicans of Polk County.[67] Isaac S. Struble, "A pronounced, conspicuous, and uncompromising prohibitionist", was chosen permanent chairman of the convention.[68] The State convention adopted a platform endorsing Harrison's administration, protection, reciprocity, and the maintenance of a sound currency, and chose four delegates at large to the

[63] "The Iowa Sentiment is almost unanimously for Blaine".— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 4, 1892. Blaine "is the only man for the Republican party to nominate".— *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), February 11, 1892. *The Iowa State Register* estimated that Blaine would poll 10,000 more votes in Iowa than any other candidate and that he would poll about that number of votes more than any other man in all the other States.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 4, 1892.

[64] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 238, 239; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), June 2, 1892.

[65] *The Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), March 23, 1892.

[66] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, January 14, 1892.

[67] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, March 17, 1892.

[68] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), August 17, 1892.

national convention,[69] all of whom were uninstructed.[70] Delegates were also chosen in the congressional district conventions, and in a number of cases were instructed for Harrison.[72]

On June 4, 1892, three days before the gathering of the Republican National Convention, which was held at Minneapolis, Blaine resigned his secretaryship. No explanation for his action was given in his curt note of resignation, and Harrison's acceptance of his resignation was equally curt. Friends of the Secretary attributed his resignation to ill-health, to unjust criticism heaped upon him, to disagreement with the President over questions of public policy. Others construed the resignation as a sign that he was willing to accept the nomination untrammelled by considerations of loyalty to the President.[73]

As the time for the meeting of the convention approached, it was still doubtful who would be nominated for the presidency. Chairman Clarkson worked for the nomination of Blaine,[74] and filled the convention hall with plumes and banners in the hope of stampeding the delegates to Blaine,[75] while Marcus A. Hanna opened head-

[69] The delegates at large were John S. Gear, E. E. Mack, D. C. Chase, and J. S. Clarkson.— *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), March 23, 1892.

[70] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 25, 1892.

[71] *Spirit Lake Beacon,* May 27, 1892.

[72] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* pp. 240, 241.

[73] Dunning's *Record of Political Events* in *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. VII, p. 764; Rhodes's *History of the United States from Hayes to McKinley, 1877–1896,* pp. 380–382.

[74] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* June 1, 1892.

[75] Muzzey's *The United States of America,* Vol. II, p. 238. Clarkson claimed after the convention was over, that they could have beaten Harrison, if they had had positive assurance that Mr. Blaine would accept the nomination, or if he had not resigned from the cabinet. He states that they did not have positive assurance that Blaine would accept the nomination, until the

quarters for McKinley at his own expense, in a hotel close by.[76] When the time came for the nomination, it took only one ballot to choose Harrison as the Republican candidate for the presidency, the vote standing Harrison, 535 5/6; Blaine, 182 1/6; McKinley, 182; Reed, 4; and Robert Lincoln, 1. The Iowa delegation gave 20 votes to Harrison, 5 to Blaine, and 1 to McKinley. Whitelaw Reid of New York was then nominated for Vice President by acclamation.[77]

The Democrats were also divided at the beginning of the canvass for the nomination. The leading candidates were Ex-President Grover Cleveland and Senator David B. Hill of New York. Cleveland had returned to the practice of law after his defeat in 1888. His popularity increased during this period as he from time to time by letter and by speech expressed his opinions on political questions. Despite differences within his party he never varied from his previous convictions either as to silver or the tariff.[78] Agitation for his renomination began as early as 1889 and was given a powerful impetus by the congressional elections of 1890, which were won on Cleveland's tariff issue.[79] Cleveland's availability, however, was questioned early in 1891, after the publication of his Ellery Anderson letter, in which he sharply denounced "the dangerous and reckless experiment of free, unlimited, and independent silver coinage". This letter caused a storm of denunciation for a short

Saturday preceding the nomination, and it was then too late.— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* June 15, 1892.

[76] Muzzey's *The United States of America,* Vol. II, p. 238; Croly's *Marcus Alonzo Hanna, Life and Work,* pp. 165, 166.

[77] *Proceedings of the Tenth Republican National Convention,* pp. 3–141, 148; *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia,* 1892, pp. 749, 750.

[78] Peck's *Twenty Years of the Republic,* pp. 252–257; Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* p. 241.

[79] Parker's *Recollections of Grover Cleveland,* pp. 128, 132.

time,[80] but the defeat of the Democrats in Ohio and other States in 1891, where silver coinage was made the leading issue, made it clear that if the Democrats were to win in 1892, it must be on the issue of tariff reform, and on this issue Cleveland stood supreme. On silver "we believe him to be wrong", said Senator Vest, "but honestly wrong, and he has as much right to his opinion as we have to ours. He can be elected on the issue of tariff reform; every Democrat should be willing to postpone the silver question to prevent Republican success."[81]

Cleveland's chief opponent, Senator Hill, had been favored by a record of seven successive victories, although his progress had been difficult. He was an extreme partisan, constantly engaged in political warfare in his own State, and his dependence upon Tammany Hall awakened distrust and convinced many that he was insincere. Moreover, he had been accused of "stealing" the State Senate by coercing county clerks to return fraudulent certificates of election. Hill displayed unexampled adroitness in his efforts to retain control of the machine in New York.[82] He was accused of using questionable methods in securing the New York delegation for himself; he called the State convention of the Democratic party in New York, in February, 1892, far in advance of the usual time in order to take the supporters of Cleveland by surprise, and to influence the action of delegate conventions in other States. His plan was successful so far as the New York delegates were concerned, but the Cleveland supporters held a convention of

[80] Parker's *Recollections of Grover Cleveland,* pp. 151, 152.

[81] Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* p. 243.

[82] *The American Review of Reviews,* Vol. V, pp. 26–36; Anan's *Another View of Mr. Hill* in *The Nation,* Vol. LIV, p. 26, passim; Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* pp. 241, 242.

their own and chose Cleveland delegates. While these delegates were not recognized in the national convention, they showed that Hill's method had aroused opposition in his own State.[83] In spite of the methods used by Hill to secure the New York delegation, some seemed to think that Cleveland's candidacy was doomed since his own State had not declared for him. Henry Watterson, editor of the *Louisville Courier Journal,* and one of the influential Democratic leaders of the time, wrote that the selection of Cleveland "as the Democratic standard-bearer, if such a thing were under the circumstances conceivable, would be, on the part of National Democracy, an act of deliberate suicide."[84] Other men who were frequently mentioned for the nomination were Horace Boies, who had been twice elected Governor of the Republican State of Iowa and would go well in the silver States of the West,[85] and Senator Arthur P. Gorman of Maryland.

The Iowa Democratic State Convention to select delegates to the national convention was held at Sioux City on May 11, 1892. John C. Bills, a man who had recently deserted the Republican party, was temporary chairman.[86] The Iowa delegates were instructed to work for the nomination of Horace Boies, and were given no second choice. The platform adopted declared that tariff reform was the

[83] Coudert's *The Democratic Revolt in New York* in *The Forum,* Vol. XIII, pp. 167–178; Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897,* p. 242.

[84] *The Editorials of Henry Watterson; Compiled with an Introduction and Notes by Arthur Krock,* p. 72. Watterson held that both Cleveland and Hill should stand aside, because Cleveland was weak in New York and strong elsewhere, while Hill was strong in New York and weak elsewhere. He favored Senator Carlisle of Kentucky.— Editorials in *Louisville Courier Journal,* quoted in *The Editorials of Henry Watterson; Compiled with an Introduction and Notes by Arthur Krock.*

[85] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* May 26, 1892, passim.

[86] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), May 19, 1892.

fundamental issue of the campaign, but it also placed the party on record as favoring equal free bimetallic coinage.[87]

The Democratic National Convention met at Chicago, Illinois, on June 21st. Cleveland, Hill and Boies were nominated on the floor of the convention. The Hill men carried the fight to the bitter end and pleaded from the floor of the convention for recognition of the claims of the Democrats of New York. The Iowa delegates worked hard in an effort to secure the nomination of Boies, but Cleveland was nominated on the first ballot, receiving 613 1/3 votes to Hill's 114 and Boies's 103, with the other 75 1/6 votes scattered among a number of candidates. Cleveland's vote was only 10 2/3 above the necessary two-thirds majority. Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois was nominated for Vice President on the second ballot.[88]

The People's party was also an important factor in the election of 1892. The agrarian discontent and the unrest which had been gathering during the eighties had found expression in the political campaign of 1890. The Farmers' Alliances took considerable part in this campaign, suiting their political activities to local necessities. In many southern States, Alliance men took possession of the Democratic conventions and forced both the incorporation of their demands in the platforms and the nomination of candidates who agreed to support these demands. They were fairly successful in the South in 1890, securing control of five legislatures, and electing three Governors, one United States Senator, and forty-four Congressmen — including the fourteen elected in Missouri on the Union-Labor ticket. In the West, the Alliance men worked by themselves and

[87] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), May 20, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), May 19, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, June 25, 1892.

[88] *Official Proceedings of the National Democratic Convention*, 1892, pp. 27, 59; *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1892, pp. 750–753.

created a new party. In 1890 they secured control of two State legislatures and elected two United States Senators and eight Congressmen.[89]

Five conventions were connected with the early history of the People's party. The first was held at St. Louis and accomplished a union between the farmers' organizations and the Knights of Labor under the name of the Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union; the second was at Ocala, Florida, on December 7, 1890; and a third convention, held at Cincinnati, Ohio, on May 19, 1891, saw the launching of the new party. This convention was attended by 1400 delegates, three-fourths of whom were from Kansas, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Nebraska. The "People's Party of the United States" was formed, and resolutions were adopted calling for a conference of "all progressive organizations" at Cincinnati on February 22, 1892. A national committee was authorized "if no satisfactory coalition with other reform organizations could be affected, to call a convention of the People's party for the nomination of a President, to be held not later than June 14, 1892". The platform adopted was similar to those adopted at the St. Louis and Ocala conventions.[90] The fourth convention was held at St. Louis on February 22, 1892. This was the preliminary convention for the selection of a national committee with the power to call a national convention to nominate candidates for President and Vice President. The convention was featured by a contest for supremacy be-

[89] Buck's *The Agrarian Crusade,* pp. 133–138; Drew's *The Present Farmers Movement* in the *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. VI, p. 307; *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia,* 1890, p. 301; Haynes's *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War,* p. 237.

[90] *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia,* 1892, p. 832; Haynes's *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War,* p. 247; McVey's *The Populist Movement* in *Economic Studies of the American Economic Association,* Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 136–139; Buck's *The Agrarian Crusade,* pp. 140, 141.

tween the southern Alliance and some of the northern members, which ended in victory for the northern faction.[91]

The Iowa People's party held their State convention to choose delegates to the national convention at Des Moines on June 7th. The backward spring interfered with the attendance, for many of the farmers were busy. Only about two hundred and fifty attended, one hundred of whom were from Des Moines. Among the prominent men in attendance were General James B. Weaver and J. F. Willits, national lecturer of the Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union. A platform was adopted and General Weaver was recommended to the Omaha convention for the Populist nomination for President.[92]

The first national nominating convention of the People's party was held at Omaha on July 2, 1892. Thirteen hundred and sixty-six delegates attended the convention. Nominations were postponed for a number of hours until definite word could be secured from Judge Walter Q. Gresham, a prominent Republican, whom Hayes and Powderly, of the Knights of Labor, hoped to nominate. He had gained poularity with the Populists because of a number of railroad decisions. When he refused to accept a nomination under any terms, the convention proceeded to nominate a candidate. General Weaver and Senator James H. Kyle were placed in nomination. The balloting was "a struggle between the 'new blood', represented by Senator Kyle of South Dakota, and the 'old guard' of the Greenbackers represented by General Weaver". Weaver was

[91] McVey's *The Populist Movement* in *Economic Studies of the American Economic Association*, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 140; Haynes's *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War*, p. 257; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 4, 1892; *Clinton Weekly Age*, February 26, 1892.

[92] J. Belangee was temporary chairman and F. F. Roe permanent chairman. — *Clinton Weekly Age*, June 10, 1892; *Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), June 10, 17, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, June 9, 1892.

nominated with 995 votes to 265 for Kyle. New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Maryland, and South Carolina were not represented in the balloting. General James G. Field of Virginia was nominated for Vice President over Ben Terrill of Texas.[93] The nomination of Weaver was probably an error on the part of the Populists, since he had been connected with unsuccessful third party movements for so long that his nomination did not excite much hope or enthusiasm.[94]

The Prohibition party was also active in Iowa during this election. At the sixteenth annual meeting of the Iowa State Temperance Alliance held at Des Moines in the spring of 1892, the Gatch bill was roundly scored. President Harvey of the State Alliance made a speech in which he attributed the Republican defeat in the State election of 1891 to their indifference on the prohibition question.[95] The State Prohibition party held its annual State convention at Des Moines on June 1, 1892. One hundred delegates representing forty counties were reported present. Pledges were taken for carrying on the expense of the coming campaign and about $600 was raised. A platform was adopted, delegates were chosen to the national convention, and State candidates were nominated.[96] The Prohibition national convention was held at Cincinnati, Ohio, on June 29th. John Bidwell of California was nominated for President on the

[93] Haynes's *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War,* pp. 261, 262; *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia,* 1892, p. 753; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 8, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 7, 1892; McVey's *The Populist Movement* in *Economic Studies of the American Economic Association,* Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 143–150; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, pp. 269–272.

[94] Buck's *The Agrarian Crusade,* pp. 145, 146; Haynes's *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War,* p. 264.

[95] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 4, 1892.

[96] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* June 9, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), June 3, 1892.

first ballot, and J. B. Cranfill of Texas for Vice President on the second ballot.[97]

The Socialist labor party also placed a ticket in some States, but did not develop very much strength in the country as a whole, and did not seem even to have placed their candidates on the ballot in Iowa.[98]

An analysis of the various platforms brings out the principal issues of the campaign. The Republicans and Democrats considered the tariff as the principal issue. The Democratic platform denounced "Republican protection as a fraud, a robbery of the great majority of the American people for the benefit of the few", and asserted that the Federal government had no constitutional power to levy tariff duties, "except for the purpose of revenue only". The McKinley tariff was denounced as "the culminating atrocity of class legislation" which had resulted in the reduction of wages and the mortgaging of the farms and homes of the country. Reciprocity was favored, but "the sham reciprocity" of the McKinley bill was denounced. Trusts and combinations were described by the Democrats as a natural consequence of the protective tariff, and further legislation for their control was demanded.[99]

The Republican platform took an opposite stand and re-

[97] McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, pp. 271, 272; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 8, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* July 6, 1892; *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia,* 1892, p. 754.

[98] Eight delegates of the party representing the five States — New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania — met for their national convention in New York on August 28th and nominated Simeon Wing, a tailor from Massachusetts, for President and a Mr. Matchett, a carpenter of Brooklyn, for Vice President. A platform was drawn up.— *The Quarterly Review of Current History,* Vol. II, pp. 276, 277. The party polled only 21,534 votes in the country as a whole in November.— McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1894, p. 272.

[99] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* pp. 160–162; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, pp. 264, 265.

affirmed "the American doctrine of protection". Duties "equal to the difference between wages abroad and at home" should be levied on "all imports coming into competition with the products of American labor", but all articles which could not be produced in the United States, except luxuries, should be admitted free. Reciprocity was declared a success, and it was affirmed that "our present laws will eventually give us control of the trade of the world." Trusts and combinations of capital were denounced and laws for their regulation were demanded.[100]

The minor platforms laid less stress on the tariff. The platform of the People's party denounced both major parties for proposing "to drown the outcries of a plundered people with a sham battle over the tariff",[101] while the Prohibition platform affirmed that a "tariff should be levied only as a defense against foreign governments which levy tariff upon or bar out our products from their markets, revenue being only incidental".[102]

There was no clear cut issue between the two major parties in regard to the currency question. They were both badly split on this issue, for each had a strong silver wing and a strong gold wing. The Democrats could not consistently endorse free silver with Cleveland, who opposed the free coinage of that metal, as their candidate, while the Republicans feared they would lose the support of the western States if they adopted an out and out gold platform. So each party adopted a plank which was designed

[100] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* pp. 173, 174; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, p. 261.

[101] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* p. 167; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, p. 269.

[102] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* p. 170; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, p. 271. The Socialist Labor platform is omitted, since that party did not enter the contest in Iowa. For their platform see Porter's *National Party Platforms,* pp. 177–180.

to hold both elements in line. The Democrats denounced the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890, but did not say what they would put in its place. They declared "for the coinage of both gold and silver without discriminating against either metal", but added that "the dollar unit of coinage of both metals must be of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value", to be adjusted through international agreement or legislation if necessary. They also recommended the repeal of the 10 per cent tax on State bank notes.[103] The Republican platform declared that "the Republican party demands the use of both gold and silver as standard money, with such restrictions and under such provisions, to be determined by legislation" as will maintain the parity of the two metals. The steps already taken by the government to call an international monetary conference were commended.[104] Thus, the two parties favored the use of both gold and silver as money, but insisted that the parity of each must be maintained, and since the two metals would not remain at par in case of free coinage of silver, it was difficult to determine just what the platforms did favor.

The minor parties did not straddle this issue. The People's party platform called for the "free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold at the legal ratio of 16 to 1", and the increase of the circulating medium to "not less than $50 per capita". They also demanded a sub-treasury or a better plan of giving the people credit, and the establishment of postal savings banks. The Prohibition platform called for the issue of more money and demanded that

[103] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* p. 174; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, p. 261.

[104] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* p. 174; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, p. 261.

"the money of the country should consist of gold, silver, and paper".[105]

The war issues were still given a place in the rival platforms. The Democratic platform denounced the Force Bills as an "outrage of the electoral rights of the people in the several States", which if "sanctioned by law, would mean the dominance of a self-perpetuating oligarchy of office-holders". The Republican platform demanded "that every citizen of the United States shall be allowed to cast a free and unrestricted ballot in all public elections", which ballot "shall be counted and returned as cast". The political outrages in some of the Southern States were also denounced. The platform of the People's party stated that "the civil war is over and . . . . every passion and resentment which grew out of it must die with it", and included a statement opposing Federal control of elections in the States.[106]

The Republican platform pledged the party to a "watchful care and recognition" of the just claims of Union veterans, but the Democratic platform while expressing an appreciation "of the patriotism of the soldiers and sailors of the Union" and favoring "just and liberal pensions for all disabled Union soldiers, their widows and dependents", insisted that "the work of the Pension Office" should "be done industriously, impartially, and honestly", and denounced the Republican "administration of that office as incompetent, corrupt, disgraceful and dishonest." The supplementary platform of the People's party pledged the support of that party "to fair and liberal pensions to ex-Union soldiers and sailors", while the Prohibition party

[105] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 169, 170; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, p. 271.

[106] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 159, 160, 167, 174; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, pp. 261, 262, 264, 269, 270.

platform pledged that party to "grant just pensions to disabled veterans of the Union army and navy, their widows and orphans".[107]

All the party platforms mentioned the subject of civil service reform, but they were all so nearly alike in regard to this subject, that it is probable the only part that this issue played in the election was determined by candidates of the respective parties. The Democratic platform declared that "public office is a public trust" and called for the honest enforcement of all civil service laws, while the Republican platform commended "the spirit and evidence of reform in the civil service and the wise and consistent enforcement by the Republican party of the laws regulating the same. The Democratic platform declared that Federal office-holders had a practice of usurping the control of party conventions in the States and denounced this practice. The aid of the Federal office-holders in renominating Harrison at the Republican convention was also condemned.[108] The People's party platform stated that the party would favor a constitutional amendment placing all government employees under civil service to prevent the power of the national government from increasing, in case the government took over the ownership and management of the railroads.[109] The Prohibition platform denounced the records of both major parties and declared that each "protests when out of power against the infraction of the

[107] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 171, 177; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, pp. 262, 263, 270, 272. A supplementary platform was adopted by the People's party, the resolutions not being considered a part of the platform, but merely as resolutions expressive of the sentiment of the convention.— McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, p. 270.

[108] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 163, 176; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, pp. 262, 265.

[109] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 168, 169; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, p. 270.

civil-service laws, and each when in power violates those laws in letter and spirit''.[110]

The major party platforms contained the usual number of minor planks placed there as bait to attract certain small groups of voters. Each condemned the persecution of Jews and Lutherans in Russia, professed sympathy for the Irish in their struggle for home-rule, and favored the building of the Nicaragua Canal, the appropriation of money by Congress to support the World's Fair, and the passage of legislation restricting immigration to prevent the entrance of criminal, pauper, or contract labor. The Democratic platform favored excluding the Chinese. Both favored admitting the Territories to statehood at the earliest practicable moment, the Democrats stating that New Mexico and Arizona were ready for admission. Both endorsed legislation by Congress and the States to protect the lives and limbs of railway employees. The Republicans went further and urged the enactment of State laws protecting employees engaged in State commerce, mining, or manufacturing. The Democratic platform favored State laws abolishing convict labor, and prohibiting sweating systems and the employment of children under fifteen years of age. Both favored freedom of education; and the Democrats, probably having in mind the opposition to anti-parochial school laws in such States as Illinois and Wisconsin during the preceding few years, declared for no ''State interference with parental rights and rights of conscience in the education of children''. The Democratic platform also condemned all sumptuary laws, while the Republicans expressed sympathy ''with all wise and legitimate efforts to lessen and prevent the evils of intemperance and promote morality''. The Democratic platform denounced the Repub-

[110] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, p. 172; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, p. 272.

licans for having given away the people's lands to the railroads and other corporate interests, and approved of Federal aid for rivers and harbors, while the Republicans favored rural free delivery and one cent postage.[111]

The People's party platform, besides containing the planks mentioned above, contained a scathing arraignment of the old parties, which were declared to be proposing "to sacrifice our homes, lives, and children, on the altar of mammon; to destroy the multitude in order to secure corruption funds from the millionaires". The nation, it was asserted, was on "the verge of moral, political, and material ruin", with corruption everywhere, its newspapers "largely subsidized or muzzled", its "public opinion silenced, business prostrated, homes covered with mortgages, labor impoverished, and the land concentrating in the hands of capitalists". The platform demanded "the union of the labor forces of the United States", and declared that "wealth belongs to him who creates it", and that "every dollar taken from industry without an equivalent is robbery". It demanded government ownership and management of the railways, telephones, and telegraphs. Alien ownership of land should be prohibited, and all lands owned by aliens should be reclaimed and kept for actual settlers. The supplementary platform of the party contained a number of additional planks, such as a demand for a graduated income tax, a single term for the President and Vice President and the direct election of United States Senators. The ineffective laws against "contract labor", the hiring of standing armies like the Pinkertons, and the granting of any subsidy or "national aid to any private corporation for any purpose", were condemned.[112]

[111] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 163–165; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, pp. 262–266.

[112] Porter's *National Party Platforms*, pp. 166–169; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics*, 1892, pp. 269–271.

The Prohibition platform, in addition to denouncing "the liquor traffic as a foe to civilization, the arch enemy of popular government and a public nuisance", which should be abolished, declared for a number of other changes: woman suffrage; government control of railways, telegraphs, and telephones; a revision of our immigration laws; the prohibition of the ownership of land by aliens; the suppressing of mob law; the granting to every man of "one day of rest in seven"; arbitration in settling national differences; the suppression of speculating in margins; and the prohibition of the "appropriation of public funds for sectarian schools".[113] Emphasis was, of course, placed upon the opposition to the liquor traffic.

After the candidates had been nominated, and the national platforms adopted, the parties began to perfect their organizations for the campaign. Since Clarkson, who was chairman of the Republican National Committee, had worked for the nomination of Blaine instead of Harrison in the convention at Minneapolis, it was perhaps natural that Harrison should favor another man for the Republican campaign leader. At any rate when the Republican National Committee met at Washington on June 28th, Mr. Clarkson declined reëlection as chairman, presumably as a result of his conference with the President just before the meeting. The committee chose William J. Campbell of Chicago chairman, M. H. DeYoung of California as vice chairman, Thomas H. Carter of Montana as secretary, and Cornelius N. Bliss of New York treasurer.[114] Campbell served only a few weeks, and when he found it necessary to resign, Thomas H. Carter was elected to his place, Ex-Con-

[113] Porter's *National Party Platforms,* pp. 170–172; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1892, pp. 271, 272.

[114] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 1, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* June 30, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), July 6, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* July 2, 1892.

gressman McComas of Maryland being chosen to take Carter's place as secretary.[115]

The Iowa Republican State Convention assembled on June 29th in Des Moines. The platform adopted endorsed the national declaration of principles. The avoidance of any recognition of State issues, notably of the prohibition question, was the keynote of the convention. Candidates for the State offices which were to be filled in 1892 were W. M. McFarland for Secretary of State, Byron A. Beeson for Treasurer, John Y. Stone for Attorney General, C. G. McCarthy for Auditor, and G. W. Perkins for Railway Commissioner. To conciliate both Prohibitionists and anti-Prohibitionists, the electors at large were chosen from both factions, A. B. Cummins representing the "wets" and Milton Remley the prohibitionists.[116] James E. Blythe of Mason City, who had represented the Fourth District in the State Central Committee for many years, was appointed the new chairman of the Republican State Committee.[117]

One of the means used to arouse interest during the campaign was the organization of numerous Republican clubs throughout the State. A convention of the Republican clubs, which formed the Iowa Republican League, was called at Des Moines for June 28, 1892, while another meet-

[115] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 21, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* July 23, 1892. Carter had lived for a time in Iowa. It was claimed by the *Iowa State Press* that his past life contained a number of doubtful episodes.— *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), August 2, 1892.

[116] *Clinton Weekly Age,* July 1, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* July 2, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), August 17, 1892. McFarland, Beeson, and Stone were renominated for office.— *Iowa Official Register,* 1892, pp. 5–7.

[117] *Spirit Lake Beacon,* July 8, 1892.

[118] *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* June 13, October 22, November 5, 1892. It was announced that the Hon. R. M. LaFollette of Wisconsin, "the brilliant young orator who had made for himself a national reputation in the last Congress" would address the meeting, but his name is not included in the *Herald's* account of the meeting.

ing was called and met at Cedar Rapids on November 2, 1892. Johnson Brigham, president of the League, stated during his address at this meeting that the Iowa League of Republican Clubs had 20,000 members.[118] That the organization of the foreign voters was not entirely neglected is shown by the organization of a "Swedish Republican Political Club" at Clinton.[119] Candidates for the eleven congressional seats were nominated at the various Republican district conventions. The Republican congressmen in the third, seventh, tenth, and eleventh districts were renominated.[120]

The Democratic National Committee was also active. W. F. Harrity of Pennsylvania was chairman and S. P. Sheerin of New York secretary. The twenty-five members of the executive committee and the nine members of the campaign committee were appointed by Chairman Harrity on July 29th. Among the members of the executive committee was J. J. Richardson of Iowa.[121] On September 1st, representatives on the Democratic National Committee from Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin held a conference with Don M. Dickinson, chairman of the Campaign Committee, to lay plans for the Democratic "campaign of education" in the West.[122]

The Democrats of Iowa had been ably led for a number

[119] *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* October 22, 1892.

[120] *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, pp. 193–198. The Republican candidates were as follows: First District, John H. Gear; Second, John H. Munroe; Third, David R. Henderson; Fourth, Thomas Updegraff; Fifth, Robert G. Cousins; Sixth, John F. Lacey; Seventh, John A. Hull; Eighth, William P. Hepburn; Ninth, A. A. Hager; Tenth, J. P. Dolliver; and Eleventh, George R. Perkins.

[121] *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia,* 1892, p. 755; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* August 6, 1892.

[122] *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* September 3, 1892.

of years. A prominent Republican, writing in April, 1892, tells us that "the old 'bourbons' of the party have been retired and the young men have become leaders. Recruits from the Republican party have been given the places of honor. At the last state election (1891) the candidates for governor, lieutenant-governor, and supreme judge on the Democratic ticket were all men who had in recent years been Republicans".[123]

The Iowa Democratic State Convention met at Davenport on August 18th. A platform was adopted endorsing the Democratic national platform, and containing additional planks expressing sympathy with workingmen but denouncing violence. The platform favored popular election of United States Senators, denounced all societies which bring religious questions into politics, and reiterated the party's support of license and local option in regard to the prohibition question. The candidates selected for State offices were J. J. McConlogue for Secretary of State, S. P. Vandike for Auditor of State, Charles Ruegnitz for Treasurer, Ezra Willard for Attorney General and William G. Kent for Railway Commissioner. Charles Ruegnitz, the Democratic candidate for Treasurer, was a German, a fact which may have had some effect on the voters of that nationality. The chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee was Chas. D. Fullen and the secretary was J. E. Seevers.[124] The Democratic Congressmen in the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Districts were re-

[123] Irwin's *Is Iowa a Doubtful State?* in *The Forum*, Vol. XIII, pp. 257–264. Irwin was a prominent Iowa Republican. He had been Territorial Governor of Idaho and Mayor of Keokuk and was Governor of Arizona at the time this article was written.

[124] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, August 24, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, August 25, September 8, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald*, August 20, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), August 24, 31, 1892; *Iowa Official Register*, 1893, pp. 105, 106.

nominated for office.[125] In the Eleventh District, the Democratic congressional convention met at Cherokee on August 25th and endorsed the nomination of Daniel Campbell, who had been nominated by the People's party for the same office on the previous day.[126]

Like their chief opponents, the Democrats seemed to have realized the utility of organized clubs. The Danes of Clinton are reported to have held a Democratic rally on October 18th while the Democratic clubs of that city held a rally a few weeks later.[127] It is probable that similar rallies were held in other cities.

The national committee of the People's party organized at Omaha on July 5th. A list of the members of the executive committee shows the nation-wide scope of the party. H. E. Taubeneck of Illinois was selected chairman, M. C. Rankin of Indiana treasurer, J. H. Turner of Georgia secretary, and Lawrence McFarland of New York assistant secretary. The other members of the executive committee were Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota, G. F. Washburn of Massachusetts, J. H. Davis of Texas, V. O. Strickler of Nebraska, and G. F. Gaither of Alabama. The question of financing the new party required careful consideration, and before adjournment, the committee adopted resolutions requesting the reform press to urge that on or before July 24th "all clubs and labor organizations meet and collect campaign funds, and then adjourn to meet August 16th",

[125] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* September 8, 1892; *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, pp. 193–198. The Democratic nominees for Congress were as follows: First District, John J. Seerley; Second, Walter I. Hayes; Third, James H. Shields; Fourth, W. H. Butler; Fifth, John T. Hamilton; Sixth, F. E. White; Seventh, Joseph A. Dyer; Eighth, Thomas L. Maxwell; Ninth, John F. McGee; and Tenth, J. J. Ryan.

[126] *Spirit Lake Beacon,* September 2, 1892; *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, p. 198.

[127] *The Clinton Weekly Age,* October 14, 28, 1892.

and collect funds again. It was "ordered that country meetings" should "be held at 10 a. m. and village and city meetings at 8 p. m." All money collected was to be sent to M. C. Rankin, Terre Haute, Indiana. It was requested that "a finance committee should be appointed to canvass the locality" at the meeting of each club. It was "further suggested that four funds be established the 'Ten Dollar' fund, the 'Five Dollar' fund, the 'One Dollar' fund, and the 'Fifty Cent' fund". All solicitors were to send the names and contributions to Rankin to be published in the reform press. Contributions payable in monthly installments were allowed. Speakers were also requested to take up collections and the women in sympathy with the party were also urged to make themselves "collecting agents for funds". The leaders of the committee announced that the party could win if means were provided. "A resolution was adopted asking the women to organize and help the cause". The women attending the People's party national convention also issued an appeal to the "true women of the north and west" asking them to "rejoice at the sublime outlook for the cause of the great plain people" and to join the party and help save "this glorious nation from the wicked clutch of plutocracy". This appeal was signed by forty women including Mrs. J. B. Weaver and Mrs. Mary E. Lease.[128]

The Iowa People's party held their State convention at Des Moines on August 11, 1892. The platform adopted was "like most other Alliance platforms", but it included a plank demanding the repeal of all State laws which permitted the existence of private corporations organized for pecuniary profit. The electors at large and the nominees for State officers were chosen. Some difficulty was experienced in getting candidates for State offices since a number

[128] *The Clinton Weekly Herald*, July 9, 1892.

of the members declined nomination on the grounds of poverty. The nominees were E. H. Gillette of Des Moines for Secretary of State, A. J. Blakely of Newton for Auditor, Justin Wells of Eldora for Treasurer, Charles MacKenzie of Denison for Attorney General, and James H. Barnette of Indianola for Railroad Commissioner. The convention was described as being overwhelmingly against fusion and a proposal to endorse S. H. Taft, the Prohibitionist candidate for Secretary of State, was voted down by a heavy majority.[129] The chairman of the State Central Committee of the Iowa People's party was R. G. Scott, the secretary was J. Belangee, and the treasurer was E. B. Gaston.[130] The People's party entered candidates for Congress in every district except the Third and Fourth.[131]

The Iowa State Prohibition party held only one State convention, nominating their State candidates at the same time they elected their delegates to the national convention. This convention was held at Des Moines on June 1st, and nominated S. H. Taft for Secretary of State, A. B. Whitmore for Treasurer, and R. M. Dihel for Auditor.[132] Later in the campaign William Orr was nominated for Attorney General and Malcolm Smith for Railroad Commissioner.[133] The chairman of the Prohibition State Central Committee was Isaac T. Gibson, the secretary R. S. Beall.[134] Con-

[129] *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* August 13, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* August 18, 1892.

[130] *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, p. 113.

[131] Their candidates were Thomas J. Sater for the First District; Charles Dalton, Second; Thos. E. Mann, Fifth; E. S. Owens, Sixth; Ed. A. Ott, Seventh; Walter S. Scott, Eighth; F. W. Myers, Ninth; John E. Anderson, Tenth; and Daniel Campbell, Eleventh.—*Iowa Official Register,* 1893, pp. 193–198.

[132] *Clinton Weekly Age,* June 3, 1892.

[133] *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, p. 117.

[134] *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, p. 118.

gressmen were nominated at the various conventions, the Eleventh Congressional District being the only Iowa district in which the Prohibition party did not enter a candidate.[135]

THE CANVASS FOR VOTES

The paramount issue of the presidential campaign of 1892 in Iowa was the tariff. While some time on the platform and some space in the press was devoted to the discussion of minor issues, the major emphasis was placed upon either protection or tariff reform. The campaign textbooks of the Republican and Democratic parties show the importance which these parties attached to this issue; nearly one-half of the space in the Republican campaign textbook and over a third of the space in the Democratic was devoted to a discussion of the tariff. Each party considered the tariff the most important issue and spent most of its efforts in proving its side of the question.[136]

During the campaign, there was considerable dispute as to what the Democratic position on the tariff was. The Republicans maintained that the Democratic platform favored free trade and that "tariff reform is only another name for free trade",[137] while the Democrats themselves were not in agreement on this question. Cleveland denounced the protective tariff but insisted that the Democratic policy was not a destructive one and would not

[135] Their congressional candidates were S. B. Glasgow for the First District; S. A. Gilley, Second; Lindsey Jessup, Third; Jacob W. Rogers, Fourth; J. J. Milne, Fifth; J. C. Reese, Sixth; D. M. Haggard, Seventh; David Dodds, Eighth; John Pennington, Ninth; and Thomas C. Griffith, Tenth.— *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, pp. 193–198.

[136] *Republican Campaign Textbook,* 1892; *Democratic Campaign Textbook,* 1892.

[137] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* April 27, 1892; *Republican Campaign Textbook,* 1892, pp. 108–112; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 21, 1892.

abandon American interests.[138] Other Democrats maintained that "there is no such thing as free trade suggested in the Democratic platform. The sum and substance of the views of the Democratic party on the tariff are that it favors a tax for revenue only."[139] Not all the Democrats feared to be classed as free traders, for some came out for free trade, and stated that it would be a beneficial policy for the country to follow.[140]

There was also considerable discussion over the question as to whether the tariff is a tax. The Democrats insisted that the tariff was a tax "to the extent of the difference in the value of the article as between this and a foreign country", and that this tax was paid by the consumer and not by the producer.[141] This was denied by the Republican papers, which insisted that the price of articles was fixed by the cost of production, and cited the fact that the price of many articles was less than the duty imposed on them. It was also maintained that the foreigner paid the duty.[142] The Democrats frequently attacked the tariff on the grounds that it built up trusts and monopolies, and that it aided some "industries at the expense of others", or at the expense of the people.[143] *The Iowa City Republican* denied that the tariff had any effect on trusts and monopolies and

[138] Cleveland's speech accepting the Democratic nomination at New York, July 20, 1892.— *Democratic Campaign Textbook,* 1892, p. 17.

[139] *The Clinton Weekly Age,* July 26, 1892.

[140] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 14, 28, 1892.

[141] *The Clinton Weekly Age,* September 9, 1892; speech of Governor Boies at the Fort Dodge fairgrounds on October 7, 1892, printed in the *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 13, 1892.

[142] *Protection and Reciprocity,* October, 1892, appearing as a supplement to the *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 13, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* September 10, 1892.

[143] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* February 18, August 25, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* April 6, 1892.

pointed out that trusts had grown up in such fields as petroleum, which was not protected by a duty, and that they also existed in free trade England.[144]

A widely debated question during the campaign was the effects of the McKinley tariff on wages and the cost of living. The Democrats maintained that "the McKinley Bill had greatly retarded the decline of prices" for "while products had been getting cheaper for years, the McKinley Bill held them nearly stationary", and had raised prices on certain articles such as tinware. There had been a drop in prices in certain commodities, but the Democrats declared that this decline was the result "of modern inventions and not by reason of protection". The Republicans insisted that the McKinley tariff had lowered prices and decreased the cost of living.[145]

In addition to the discussion over the general effects of the McKinley tariff, there was much dispute over certain sections of the bill, especially over those relating to tin plate and wool. The McKinley bill had laid a heavy duty upon tin plates, the manufacture of which had not been begun in the United States up to 1890, for the "purpose of

[144] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* April 6, 1892.

[145] *Democratic Campaign Textbook,* 1892, pp. 85–89; Governor Boies's speech at the Fort Dodge fairgrounds, October 7, 1892, printed in the *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 13, 1892; Senator Allison's speech at Waverly, Iowa, on August 31, 1892, printed in the *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), September 15, 1892; Milton Remley's speech at Iowa City, October 11, 1892, extracts printed in *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 12, 1892. Never before, said a Republican paper, has there been "such great decline in prices of the necessities of life as has taken place within the past year". Coffee has dropped 24.3%, kerosene 13%, sugar (Refined) 2.8%, cotton 16.8%. As a result "the laboring men can live much cheaper".—*The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* June 1, 1892. The Democrats maintained that the Republican position was inconsistent in regard to this matter; they maintained that if the protective tariff raised the price of farm products, it must also raise the cost of living.— *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* September 15, 1892.

stimulating the introduction of this industry.'' The tinware men and the canners at once claimed that the new tariff would ruin their business and used it as an excuse to raise the prices on canned goods and tinware beyond any figure justified by the slight rise in the cost of tinware which resulted from the duty. This rise in prices in anticipation of the tariff had much to do with the overwhelming defeat suffered by the Republican party in the congressional elections of 1890.[146]

The Democrats continued their assault on the tin plate duties in 1892. They maintained that the duty had not only raised the price of cans and thus lowered the returns which the farmers received for their crops, but also harmed labor by harming the can producing plants, and added that ''with free tin plates a business revolution among the canneries would take place, the farmers would get 25 per cent of this tariff tax added to the price of his tomatoes; the laborer could get 25 per cent of this tariff tax added to his labor; consumers would get 50 per cent of the tax through a reduction in the cost of canned food. This reduction in prices would increase their consumption 25 per cent, which means a larger home market and more acreage for the farmer''.[147]

The Republicans defended the duty on tin plate. They said that ''the Welsh tin plate industry was being ruined by American competition and the McKinley Tariff''. The United States was making no tin plate when the McKinley bill was passed but there would be about fifty tin plate mills operating in the United States by January 1, 1892. The Americans had been paying ''Great Britain'', said one newspaper, ''from $15,000,000 to $20,000,000 per year for tin plate'', but ''if Democratic free traders let this industry

[146] Stanwood's *American Controversies,* pp. 264, 290–294.

[147] *Democratic Campaign Textbook,* 1892, pp. 103–113; *Iowa State Press* (Iowa City), September 21, 1892.

alone, it will soon save the people of this country more than $20,000,000 yearly which they have been sending abroad for the products of British labor''. The Republicans also maintained that tin plate was slightly cheaper than it had been when the McKinley bill was passed.[148]

The duties on wool were also attacked by the Democratic press which asserted that the tariff raised the price of clothing and caused the use of ''shoddy''. ''If it costs a young man one hundred dollars for clothing,'' said the *Clinton Weekly Age,* ''he is paying fifty dollars tax.'' It was asserted that there were 94 shoddy mills in successful operation in the country, producing over 125,000 pounds of shoddy annually. Thus, said *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* the Republican policy means that ''the poor must wear the renovated rags of the rich''. The same paper added that ''the tariff on wool has not benefited the wool trust as much as they have desired for it has raised the price of its raw materials and has destroyed part of the home market. The price of woolens have gone up and the laborer has been unable to pay the increased price thus the sale has decreased''.[149]

The Republican newspapers defended the duty on wool. The *Iowa State Register* printed a list of clothes needed by the average working man with the price of each to bring out the low cost of working clothes. ''Free traders'', said this paper, ''cannot make much headway in howling about the tax upon the laboring man's clothes when he can purchase an entire suit, including everything that is necessary for him to wear, for less than $5.00.''[150]

[148] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 13, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* July 13, 1892; *Republican Campaign Textbook,* 1892, pp. 136, 137.

[149] *The Clinton Weekly Age,* November 4, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* March 24, 1892; *Democratic Campaign Textbook,* 1892, pp. 90–95.

[150] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 22, 1892.

The reciprocity section of the McKinley bill also came in for its share of attention. The Democrats claimed that Mr. Blaine's reciprocity was "the opposite of the McKinley idea. McKinleyism aids to build up the home market and has no use for a foreign market. Mr. Blaine's plan, on the other hand, aims to open the foreign markets to American foodstuffs and American goods". The fact that the Republicans had negotiated "reciprocity treaties only with agricultural countries", who "may bring any and all their products to this country free, if they will open their ports to the manufacturers, who are always republican favorites", was also criticised.[151] The Republicans, in reply, stated that "reciprocity had worked well", and were able to point to the fact that "these treaties have saved American consumers 2 or 3 cents per pound on sugar or about $75,000,000 per year".[152] Other articles on which the price had fallen after the enactment of the McKinley bill were used by the Republicans in their attempt to prove that the tariff had lowered prices on the necessities of life.[153]

The effect of the tariff on wages was also a mooted question. The Republican position was that the McKinley tariff not only reduced the cost of living but that it raised wages. They constantly referred to the well known fact that wages were higher in the United States than in free-trade England and maintained that the reason for this difference in wages was due to the protective tariff, which "levied duties

[151] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, February 11, April 28, 1892.

[152] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 27, 1892.

[153] Wire nails, which are frequently used by the farmers, furnish an example of this. "A few years ago", said one paper, "wire nails were so dear farmers could not afford to own them but now, under protection, they have fallen in price until they are sold for less than the tariff on the imported article, and consumers get home made nails which are not only low in price, but the best in quality of any made in the world".— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, June 1, 1892.

equal to the difference between wages abroad and at home''. The protective tariff, they affirmed, guaranteed that ''the low wage scale and low conditions of life abroad'' should not become a factor in prices or wages here.[154] The Democrats denied that the McKinley tariff raised wages. Wages, they said, are regulated by supply and demand, and American wages are higher than European on account of our cheap lands and because our labor is more productive than European. The American worker receives more wages per week but he receives less per article produced. The fallacy of the Republican argument that American wages were higher than English wages, because ''we were blessed with a protective tariff'' while England was not, was shown by bringing out the ''fact that wages in Germany and in other European countries'', which had a protective tariff were lower than in ''free trade England''.[155]

The prevalence of labor disputes following the enactment of the McKinley tariff made it difficult for the Republicans to prove that the tariff raised wages. *The Democratic Campaign Textbook* devoted eight pages to a discussion of ''Specimen Strikes, Lockouts, and Wage Reductions in Protected Industries following the Passage of the McKinley Bill, October 4, 1890'' and gave a list of two hundred

[154] Senator Allison's speech at Waverly, Iowa, on August 31, 1892, printed in the *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), September 15, 1892; Milton Remley's speech at Iowa City on October 11, 1892, extracts printed in *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 12, 1892. *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 29, 1892, contains the report of a Senate Investigating Committee which reported that wages had gone up since 1890. See also the *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), August 18, October 27, 1892.

[155] *Democratic Campaign Textbook,* 1892, pp. 78, 79. Frequent quotations from Shoenhof's *Economy of High Wages* are printed in the *Campaign Textbook* to substantiate the Democratic position. See also *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), September 21, October 5, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 28, 1892.

and ninety-two strikes and lock-outs, which occurred between October 4, 1890, and July 10, 1892.[156] In this contention, the Democrats were aided considerably by the prevalence of serious labor disputes in 1892. Rioting and bloodshed took place at a number of places. Conspicuous disputes occurred at Homestead, Pennsylvania, and Coeur D'Alene, Idaho, in July, 1892, near Nashville, Tennessee, and on the Erie and Lehigh Valley Railroads in August, 1892.[157]

The most violent of these was the one at Homestead, an industrial suburb of Pittsburgh.[158] The Democrats did not overlook the opportunity to make political capital out of the Homestead riots. Democratic papers repeatedly insisted that the riots demonstrated the fact that protection does not help labor. "The Homestead contest", said one paper, is an object lesson on the tariff — " a lesson that the Republican party cannot afford to have continued much longer. Every day it demonstrates the rottenness of protection. . . . The increase of the tariff has been accompanied by increased labor troubles". They asserted that the tariff had been used by the Republican party "to en-

[156] *Democratic Campaign Textbook*, 1892, pp. 61–68.

[157] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, July 20, 27, August 17, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, August 18, 1892; Bridge's *The Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Company*, pp. 203–223.

[158] The immediate causes of this affair seem rather trivial. The Carnegie Company notified the workers of a reduction of wages and of their refusal in the future "to recognize the Amalgamated Association of Steel and Iron Workers". The wage reductions affected only a few hundred of the employees, but the workmen felt that H. C. Frick, the general manager of the works, was intending to destroy their union, so they rejected the terms. The company, considering the protection given by the sheriff and local officers inadequate, sent in a large body of Pinkerton detectives, and when these forces endeavored to enter the mills, the strikers fired upon them. There was actual warfare for several days, until the State militia appeared on the scene and stopped trouble.— Bridge's *The Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Company*, pp. 204, 213–223; Dewey's *National Problems, 1885–1897*, pp. 247, 248.

hance the market price of iron for the benefits of those engaged in the industry''. ''The riots'', said one paper, ''are a direct result of a failure to divide the spoils. Carnegie has no more moral right to the millions of the plunder which he owns than have the strikers, but he has possession and refuses to 'divvy'. The people, the consumers, have been robbed, and now the robbers are fighting to retain the booty. With free trade the workers would have had a much bigger share and the consumers would have had the benefit of cheaper iron''.[159]

The Republican papers attempted to make the best of a bad situation. They denounced ''the Democratic demogogues'' for trying to make political capital out of the Homestead trouble, and claimed that the bloodshed was chargeable to ''the imbecile Democratic governor of Pennsylvania'', who had delayed in calling out the militia. The tariff, it was asserted, had ''actually reduced the duties on nearly every article manufactured at Homestead and especially on structural steel, the principal output of these mills'', while the wages paid by the Carnegie company were very high.[160] It was difficult, however, for the Republican papers to demonstrate how the protective tariff aided the working men, when 150,000 men in Pennsylvania were out of work ''because they would not submit to a reduction in wages in the highly protected industry of the manufacture of iron'',[161] and numerous strikes were going on in other parts of the country. The Homestead strike was

[159] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 14, 1892. ''The bloodshed and murder and riot at Homestead is the logical result of a protective tariff'', said another paper, ''Carnegie and Phipps go to Europe and order wages reduced and ''the nation plundered behind the tariff wall''.—*Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), July 13, 1892.

[160] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* July 20, 27, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 15, 22, 1892.

[161] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 7, 1892.

one of the most important factors in the campaign,[162] and probably had considerable effect on the labor vote, but it is doubtful if this issue had as great an influence on the results of the election in an agricultural State like Iowa, as in some of the industrial States.

Another indication of the importance that was attached to the labor vote by the rival parties is clearly shown by publicity, which was given to statements from T. V. Powderly, General Master Workman of the Knights of Labor. Powderly had taken a prominent part in the organization of the People's party and denounced both the Republican and Democratic parties. Each side printed those statements of Powderly attacking the opposition party, but failed to include the statements attacking its own position.[163]

A report issued by the Labor Commissioner of New York State, a Democrat named Peck, furnished the Republicans with a talking point in their attempts to prove that the

[162] Bridge's *The Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Company*, pp. 247–249, 277. Chauncey Depew, one of the prominent Republican leaders of the time, stated that "the Homestead Strike was one of the most important factors in the presidential contest, and led to a distinct issue in the campaign." Bridge suggests that the farming vote was adversely affected by the broadcast publication of the high wages paid to the Homestead workers "under a protective regime which left the agriculturist on the outside", but a careful study of the newspapers of the time leads to the conclusion that such was not the case in Iowa.

[163] The Republican newspapers printed Powderly's denunciation of Cleveland's position on silver, his opposition to the "wildcat currency" plank in the Democratic platform, and especially stressed a statement, in which he said, "the Democratic party is the party of the poor man and if he continues to vote the ticket he will never be anything else than a poor man".— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), September 30, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 13, 1892. The Democratic papers stressed Powderly's denunciations of the tariff. Powderly maintained that "the workman had not been protected from competition by the government", but that foreign competition was "largely attracted by our delusive tariff laws".— *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), October 5, 1892.

tariff aided the laborers. This report declared that wages had increased during the previous year. The Republicans insisted that this report proved conclusively that the tariff aided the laborers, and laid especial stress upon the fact that it was issued by a Democratic official.[164] A similar report issued by the Labor Commissioner of Massachusetts, which appeared a few weeks later, was also used by the Republican papers in an effort to gain the votes of labor.[165]

The Democrats at once questioned the authenticity of Peck's report. Commissioner Peck was called upon for copies of the reports sent to his office by the manufacturers, but he refused to present them, claiming that they were confidential. Court proceedings were then instituted to compel their presentation, and when Peck admitted the reports had been burned upon his order, he was arrested and placed under bond. This gave an opening for an attack on the whole report, which the Democrats did not neglect. They asserted that Peck had destroyed the papers because they did not sustain the results he had given in his report. It was also charged that "Peck asked only such manufacturers who would be interested in saying the tariff aided them", for they had made millions from the tariff.[166]

[164] Peck had secured reports from sixty-seven wholesale manufactories of New York and totaled the results presumedly for the purpose of discovering the effects of the tariff on wages and production. His report, which was published early in September, 1892, showed that in "the wholesale manufactories of New York State the wages paid for the year ending August 31, 1892, showed an increase over the wages paid during the year ending August 31, 1890, of $6,377,925" while the net increase of production was given as $31,315,130.08. Of the 67 industries investigated, 77 per cent showed an increase in wages, or production, or both.— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* September 7, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), September 2, 9, 16, 1892. These figures, said an Iowa paper, are "a deathblow to free trade Democracy".— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 12, 1892.

[165] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), September 23, 1892.

[166] "Men do not burn documents that support their position in important public questions and without which they are left unsupported", asserted one

Even if the wage increase found by this report were true, it was asserted that the increase was less than the annual increase during the decade 1880-1890.[167] It is doubtful if the Republicans gained much from this report. Upon first appearance, it must have seemed damaging to the Democratic contention as regards the tariff, but the destruction of the data upon which it was based by Commissioner Peck placed its validity in doubt and largely destroyed its value as a campaign document.

A discussion, which must have been of more interest to the Iowa farmers than the continual wrangling over the "Homestead Trouble" and "Peck's Report", took place over the effects of the tariff on the prices of farm products. The fact that our exports of agricultural products were much greater than they had been in any previous year[168] furnished the Republicans with valuable campaign arguments. Republican papers ran frequent reports pointing out that trade conditions were excellent, and that the United States was exporting much more than it was importing.[169] *The Iowa State Register* asserted that "the exports of bread-stuffs gained nearly $100,000,000 during the first year of the McKinley Tariff", and claimed that "the new tariff is responsible for the higher prices of the farmers products and the largely increased foreign demand for

paper.— *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), September 21, 1892. See also *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, September 15, 1892.

[167] For figures see *The Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), September 21, October 12, 1892.

[168] *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1900, p. 187. Our exports of agricultural products were $532,141,490 in 1889; $629,820,808 in 1890; $642,751,490 in 1891; and $798,328,232 in 1892.

[169] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), January 15, 1892, ff.; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican* and *The Spirit Lake Beacon*, September 16, 1892; *The Saturday Evening Post* (Weekly, Burlington), September 3, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), January 22, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 6, 1892.

them during 1891". "Our protective tariff", said the *Fort Dodge Messenger,* "is a 'persuader' which is bringing factories to this country by the score", with the result that the foreign manufacturer "brings over his workers to eat American products".

The Democrats pointed out the fallacy of the Republican argument that the increased amount of exports was due to the McKinley tariff by calling attention to the fact that "this increase consisted wholly of exports of wheat and corn to the famine-smitten regions of Europe, and the exports of nearly all other American staples have seriously declined under the operation of the McKinley tariff." They declared that there would have been a dull market for the bumper crops of 1892 if the harvests of Russia and other parts of Europe had not failed, and insisted that "the McKinley tariff had signally failed to produce the 'home market' for our products which the protectionists claimed was one of the strongest arguments for protection".[170] They not only denied that the protective tariff raised the prices of farm products, but insisted that it narrowed the market for our agricultural products and thus caused lower prices. The United States produced a surplus of agricultural products that must be exported; the tariff did not get rid of this surplus, but merely prevented the farmer "from buying the products where they were the cheapest".[171]

It is of course impossible to determine with absolute ac-

[170] *Philadelphia Record,* April 29, 1892, quoted in *The Literary Digest,* May 7, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* January 7, 1892.

[171] *The Clinton Weekly Age,* November 4, 1892. Governor Boies wrote that "every obstacle which is thrown in the way of the importation of foreign merchandise, deprives our farmers of so much custom for their wheat, corn, or cotton."— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* November 2, 1892. Another paper pointed out that "America must take in exchange, in large part, the products of other countries, if she will sell her products".— *The Clinton Weekly Age,* June 24, 1892.

curacy just what influence this discussion over the tariff had on the electorate. Professor Taussig's statement that "there was little in public discussion to indicate that the true question at issue was fairly before the public mind" is probably true, but, he adds, there was "a vague uneasiness about trusts and monopolies, which the protective duties were supposed to promote", which "clearly had much effect in strengthening the hands both of Democrats and of Populists", although "the comparatively simple questions which at the bottom were involved by the protective controversy were obscured by a cloud of talk about pauper wages and monopolist manufacturers, British free trade and American patriotism".[172]

The fact that the prices of grain had gone up was a distinct advantage to the Republicans. The Democrats explained that these high prices were not the result of the McKinley tariff and pointed to the crop failures in Europe as the cause of the rise in prices, but it is probable that many of the farmers did not understand either side of the controversy; they were getting a better price for their crops than they had been getting for a number of years prior to the enactment of the McKinley law.[173] The Republicans pointed to the improved agricultural conditions, claimed that they were due to the protective system, and asserted that these conditions would pass away if the Democrats won the election. They made ample use of the arguments furnished by the prosperous conditions of the country and frequently cited instances of manufacturers, who were going to enlarge their business just after election if the protective policy won, and of foreign manufacturers who were going to bring their factories over here

[172] Taussig's *Tariff History of the United States* (Sixth Edition), pp. 285, 286. Taussig's statement was probably true for Iowa.

[173] See above, note 51.

in case free trade failed.[174] The prosperity argument was especially stressed during the last few weeks of the campaign and editorials under such headings as "Let Prosperity Alone", "America's Great Prosperity", and "Prosperity or Hard Times",[175] were run in the Republican papers just before the election.

Although the Civil War had ended twenty-seven years before the campaign of 1892, the Republicans again revived the traditions of that struggle in an attempt to prove the disloyalty of the Democratic party. The Republican newspapers were almost unanimous in attacking the war records of Cleveland and Stevenson. The former had sent a substitute to take his place in the Union army, while the latter was charged with having been "a member of the Knights of the Golden Circle", a "treasonable organization" bitterly opposed to the war.[176] Both were described as "too cowardly to go in the rebel ranks" but, it was said, they "skulked in the rear and aided the rebellion all they could".[177] An indication of the importance placed upon this issue is shown by the space given to it by the Republican papers of Iowa. *The Iowa State Register* which was edited by the brother of James S. Clarkson, devoted over

[174] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* July 13, November 2, 1892.

[175] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 27, 1892; *Saturday Evening Post* (Weekly, Burlington), November 5, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), November 4, 1892.

[176] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 1, 15, September 9, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), June 30, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* July 13, 1892.

[177] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 1, 1892. This issue of *The Register* contained many similar charges. "Cleveland refused to accept Governor Gray as running mate in 1888, because he was a Union soldier and true Union soldiers, Col. Gray, Col. Mitchell, and Allen B. Morse were defeated by Stevenson. No Union soldier need to apply to the Democrats for office". Cleveland's record is spoken of in detail—"he hired a substitute when he was drafted, hanged Irishmen when he was sheriff, and vetoed pension bills of Union soldiers when he was president".

one-fourth of the space of its front page in its first weekly issue following the Democratic convention to a discussion of the war records of the Democratic candidates. Two weeks later the same paper again denounced the Democrats for "defeating Union soldier candidates for president and vice president, and then nominating copperheads and conscripts for both positions", and suggested that the "ticket was made to please the Southern bulldozers."[178] Curiously enough, the Democratic papers paid very little attention to the Republican attacks upon the war records of Cleveland and Stevenson, perhaps feeling that they had a better chance to win the election by discussing issues rather than personalities. They did, however, deny the charge that Stevenson was a member of the "Knights of the Golden Circle" and insisted that he had always loyally "supported the Union cause".[179] The Republican papers accused Cleveland of "brutal utterances concerning some of the old soldiers who sought pensions at the hands of congress" in his veto messages to Congress,[180] and it was frequently asserted that the Democratic party was hostile to the Union veterans. When the Democratic appropriations committee of the national House of Representatives reduced the amount of the pension appropriations, it was asserted that "the 'grays are on deck again' in the Democratic house",[181] while the ill-treatment of General James

[178] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 1, 15, 1892. A few weeks later, this paper stated that "when the Democratic party nominated two copperhead conscripts as its candidates, and adopted the Confederate States constitution as its platform, it revived the 'war issues'; and the Union soldiers are swinging into line to again 'drive the rebel crew from the land we love the best' ".— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 29, 1892.

[179] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* June 30, 1892.

[180] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), September 2, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 26, 1892.

[181] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), March 11, 1892. This

B. Weaver during his campaign trip in Georgia led to the assertion that this act "shows the Northern soldier that there is still a rankling hatred of Union soldiers" in the South.[182] An editorial in a North Carolina paper, *The Durham Globe,* which denounced the Union soldiers as "murderers and thieves", furnished the Republican papers with material to prove that the South was still bitterly antagonistic to the North and especially to the northern soldiers. This editorial was reprinted in most of the Republican papers.[183] *The Iowa State Press* insisted that this editorial did not represent southern sentiment and added that *The Durham Globe* was financed by a Republican national committee for the purpose of inciting northern sentiment against the Democrats and discrediting their patriotism.[184]

The Republicans also attempted to show that many of the Democratic veterans were not supporting Cleveland. Two prominent Democrats, General Henry W. Slocum and General Daniel E. Sickles, were said to have advised the veterans attending the Grand Army Reunion, held at Washington, D. C., in September, 1892, not to forget that Harrison was a Civil War veteran and Cleveland was

charge was repeated in May, when Congress attempted to pay southern war claims.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), May 20, 1892.

[182] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 11, 1892.

[183] "Between Harrison and Cleveland", wrote the editor of *The Globe,* "first, last and all the time — I am for the brave Buffalo man, who slapped the dirty pensioners, who, for the most part, are beggars, in the face . . . They were dirty and lousy rascals who came into this country and who abused women; who burned homes; who stole all that was in sight, and today; without an honorable scar, are bleeding this country, and I am helping to pay for it. Let the hired Yankees howl. I am of the South and for the South; and until my blood is cold I shall fight honestly and for a white man's country". — *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 14, 1892. See also the *Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 26, 1892, and *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* November 5, 1892.

[184] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), October 26, 1892.

not.[185] These statements were reprinted in most of the Republican papers,[186] but the truth of them was questioned by some of the opposition papers, which maintained that General Sickles was supporting Cleveland.[187]

The Iowa Republican campaign leaders probably used good strategy when they placed considerable emphasis on the "war issues" and laid little stress on pensions. If they had stressed the pension question, they would have laid themselves open to attack on the grounds of scandal, for the administration of the pension office by Tanner and Raum was certainly open to attack. The Democrats did not have a very effective reply, when their opponents pressed the "war issues" since Union sentiment was strong in Iowa, and many voters could easily have been alienated if an unwise attack had been made on the Republicans. The Democrats were probably wise in minimizing this issue, and laying more stress on less dangerous questions such as the tariff.

A favorite device of the Republican papers was to print the pension veto record of Cleveland's first administration to show that Cleveland had vetoed nearly four times as many pension bills as all the Presidents before him, while

[185] General Slocum was said to have advised the veterans not to forget that "of the candidates of the two great parties in this Presidential contest now in progress one was your comrade, who went faithfully to the front when his country needed his services, and the other was a man who did not go as a volunteer and refused to go and sent a substitute when he was drafted".— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 7, 1892. General Sickles was credited with having given the same advice and to have added that "the people of the United States will see that no man is ever elected to an office of profit and trust in this country who opposes the payment of pensions to the soldiers of the Union".— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 7, 1892.

[186] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 12, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 6, 20, 1892.

[187] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), October 26, 1892; *Clinton Weekly Age,* October 28, 1892; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* October 13, 1892.

Harrison had vetoed none.[188] The Democratic papers laid even less stress on the pension issue than their Republican opponents, but they did point out that while President Cleveland had vetoed more pension bills than any previous President, he had signed 1825 pension bills, which was more than twice as many as any of his predecessors had signed. Cleveland, they insisted, had only vetoed pension bills, "after close examination of each case and to save the pension list from becoming a roll of dishonor".[189] The Democratic papers occasionally mentioned the investigation which was going on in regard to the conduct of the Pension Office under Commissioner Raum,[190] but they made little attempt to make political capital out of the scandals which had taken place under Commissioners Tanner and Raum.

Just before the election, the Republican papers contained special appeals to the soldier voters, *The Iowa State Register,* in its last issue prior to the election, ran a special editorial on the front page entitled "Union Soldiers and Politics" for the purpose of influencing the soldier vote. "VOTE AS YOU SHOT — Next Tuesday", said the editorial, "and keep shooting until the last rebel is dead". "Any comrade who votes the Democratic ticket dishonors the cause for which he fought in 1862-1865." "Remember Cleveland's pension vetoes".[191] The *Fort Dodge Messenger* again printed the quotations from General Sickles and General Slocum and appealed to the young men not

[188] Cleveland, they said, had vetoed 524 bills, whereas all Presidents before him had vetoed only 133, and Harrison had vetoed none.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), July 22, 1892 ff.; *The Clinton Daily Herald,* July 30, 1892.

[189] *The Clinton Weekly Age,* October 28, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), August 10, 1892.

[190] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* July 14, 1892.

[191] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), November 4, 1892.

"to vote for a man whom the soldiers so unanimously protest against".[192] A Union Veterans League, organized in Iowa a short time before the election, purported "to be nonpartisan" but supported Harrison and Reid. The League sent campaign circulars to many of the old soldiers "quoting alleged utterances of General Daniel E. Sickles," and extracts from *The Durham Globe*.[193] It is impossible to know just how much effect these last minute appeals to the soldier vote had, but as in the case of similar appeals to the same element during the entire campaign, it would seem probable that they did help in lining up the soldiers and their sympathizers for Harrison in spite of dissatisfaction with the Republican program in other lines.

Neither of the major parties paid much attention to civil service reform during the Iowa campaign of 1892. The reformers may have constituted a considerable part of the electorate in some of the eastern States, but they were not very numerous in Iowa. The Democrats, however, launched some attacks against Harrison's use of Federal office-holders to secure the Republican nomination.[194] It was also charged that office holders were "pulling the strings to bring female influence into the campaign",[195] but the Democrats paid little attention to the investigations going on during this period of "the alleged violations of the civil service law by federal officials in Baltimore", under the direction of Civil Service Commissioner Roosevelt.[196] It seems probable that civil service

[192] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 20, 1892.

[193] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, October 13, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), October 26, 1892.

[194] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), May 25, 1892.

[195] It was charged that Mrs. Judith E. Foster, the wife of one of the office-holders, "was organizing women's republican clubs".— *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), July 20, 1892.

[196] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, June 1, 1892.

reform was more or less of a "highbrow" movement, which as yet had little support in Iowa.

The prohibition question did not play as prominent a part in the Iowa election of 1892 as it had in the State elections of 1889 and 1891. The action of the Republican party in refusing to endorse prohibition[197] caused "six members of the executive committee of the Iowa State Temperance Alliance" to issue a proclamation asserting that the alliance would "not support the Republican party openly as they had done in past campaigns". These members were accused of having "sold out the 'third party Prohibition' cause in Iowa to Democracy".[198] Their purpose, the Republicans claimed, was to defeat if possible the Republican State ticket and electoral ticket.[199] As early as April, 1892, *The Iowa City Republican* denounced "the 1500 Prohibitionists who signed a pledge to vote against the Republican party" as "a handful of malcontents who have done more harm to prohibition than its avowed enemies". A few months later, the same paper announced that "every vote for Bidwell is indirectly a vote for Cleveland".[200]

The Democratic press was opposed to prohibition. *The Des Moines Leader* asserted that "whenever and wherever tried, prohibitory legislation has proved to be a farce and

[197] The Republican State convention had refused to pass a resolution endorsing prohibition, maintaining that the question was a State issue and should not be brought into a national campaign. They had also placed an uncompromising opponent of prohibition, A. B. Cummins, at the head of the electoral ticket.

[198] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 28, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, November 23, 1892. *The State Register* asserted that these members had received $3,500 from the Democrats for their action.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), November 4, 1892.

[199] *The Saturday Evening Post* (Weekly, Burlington), November 5, 1892.

[200] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, April 20, August 7, November 2, 1892.

a fraud'' and ''has manufactured criminals by the wholesale, and has in no respect lessened drunkenness''. The way to end this farce was to defeat the Republican party. The Republican charge that the Democrats controlled and financed the prohibition campaign was denounced as ''a malicious falsehood'',[201] but the Democrats were willing that the supporters of prohibition should vote for the Prohibition party candidates, for they knew that such action would draw votes away from the Republicans. Prohibitionists were told that they would have to vote against the Republicans if they did not wish to lose the support of the Republicans for their program, for if the Republicans won in this election without prohibition, they would decide that they were stronger without prohibition than with it and would discard it.[202] Prohibitionists were urged not to vote for a party which was ''a coward, a hypocrite, and a deceiver''. It (the Republican party) ''pretends to be good when it is not. It pretends to favor prohibition but in this campaign has repudiated prohibition''.[203]

It is probable that the Republicans gained by repudiating the prohibition issue in this campaign. They had supported this issue in 1889 and 1891 and had met defeat in both cases, and were therefore justified in thinking that the people of Iowa were no longer in favor of the issue. Although many of the votes which the Prohibition party secured were undoubtedly from the Republican ranks, it is likely that the number of voters which came back to the Republican party as a result of the dropping of prohibi-

[201] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, September 8, 22, November 3, 1892.

[202] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, August 25, 1892. ''The Iowa Prohibitionists'', said another paper, ''will have the same opportunity to vote their sentiments as other parties have'' for their ticket will appear alongside of the tickets of the other parties.— *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), August 10, 1892.

[203] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, October 27, 1892.

tion was much greater than the comparative few who voted for Bidwell, the Prohibition candidate.

The campaign conducted by the People's party in Iowa did not excite as much notice from the newspapers, as might have been expected from the fact that James B. Weaver, the candidate for President, was a native of Iowa, and had polled over ten per cent of the vote of the State while running on the Greenback ticket in 1880. *The Iowa State Register* announced early in June that it was not going to take the People's party seriously, or "take issue with any of the things done or said, because those who did them were either insincere, like Weaver, or deluded, like about all the rest who met in the convention." The members of the new party were denounced as "Calaminites" and "stool-pigeons".[204] This paper nicknamed the August convention of the People's party "the Calamity Convention" and said that it "was the same old gathering of Greenbackers". "Politically unbalanced men, with the strangest and wildest ideas, and most impracticable views predominated. In the whole gathering there was not a single man who was capable of looking at a political, or economic question, calmly or in a business-like way".[205]

Another Republican paper described this convention as "A spiritless and insignificant affair". "There were only a hundred members of the convention, and with the exception of Judge Cole the crowd was made up of the same old lot of fossils that have figured for years as Anti-monopolists, Greenbackers, or some other of various ists or ers".[206] *The Register* predicted that "the ticket nominated will poll some votes — the Leonard Browns, the Bellangees, and others whose political sanity would not stand

[204] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), June 10, 1892.

[205] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), August 19, 1892.

[206] *The Clinton Weekly Herald*, August 13, 1892.

a very severe test, will here and there find a fellow spirit and a vote''.[207] The Democratic papers were more lenient in their characterization of the new party, probably feeling that they might lose less by its inauguration than the Republicans. *The Des Moines Leader* said that both the Democratic and the People's parties agreed ''that the policies of the republican party are ruinous to the country'', but that the ''former are conservative while the latter are fanatical'', and later added that ''while the populistic paternalists and plutocratic paternalists are waging a war to determine whether the millionaires or the tramps shall hereafter be the beneficiaries of class legislation, democracy will repeal all class legislation''.[208]

The Iowa State Register stated in August that ''the entire Democratic vote of Iowa will be cast for 'Calamity Jim' and the People's state ticket'', but it changed its mind in November and predicted that ''all the Democrats in Iowa will vote for Cleveland'', as the People's party was being used solely as a ''stool pigeon'' for Republican voters.[209] A few days before the election, a partisan paper predicted that the ''only hope of success the Democrats have is that Weaver may get enough Western States to prevent an election by the people and throw the decision into the hands of Congress''.[210]

The Republican papers frequently asserted that the People's party claimed they could break up the ''Solid South'', but that their purpose was merely to deceive the northern Republicans, and by dividing the North elect a

[207] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), August 19, 1892.

[208] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* June 2, October 20, 1892.

[209] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), August 5, November 4, 1892. ''Fusion of all ins and isms against Republicanism is the mongrel order of this year's campaign in Iowa'', said this paper.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), August 5, 1892.

[210] *Iowa City Weekly Republican,* November 1, 1892.

Democratic President.[211] Additional proof for the Republican contention that the South was still solid was found when General Weaver and Mrs. Lease were forced to drop their campaigning in the South, due to mob violence. According to the Republican papers, General Weaver, himself, said that Cleveland would lose votes in the North as a result of "the intolerance of the South", while Mrs. Lease declared: "the South will be solid for Cleveland" and the North "should be solid for Harrison".[212]

Neither party stressed the currency issue, during this campaign in Iowa, both probably fearing that they would lose the support of some of their members if they said much on the question. The People's party, which expected to secure most of its support from the South and West, where inflation sentiment was strong, was not confronted with such a dilemma, and could stress the silver issue during the campaign. The Democrats were suspected of being more friendly to the free coinage of silver than the Republicans, but Cleveland's opposition to such action probably destroyed any benefit which they might derive from this fact. The Republicans were in a slightly more favorable position. Harrison had not definitely committed himself on the issue,

[211] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* April 20, August 10, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 14, 1892.

[212] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 14, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 19, 1892. *The Des Moines Leader* (Democratic) also mentions the fact that Mrs. Lease was trying to elect Harrison and Reid and stated that "when it comes to a 'showdown' on any test of principle, the plutocratic paternalists and the philanthropic paternalists are one and the same party".— *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* October 27, 1892. *The Register* at about the same time asserted that Mrs. Lease and General Weaver spoke in Polk County, so it seems probable that Mrs. Lease continued to support Weaver.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 21, 1892. It was also stated that General Weaver's treatment had "turned thousands of People's party men in Kansas back into the Republican party".— *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 13, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 19, 1892.

but was thought to be opposed to free coinage, unless the leading nations of the world should decide in favor of bimetalism. He had called an international monetary conference and his invitation was accepted by the leading nations of Europe.[213] This invitation which was issued during the campaign, gave the Republican papers an opportunity to urge silver men to vote for Harrison, since the widest coinage of silver had been obtained through the Republican party and that "party was committed to free coinage if the international silver conference succeeds".[214]

While neither the Republicans nor the Democrats paid much attention to the silver question, the Democratic plank recommending the repeal of the ten per cent tax on state bank issues attracted much more attention. The Republicans greeted this recommendation as an attempt to secure the return of State "wild cat" banking, and frequently printed accounts and cartoons describing the uncertainty of the value of money during the period of our "State Bank System" in an effort to frighten the voters away from their allegiance to the Democratic party.[215] The Republicans did not fail to point out that while prices had decreased during the previous fifteen years "the per capita amount of money" had increased and quoted from the reports of the Secretary of the Treasury to prove their con-

[213] *The Nation,* Vol. LV, p. 1.

[214] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), November 4, 1892. A bill providing for the free coinage of silver had passed the Republican Senate of the Fifty-second Congress twice but each time failed to secure the concurrence of the Democratic House.— Rhodes's *History of the United States,* Vol. VIII, p. 370.

[215] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 21, 28, November 7, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 5, 26, November 9, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 20, 1892. It was announced that Fred White, the Democratic candidate for Congress in the Sixth Iowa District had repudiated "the 'wild cat' currency plank of the National Democratic platform".— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* August 21, 1892.

tention.[216] They asserted that the adoption of "the People's party plank calling for an issue of currency up to $50 per capita by Congress would lead to speculation and unrest."[217] Thus it is evident that the Democratic proposal for the repeal of the State bank tax was the only phase of the currency question that attracted much attention on the part of the Iowa voters, and the effects of this issue were probably rather insignificant, when compared with the tariff or "war traditions".

In the election of 1890, the Democrats had been able to use the appropriation record of the previous House of Representatives against the Republicans, but when they secured control of the House, they proceeded to spend more money than their predecessors, and thus laid themselves open to the same charge of extravagance. The opposition press duly emphasized this fact.[218] Some of the Republican papers, on the other hand, accused the Democrats of "baleful economy". It was pointed out that "the reduction by the Democratic House of nearly one-half of the appropriation to prevent the spread of contagious diseases is seriously embarrassing the Treasury Department" in its attempts to check the invasion of Asiatic cholera and that as a result of this false economy "the capital may be invaded by cholera and public business deranged".[219]

The voters seemed to be entirely unaware of the real conditions of the treasury, and did not realize that the gold reserve in the treasury was rapidly shrinking. The Democratic papers, however, must have printed some rumors

[216] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), April 29, 1892.

[217] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 27, 1892.

[218] *Spirit Lake Beacon* (Weekly), May 20, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), January 29, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), July 28, 1892.

[219] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, September 21, 1892.

that the treasury was "on the verge of bankruptcy", for *The Iowa State Register* denied these rumors and insisted that since "the Republicans are pledged to reduce the surplus and keep the money in circulation. . . . They are doing it".[220]

The two major parties made strenuous efforts to secure the support of the foreign voters. The tariff furnished a convenient issue for the Republicans to use as an appeal for Irish votes, since the majority of the Irish were bitterly opposed to England. Quotations, taken from English papers stating that the McKinley tariff was ruining the industries of England, were frequently run in the Republican papers.[221] The Irish, it was said, should vote against the Democratic party, which stood for "English free trade" and prosperity for England.[222] *The London Times* was quoted as having said that "one Irishman in the United States wearing English broadcloth and voting free trade is worth more to England than fifty Irishmen at home". This statement was frequently reprinted in the Republican papers.[223] The Democrats tried to counteract this propaganda by denouncing the "Anglo-mania" of the Republican papers and insisting that free trade was not an English doctrine, and that it would not aid England, but would enable us to destroy the English carrying monopoly.[224]

[220] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), April 15, 1892.

[221] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), May 6, June 17, 1892, quoted extracts from the *London Engineering News.* The reciprocity clause, said another paper, is "taking the South American trade from England".—*Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 6, 1892.

[222] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 6, 1892; *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), January 1, 15, May 20, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* November 5, 1892.

[223] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), January 1, 15, February 5, 26, March 18, 1892.

[224] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* August 18, 1892.

Moreover, it was declared, we should not pay any attention to British opinion as "we are intelligent enough to decide for ourselves what we want".[225] It is perhaps questionable whether this Republican propaganda had much effect on the Irish voters, who are usually Democratic.

Both parties angled for the German vote. The Germans — especially the German Lutherans — in the nearby States of Wisconsin and Illinois, had deserted the Republicans because they disliked certain features of the compulsory education laws in their respective States, and had aided in electing the Democratic State ticket in both of these Republican States. The Democrats appreciated the value of these voters and placed a plank satisfying them in the Democratic national platform. They insisted that this issue was still alive and would cost the Republicans many votes.[226] The Republicans insisted that the German Lutherans had changed their political sentiment since 1892 and would again vote Republican. They seemed to get considerable encouragement from the fact that the *Germania* of Milwaukee, the organ of the German Lutherans of Wisconsin, had come back to the support of the Republican ticket.[227] While Iowa did not have a school question

[225] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), October 26, 1892.

[226] Porter's *National Platforms*, pp. 163–165; *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, August 1, October 27, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), July 29, September 28, 1892. The Republicans seem to have been worried over the defection of the Lutherans. *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, May 25, 1892, maintained that "the German Lutheran leaders of Illinois are making a serious mistake in declaring in favor of the Democratic party", and later tried to minimize the German defection, declaring that while "the appeal of Carl Schurz and other German Democrats in the East for Democratic votes may possibly have some effect upon the New York Germans . . . . it will have little or no weight with the German-American Republicans in the West". — *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, August 21, 1892. The Democrats made frequent appeals to the German voters.— *Clinton Weekly Age*, July 26, September 2, 9, 1892.

[227] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 14, 1892; *The*

like Illinois and Wisconsin, it is probable that the Germans in Iowa sympathized with their kinsmen in Illinois and Wisconsin, and would therefore be more likely to vote Democratic because of this issue.

Little attention seems to have been paid in Iowa to the matter of President Harrison's Indian policy,[228] which was said to have cost the Republicans thousands of Catholic votes, although the *Iowa City Weekly Republican* denounced the Democrats for "making attempts to stir up religious prejudices between Protestants and Catholics" by making "political capital out of previous difficulties which arose between Indian Commissioner Morgan and the Catholic Church over Indian schools".[229]

Iowa City Weekly Republican, October 26, November 9, 1892. The Republicans maintained that the Germans would vote Republican because they favored protection and honest money.— *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), April 8, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, August 3, 1892.

[228] For years the government had maintained what were known as contract Indian schools, the contracts providing that the churches educate the children. While all churches had an equal opportunity to secure these schools, the Catholic church had obtained a larger per cent of them. The American Protective Association (an anti-Catholic organization) directed a fight against these schools. When General Thomas J. Morgan, a Baptist minister, was appointed Indian Commissioner by President Harrison, he at once began to abolish contract schools. His drastic policy aroused a strong protest from the Catholic church, but Harrison, fearing criticism from other denominations, did not remove him. Father Stephan, a priest who had spent much time among the Indians, now secured letters from prominent Catholic prelates, and went out and told leading Catholics what the Harrison administration had done in regard to these schools. His work had considerable influence wherever he went. At the same time, Illinois and Wisconsin had passed laws which were obnoxious to both Catholics and Lutherans.— Dunn's *From Harrison to Harding*, pp. 82–84, 98.

[229] It was stated that a circular had been sent out to Catholic priests "trying to besmirch the Indian office" but that the charges were really groundless, since Archbishop Ireland of St. Paul had approved of the change made by Commissioner Morgan and other prelates would also approve it when they understood the truth of the matter.— *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, August 31, 1892.

There were a few charges of fraud mentioned, but largely of occurrences in other States which were reprinted in Iowa for their news value or political effects. The Democratic press frequently mentioned the work of Dudley and his "blocks of five" in the election of 1888, evidently endeavoring to show that the Republican leaders would not hesitate at bribery in order to win the election.[230]

A number of Republican State officials, including the Secretary of State, Treasurer, and Attorney General, had been guilty of nepotism. The Democratic papers published the facts of their actions during the fortnight before the election and contended that these officials deserved no sort of charity or mercy from the State of Iowa for such "salary grabs".[231] *The Iowa State Register* asserted that these officials were economical and stated that "there had been nothing in the transactions of the various state officials as far as finances are concerned, upon which a candidate or set of candidates can be elected. . . . It is a desperate and losing cause whose devotees begin to rake up filth and filth at that which exists only in their own rattled brains". It was also asserted that Governor Boies and other Democratic officials had hired relatives, a procedure which was perfectly proper since there was no law against it.[232] It is doubtful if this last minute raking up of scandals really

[230] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, September 29, October 20, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican*, July 27, August 10, October 26, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), October 12, 1892. The Democrats also charged that money was being used in a brazen effort to elect the Republican congressional candidate in the Sixth District.— *Des Moines Weekly Leader*, September 24, 1892.

[231] A number of relatives of these officials held office, but were said to do little or no work.— *The Des Moines Weekly Leader*, October 27, November 3, 1892; *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), November 2, 1892; *Clinton Weekly Age*, November 4, 1892.

[232] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), October 28, November 4, 1892.

aided the Democrats very much, since the election seems to have been fought out largely on national issues.

The central committees of the various parties arranged for and held a good many rallies and speeches in the State. Among the prominent Republicans, who spoke in Iowa were Senator William B. Allison,[233] Governor William McKinley, Governor Joseph B. Foraker, Senator William P. Frye, and Congressman Thomas B. Reed of Maine.[234] Republicans representing the various foreign elements also spoke in the State. Among these were Marcus Kavanaugh, an Irishman of Chicago, and Rudolph Blankenburg, a German importer of Philadelphia.[235] Governor Horace Boies took an active part in the Democratic campaign in the State.[236] A series of joint debates were arranged by the chairmen of the Republican and Democratic State committees, each side being represented by a speaker.[237] General Weaver and Mrs. Lease spoke in Iowa for the People's party.[238]

Some complaints were made prior to the election that the Australian ballot used during this election lacked definiteness, and it was asserted after the election "that be-

[233] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* September 7, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* September 3, 1892.

[234] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* September 14, November 9, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* August 6, October 8, 1892.

[235] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 19, November 2, 1892.

[236] *Clinton Weekly Herald,* September 17, 1892.

[237] *The Des Moines Weekly Leader,* September 8, 1892. For examples of debates see above, also *Spirit Lake Beacon,* August 19, 26, September 9, 1892; *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), October 20, 1892; *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* October 8, 1892; *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 12, 1892.

[238] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* September 7, 1892. This paper quotes the *Omaha Bee* as saying that "Mrs. Lease's fog-horn voice is resounding in Iowa these days, reminding the people of that State that they are miserable and down-trodden, even if they do have money in the banks, own their own homes, and are educating their children at college".

tween 4,000 and 5,000 ballots in Iowa were thrown out because they were not properly marked''.[239] The Australian ballot, however, had the advantage of making bribery difficult, for the voter was enabled to keep his vote secret.

Both the Democratic and Republican newspapers stated that the campaign had been very quiet; many voters felt that the results in New York would decide the election, and it was therefore useless to do much in other States.[240]

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Both major parties seem to have had hopes of winning the election, but the national results were so decisive that they probably surprised the victors nearly as much as the vanquished. Cleveland not only carried the doubtful States of New York, Indiana, New Jersey, and Connecticut, but also carried the hitherto supposedly solid Republican States of Illinois, Wisconsin, and California, and came so near to carrying Ohio, that one of his electors slipped in over the lowest Republican elector. Cleveland received a total of 277 electoral votes, Harrison 145, and Weaver 22. The popular vote was Cleveland 5,556,543, Harrison 5,175,582, and Weaver 1,040,886.[241]

The Republicans were more successful in Iowa. They carried the State by a plurality only 7,756 votes less than their 1888 plurality. The Republicans elected all of their

[239] *Iowa State Press* (Weekly, Iowa City), November 9, 1892; *The Weekly Iowa City Republican,* November 23, 1892.

[240] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* October 26, 1892; *Clinton Weekly Age,* November 4, 1892.

[241] Stanwood's *A History of the Presidency,* pp. 515–517; McPherson's *A Handbook of Politics,* 1894, pp. 272, 273. The popular vote given is taken from Stanwood and differs slightly from that given in McPherson. It must be borne in mind that the Democratic vote is understated, and the People's vote overstated as a result of the fusion in a number of the Western States. A similar fusion in some Southern States affected the results of the People's party and Republican votes in these States.

State officers and all of their Congressmen except one — Walter I. Hayes of the Second District was the only Democratic Congressman elected. The Republican vote for President in Iowa was 219,795, the Democratic 196,367, the People's party 20,595, and the Prohibitionists 6,402.[242]

As soon as election was over the various Iowa editors began to give their explanations for the tremendous defeat suffered by the Republicans in the national contest. *The Clinton Weekly Herald* attributed the defeat to the vote suppression in the South, Tammany Hall, the Chicago anarchists who went to the polls to support Governor Altgeld, the People's party, and the school laws in Illinois and Wisconsin, which caused the German Lutherans and other Germans of these two States to support the Democratic ticket almost in a body.[243]

In the opinion of *The Iowa State Register*, the Republican defeat was due to "the enormous corruption funds" which backed the Democrats, added to the fraud and intimidation in the South.[244] Most of the editors considered the protective tariff as one of the most important if not the chief reason for the defeat of the Republicans: the people had demanded a reversal of the protective policy.[245]

One Iowa paper attributed the Republican defeat to the fact that the people had become suspicious of the party. That party, it said, "had been suspected of consorting with designing men" for twenty years. "Its great strength had gone out in a sinful and lustful way to combinations of capital. . . . The country was and is wonderfully pros-

[242] *Iowa Official Register,* 1893, pp. 193–198, 203, 204.

[243] *The Clinton Weekly Herald,* November 12, 1892.

[244] *The Iowa State Register* (Weekly, Des Moines), November 11, 1892. This paper added that Democratic free trade had triumphed for the time.

[245] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* November 16, 1892; *Spirit Lake Beacon,* November 18, 1892; *Clinton Weekly Age,* November 11, 1892.

perous. The public, however, decided to entertain the suspicion that all of this great prosperity was too one-sided in its application, the bulk of it going to the few and the modicum to the many. . . . It has temporized too long with men and measures, and combinations that were not clean, wholesome or inspired by patriotism''.[246] It seems probable that the protective tariff policy of the Republican party was the chief cause of its defeat. The dissatisfaction of certain classes with the distribution of wealth, and the economic policy of the country reacted against the party in power, especially since many of the voters considered that party closely connected with the corporate interests. Certain other factors such as the Homestead riots, the Wisconsin and Illinois school question, and Harrison's Indian policy all aided in making the Republican defeat more decisive.

A number of the editors endeavored to explain why Iowa had not drifted toward the Democratic party like most of the other States. The *Fort Dodge Messenger* claimed that the reason Iowa went Republican "is found in the universal prosperity which is enjoyed in Iowa. The cries of the calamity howlers were unavailing against the positive knowledge that times were never so prosperous before".[247] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican* attributed the Republican victory in Iowa to the fact that "the tariff question was

[246] *The Saturday Evening Post* (Weekly, Burlington), November 12, 1892. *The Review of Reviews* gave a similar opinion. It attributed the Republican defeat to the fact that the voters considered the Republican party too favorable toward the corporate interests and the concentration of wealth. "The trouble at Homestead created a widespread feeling among working men that the Republican party was not sincere in urging protection as a means of maintaining American wages. . . . This campaign involved to some extent a movement of the poor against the rich, and that the Republican party was more generally thought to stand for the rich".— *The American Review of Reviews,* Vol. VI, pp. 517–519.

[247] *Fort Dodge Messenger* (Weekly), November 17, 1892.

fairly and squarely placed before the people by the Republican papers and speakers and the McKinley measure was endorsed. There was no school or silver question to embarrass the Republicans as in some other States''.[248]

Governor Boies claimed that ''minor issues'' were responsible for the Democratic defeat in Iowa, while other Democrats claimed that the free silver Democrats had voted for Weaver.[249] An analysis of the vote by counties brings out the fact that the People's party probably injured the Democratic party fully as much as it did the Republican.[250]

It is probable that the higher prices of farm products during 1891-1892 added to the Republican votes. Iowa was comparatively prosperous in comparison with some of the States farther west, while she had no industrial population to be affected by such industrial riots as the Homestead strikes. The ''war traditions'' must also not be overlooked, for they undoubtedly aided considerably in keeping the soldier voters and their sympathizers in the Republican ranks. The average Iowa voter had been in the habit of voting Republican and since there was no very pressing reason during this election to make him change his vote, he voted for the ''grand old party''.

[248] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* November 23, 1892.

[249] *The Iowa City Weekly Republican,* November 23, 1892.

[250] Of the 37 counties in which the People's party vote was over 5 per cent of the total vote, the Democratic vote was proportionately larger in 1892 than in 1888 in 10 counties and smaller in 26, the Republican vote was larger in only 1 and smaller in 36, while in the 62 counties with less than 5 per cent Populist votes, the Democratic vote was proportionally larger in 46 counties and smaller in 10, the Republican larger in 2 counties and smaller in 58. It appears that in this election the People's party drew more votes from the Republican party than from the Democratic, but that while in some counties the dissatisfied voters voted Populist, in others they voted Democratic. Had there been no third party in the field, the majority of these voters would probably have voted Democratic. The Democrats probably lost nearly as many votes because of the third party as the Republicans did.

The foreign vote had always been a numerous and important part of the Iowa electorate. A careful study of the results of the election of 1892 gives an index of how these citizens cast their votes. In 1890, the German-born males over 21 years of age numbered over 15 per cent of the total number of males in 22 counties. The Democrats carried 15 of these 22 counties in 1892, while they carried only 13 of the other 77 counties of the State. Thus it appears that the Germans as a whole voted Democratic much more frequently than their neighbors. A study of the vote in the different counties in the State from 1880 to 1892 also shows that the drift of German voters from the Republican to the Democratic party was more rapid than that of the other voters of the State.

The explanation of this drift toward the Democratic party is probably found largely in the opposition of the Germans to prohibition, which had been supported by the Republicans during this period, although the school issues in the neighboring States of Wisconsin and Illinois probably aided somewhat in influencing them toward the Democratic party.

In the eleven Iowa counties in which the census of 1890 reported 15 per cent of the males of 21 or over born in Scandinavian countries, the Republicans were victorious, as they had been in all three of the previous State elections. The trend was away from the Republican party, however, for in all but three of these counties, the Republican vote reached its lowest level for these four elections, although the Democratic vote was smaller than in 1884 in all but two of these counties.

In the election of 1892 the Republicans carried eight of the ten counties which had the smallest percentage of foreign-born residents in 1890. There seemed to be a slight trend toward the Democratic party during this period on

the part of the native-born voters, but this was much less than among the Germans, and slightly less than among the Scandinavians. The Scandinavians appear to have been strongly Republican, the native-born citizens while usually Republican were frequently Democratic, while the Germans were oftener Democratic than Republican.

Although the Democratic party elected their presidential candidate and secured control of both houses of Congress in 1892, the People's party also derived some comfort from the election. As one paper put it: "A party that can carry four or five States in a presidential election certainly has reason to hope. When all of the nondescript elements that properly belong with that party get safely marshalled under its banners, and they will all now go to it then it will have good fighting strength. . . . We think it probable that the People's party will advance to second place by the action of the farmers, who will not ally themselves to any extent with the Democratic populations of the city. It looks now as if the readjustment of political lines might divide the city from the country and deliver the cities into the keeping of the Democratic party".[251] Another Republican paper of the time spoke less optimistically of the future of the new party, characterizing it as "a nine days' wonder that will pass away and be known only as a memory, along with the Greenback, Anti-Monopoly, and various other crazes that have come and gone".[252]

There was much discussion as to the future of the new party. Would the party increase in strength and ultimately take the place of the Republican party? Or on the other hand, would the new party follow the example begun in 1892, and fuse with one of the major parties either partially or completely? The party ultimately followed the latter

[251] *The Saturday Evening Post* (Weekly, Burlington), November 12, 1892.

[252] *Clinton Weekly Herald*, November 12, 1892.

alternative, captured the Democratic party in 1896, wrote an endorsement of "the free and unlimited coinage of silver", the chief issue of the People's party, in the Democratic platform, endorsed William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic candidate, and made silver the paramount issue of the campaign. Certain of the demands of the People's party such as the direct election of the United States Senators, a graduated income tax, and postal savings banks have since been written into the national statute books, while other reforms like the initiative and referendum have been adopted by many of the States.

The Populist vote was comparatively small in Iowa. They polled slightly less than 5 per cent of the total vote of the State for their presidential candidate in 1892 or slightly less than half as large a percentage of the total vote as the Greenback party drew in 1880. They did not even keep their ratio in the counties in which the Greenback vote had been strong.[253] While the Populists did not in the majority of cases keep up their ratio in the counties in which the Greenback vote had been large, they did draw their chief strength from these counties. It was only in the northern and far western part of the State that the Populists made important gains over the Greenback vote of 1880.[254] The frontier had moved westward during the twelve years from 1880 to 1892, and the tide of radicalism had gone with it.

The People's party appears to have gained little support from the German voters in Iowa. Bremer was the only

[253] Of the 33 counties in which the Greenbackers received 10 per cent or more of the popular vote in 1880, the Populists kept their ratio in 11, and drew less than 2½ per cent in 10 of them.

[254] Notably Lyon, Sioux, Osceola, O'Brien, Dickinson, Clay, Buena Vista, Pocahontas, Winnebago, Hancock, Worth, Cerro Gordo, and Floyd in the North. It will be noticed that none of these counties are in the northeast where in 1880 the Greenbackers received a considerable vote.

county with a heavy German population which had given the Greenback party as large a vote as their Statewide average, while over half of the German counties gave them less than 30 per cent of their State average. The People's party did not fare much better, getting as large a percentage as their State average in only one county, Muscatine, and securing less than 3 per cent of the vote in 19 of the 22 German counties. The German voters, it appears, would not vote for a third party, but when they became dissatisfied with the Republican party went over to the Democrats.

The People's party gained only slightly more support from the Scandinavian voters. The Greenback party had drawn over 10 per cent of the vote in three of the eleven Scandinavian counties, Story, Webster, and Hamilton, but the voters in these counties seemed to have gone back to the old parties by 1892, the People's party vote being less than 5 per cent in each of these counties. The People's party vote did increase in a few of the Scandinavian counties, notably in Winnebago.

It was among the counties which had a very small foreign element that the third parties drew their largest vote. Eight of the ten counties with the smallest percentage of foreign-born citizens,[255] had given the Greenback party over 10 per cent of its vote in 1880 — in one of the other two it was over 8 per cent and in the other nearly 6 per cent. The People's party vote was also strong in these counties. There was also a strong sectional bias in the third party vote, the Greenback-Populist stronghold being in the south central part of the State.[256]

The election results in Iowa were not very encouraging

[255] Less than 10 per cent of the males of 21 or over in 1890 were born in a foreign country.

[256] Haynes's *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War*, p. 326.

for the new party. The small percentage of their total vote and the fact that the foreign voters would not support them to any great extent made it improbable that the People's party would ever develop much strength in the State. Iowa, it appeared, was no longer a frontier State, subject to frontier third-party movements.

The chief issue of the campaign had been the protective policy of the Republican party, and while the nation as a whole had rejected it, Iowa had endorsed it. It was evident that neither the People's party or the anti-prohibition movement toward the Democratic party during the later eighties and early nineties would succeed in wresting Iowa from the Republican party. As was forecast by their action in 1892, the Republicans dropped prohibition in the next State election and won the election by an increased majority.[257] Iowa has never since elected a Democratic Governor.

Finally, the election of 1892 marked the first election in which the Democrats secured control of both Houses of Congress and the presidency since the administration of James Buchanan. Cleveland's election in 1884 rested on a slender majority in New York, which was probably due to Burchard's unfortunate remarks in New York and could be considered accidental, but in 1892 the Democratic victory was complete and decisive.

THE FOREIGN VOTE

The foreign vote constituted a numerous and important element of the Iowa electorate in 1892. In 1890, 16.95 per cent of the inhabitants of the State were foreign born and 26.84 per cent more had one or both parents foreign born.[258] Of the 324,069 foreign born inhabitants of Iowa,

[257] Cole's *A History of the People of Iowa*, pp. 483, 484.

[258] *Eleventh Census of the United States*, 1890, Population, Pt. I, p. 88.

136,902 were Germans (including Austrians and Dutch), 72,873 were Scandinavians, 37,560 were British (including Scotch and Welsh), and 37,353 were Irish.[259] An analysis of the foreign element by counties furnishes some interesting sidelights as to how the various foreign elements tended to vote in the presidential elections from 1880 to 1892. In some parts of the State, especially in the southern counties, the foreign element made up only a very small portion of the total population. In ten of these less than ten per cent and in twenty-seven less than twenty per cent of the males over twenty-one years of age, in 1890, were foreign born. In other counties the foreign born were in the majority or else constituted a strong minority of the total inhabitants. In two counties over sixty per cent, in six counties over fifty per cent, and in nineteen counties over forty per cent of the males over twenty-one in 1890 were foreign born.[260]

The largest group of foreign born voters in Iowa were the Germans. In twenty-two counties fifteen per cent or more of the males were German born.[261] The Republicans carried nineteen of these German counties in 1880, eleven in 1884, eleven in 1888, and only seven in 1892, the Demo-

This total of 43.79 per cent foreign born or born of foreign parents was less than half the similar element of North Dakota, only slightly over half as large as that of Minnesota, Wisconsin, or South Dakota, and less than that of Michigan or Illinois.

[259] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Pt. II, Population, pp. 628–630.

[260] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Population, Pt. I, pp. 777, 778.

[261] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Population, Pt. I, pp. 777, 778, Pt. II, pp. 628–630. In five counties — Jackson, Benton, O'Brien, Cedar, and Hardin — the percentage of German born of all ages was less than 15 per cent of the total population, but this estimate is conservative for the percentage of males over twenty-one was about double the percentage of the foreign born of all ages, most of the children being native born.

crats in each case carrying all the others. In only one of these counties — Lee — was the Republican vote as great in 1884 as it had been in 1880, while the Democrats gained in every county.[262] It appears that there was a marked drift of the German voters from the Republican to the Democratic party in these twenty-two German counties in 1884. The Republican vote in 1888 was less than that in 1884 in fourteen counties, and more in eight, even gaining over 1880 in two counties — Clayton and Lee. The Democrats in 1888 just about held what they had won in 1884, gaining in eleven counties and losing in eleven. In 1892 the Republicans lost in every county except Dubuque, while the Democrats gained in nineteen counties and held their own in the other three — Lee, Jackson, and Des Moines. From 1880 to 1892, the Republican vote in the State as a whole decreased six per cent, while in fifteen of these German counties it decreased over ten per cent and in only four did it decrease less than six per cent. During these twelve years, the Democrats increased their vote in the State as a whole over eleven per cent,[263] and in fourteen of these German counties, the Democratic gain was greater than eleven per cent, while in Scott County their gain was thirty per cent. The Germans as a group seemed to have left the Republican party in greater numbers than the average voters of Iowa. This change may have been due to the attitude of the Republicans on Prohibition.[264]

[262] The term gain as used here is made to apply to proportional gain. The returns from elections are figured in percentages and these percentages compared. The Republican vote in Sioux County was 65 per cent of the total in 1880, 60 per cent in 1884, 57 per cent in 1888, and 52 per cent in 1892.

[263] The fact that the Democrats gained more than the Republicans lost is explained by the fact that the Greenback party in 1880 polled over twice as large a percentage of the total vote as the People's party did in 1892.

[264] For election returns for 1880–1892, see the following: *American Almanac*, 1885, pp. 216, 217; *Iowa Official Register*, 1889, pp. 76–192, 1893, pp. 119–203.

In eleven counties of Iowa over fifteen per cent of the male residents over twenty-one in 1890 were born in one of the Scandinavian countries.[265] The Republican party carried all of these counties in each presidental election from 1880 to 1892 inclusive. In 1880 and 1884 in ten of these counties and in 1888 and 1892 in all eleven of them, the Republican vote was proportionally greater than the Republican vote in the State as a whole. Winnebago, which had the largest percentage of Scandinavian voters in the State, gave nearly eighty-eight per cent of her vote to the Republican party in 1880, nearly seventy-six per cent in 1884, nearly seventy-nine per cent in 1888, and over sixty-seven per cent in 1892.[266] As was the case in most of the counties of the State, the proportion of Republican votes to the total vote declined considerably in the Scandinavian counties between 1880 and 1884, but while the Republican vote in Iowa declined still more from 1884 to 1888, it increased in nearly all the Scandinavian counties, though it did not reach the level of 1880. Since the Republican vote in 1888 in the Scandinavian counties increased over the total vote four years before, while their vote in the State at large declined, it would seem probable that most of the Scandinavian voters who had left the Republican party in 1880 had returned by 1888. The fact that the Republican vote did not reach the 1880 level is explained by the fact that the other voters in these counties had not all returned to the party. The Republican vote in these counties was proportionally smaller in 1892 than in 1888, and in all but three reached the lowest level of any of these four elections.

The Democratic vote in each of these Scandinavian

[265] *Eleventh Census of the United States,* 1890, Population, Pt. I, pp. 777, 778, Pt. II, pp. 628–630.

[266] Winnebago County gave the Populist party over 10 per cent of her vote in 1892, which explains most of the Republican loss.

counties increased in 1884 as compared with 1880. While the Greenback-Democratic fusion in that year explains part of the Democratic gain, the fact remains that in each county, Cleveland drew a larger percentage of votes than the Greenback and Democratic total in 1880. In 1888 the Democratic vote declined over four years before but was greater than it had been in 1880, showing that although the Scandinavians were gradually returning to the Republican party, they had not all returned. In 1892, the Democrats again gained in eight of these counties and lost in three, although they reached their high water mark in 1884 in only two counties. The above figures bring out the fact that the Scandinavians as a group were strongly Republican and during this period did not swing toward the Democratic party as their German neighbors did.

It will be worthwhile to compare the returns from the foreign counties with those from the counties which had a very small foreign element. It must be borne in mind, however, that part of the difference between the political affiliations of the native born citizen and the foreign born may have been due to geographic influences, since the native born element was strongest in the south-central part of the State, while the Germans and Scandinavians were mostly in the northern part of the State or along the extreme southeast or southwest of the State.

In 1890 ten counties of Iowa reported less than ten per cent of their male residents born in a foreign country. The Republicans carried nine of these counties in 1880, seven in 1884, eight in 1888, and eight in 1892; the Greenbackers carried one in 1880; the Democrats carried three in 1884, two in 1888, and two in 1892. Although the Republican vote in the State as a whole declined 4 1/2 per cent between 1880 and 1884, that party gained in five of these counties, held their own in two more, and lost in only three, and in

no case was their loss over three per cent. It seems that the Republicans gained somewhat in this election as a result of the Greenback-Democratic fusion. Apparently some of the Greenbackers refused to be delivered to the Democrats by the fusion of 1884.

The Democrats, probably due to their fusion with the Greenback party, increased the proportion of their vote in nine of these ten counties in 1884 and lost in only one, but were not so fortunate in the next election, gaining over 1884 in only one county and losing in nine. In 1892, they increased their vote over 1888 in only two counties and lost in eight. In only one county was their vote greater than in 1884. The rise of the Populists probably had something to do with the fact that the Democrats did not gain in 1892, since the new party secured considerable support in these counties.

The above statistics seem to point out that although a considerable number of the native born Americans voted the Greenback ticket in 1880, they did not all go over to the Democrats in the fusion of 1884, while some that voted Democratic in 1884 went over to the Republicans in 1888.

By 1892 the Germans as a group seemed to be oftener Democratic than Republican, the Scandinavians were still very strongly Republican, while the native born citizens of Iowa, while voting Republican more than Democratic, did not support the Republicans in as large a proportion as did the Scandinavians.

WALTER ELLSWORTH NYDEGGER

WHEATON COLLEGE
WHEATON ILLINOIS