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“‘Challenge Accepted’ Movement on Instagram:
An Embodied Virtual Protest”

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether social media provides an alternative protest forum minimizing bodily harm for vulnerable groups through an analysis of the “Challenge Accepted” movement on Instagram. The Instagram challenge constituted a part of the physical and online protests against the actions of the authorities and mechanisms in Turkey, especially after the Turkish government’s decision to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention, which increased women’s vulnerability. Based on Judith Butler’s writings, I propose four main properties for an effective protest: 1. Visibility of the protesters and their bodies, 2. Plural action, 3. Occupation of “public” spaces, 4. Vulnerability of the protesters. Looking into the properties and tactics that carry over from physical to virtual protests, I argue that social media offers its users an alternatively embodied political presence in public that minimizes harm and allows for plural political action, and has tangible socio-political consequences and effects on protesters’ bodies and lives. Although I ultimately argue that hybrid physical-online protests are more effective and less risky for the protesters, this paper is an attempt to re-think and imagine alternative protest platforms that reduce vulnerability and increase social and political impact, which is much needed under certain circumstances that increase protesters’ vulnerability and discourage physical participation, such as police brutality, governmental oppression and the COVID-19 pandemic.

KEYWORDS: activism, embodiment, public space, social media, vulnerability

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During the summer of 2020, the Turkish government was on the verge of withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention on the grounds that the Convention was antithetical to “Turkish family values.” The government’s decision caused opposition and unrest among women throughout the country because the Convention was one of the most effective mechanisms to lessen women’s vulnerability, as it aimed to combat violence against women through prevention, protection, prosecution and coordinated policies. The protests first started in the streets of a number of cities throughout Turkey, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic and fear and uncertainty that existed about which political actions were permissible following the attempted coup d’état that took place in Turkey in 2016, the numbers of protesters was lower than usual in many cities. Women’s more vulnerable condition in the physical protests pushed them to seek an alternative space to form alliances that would minimize their bodily exposure and the risk of harm. As an already widely used extension of physical protests, social media stood out as a viable option.

A campaign named “Challenge Accepted” started on Instagram. Women challenged each other to post a black-and-white photograph of themselves with the hashtags “#challengeaccepted”, “#womensupportingwomen”, “#womenempowerment”, and “#istanbul sözleşmesi yaşatır” (or “istanbulConventionsaveslives”). In a very short time, the movement became a worldwide trend. The campaign’s main purpose was to protest the actions of the authorities and mechanisms in Turkey that increase women’s vulnerability, especially the withdrawal from the Convention, and therefore to raise awareness about the Convention and the high femicide rate in Turkey.

In this paper, I analyze the Challenge Accepted movement on Instagram through news articles, Instagram posts, the campaign prompt, and Instagram’s unique properties to investigate whether social media, specifically Instagram, provides an alternative protest forum that minimizes bodily harm while offering a kind of *alternatively embodied* space for vulnerable groups. The notion of an *alternatively embodied* political presence in public draws from Judith Butler’s writings on vulnerable bodies and alliance. Butler claims that bodies have an inherent public dimension; our bodies are necessarily exposed to external impacts and interferences, which renders us all vulnerable. However, coordinated political action, such as street protests, has an important inter-body dynamic: namely, the action takes place ‘between’ bodies and can transform shared vulnerability into collective strength that cannot be contained. Butler’s work on physical protest is explored within both the physical and online contexts in this paper to see what carries over to virtual spaces.

Reviewing the physical protests against Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention through the lens of Butler’s writings, I propose four main properties for an effective protest that I proceed to look for in the Challenge Accepted movement, questioning whether these properties can carry over from physical to virtual protests:

1. Visibility of protesters’ bodies: Making the protesters’ bodies visible and accessible renders vulnerable bodies “site[s] of contention in the politics of gender, sexuality, race, religion, and culture” (Baer 19).
2. Plural action and simultaneity: Protesters can gather “there” at the same time in their coordinated actions to build a sense of common cause, solidarity, shared suffering and vulnerability, and form counterpublics.
3. Occupation of “public” spaces: Taking up space and interrupting the usual flow within that space allows for counterpublics to intervene in the dominant discourses and disseminate their discourses.
4. Vulnerability of protesters: Being exposed to harm is a shared condition for all embodied beings. However, the degree of vulnerability depends on context and conditions as well as the non/presence of institutions and structures of support. Our shared vulnerability implies interdependency and relationality, and has the potential to transform into collective strength and create opportunities for political change.

By demonstrating the ways in which protesters’ bodies become visible, coalesce into plural action, form counterpublics, and occupy virtual spaces, and by establishing parallels between physical and virtual protests, I claim that political strategy and protest tactics can be effectively carried over from the physical to the virtual. I argue that embodiment and spatiality on social media are more than metaphorical or symbolic; they form “real” conditions with tangible socio-political consequences and effects on protesters’ bodies and lives. “Real” in this case, implies

that these conditions extend beyond the virtual realm and are experienced both physically and psychologically by the individuals, affecting their experiences offline.

Social media, I argue, offers users an alternatively embodied political presence in public, and enables users to form counterpublics within and against more dominant public domains. The users' bodies become visible through the act of sharing a photograph, and also become open to cyberbullying and online violence. This visibility can also be used as a means of identification, which at times leads to discrimination, detainment, and arrest. Images of actual bodies take up space within these virtual spaces. They can occupy and interfere with other users' screens and lay claim to those spaces. Therefore, social media cannot be thought of as a disembodied realm, and the vulnerability that stems from our embodied existence carries over to the virtual to some extent. Social media's "public" aspect stems from its function as a space for deliberation and interaction, as well as from the constant need to reclaim space as "public" by different publics, like in physical "public" spaces. Users who occupy virtual space are alternatively embodied, as they are exposed to others and to the potential impacts and interactions in virtual platforms. This virtual exposure creates opportunities for expression, dialogue, and the formation of communities and counterpublics, all of which take place in online protests, where the risk of bodily harm is reduced.

This investigation is very timely because of the increasing vulnerability of certain counterpublics such as women, people of color, and LGBTI+ groups. These groups are generally drowned out by dominant publics in the public sphere and are faced with police brutality and governmental repression during physical protests. Recently, the intensity of this oppression has been scaled up due to the pandemic, especially in the context of Turkey. As the need for a new form of protest with less exposure to harm becomes pressing, I offer a set of essential properties that can be used as future reference for alternative forms of protest, and an assessment of the currently popular platform of social media as a space of protest.

I. Vulnerability and the Istanbul Convention

The concept of vulnerability has generally been used to define certain groups of persons who are living in poverty, confined in state institutions, or infected with HIV-AIDS, or for children and the elderly. But legal theorist and political philosopher Martha Fineman argues against these conceptions of vulnerability that are attributable to identity, and offers a redefinition of the concept as a "universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition" (8). According to her, this definition brings with it the potential for "vulnerability" to open up new conversations about the responsibilities of the state. Fineman claims that as embodied beings, we always carry the risk of getting harmed with us (9). Although we can try and lessen this risk, it is impossible to completely eliminate it. Therefore, every individual is inevitably and constantly vulnerable, however, the degree of vulnerability is dependent upon context and conditions.

Although Fineman views vulnerability as "post-identity" concept, Ulrich Beck draws a connection between vulnerability and identity and claims that members of certain groups may be disproportionately exposed to harm. This view helps close the gap of race, gender, class, and external factors that affect one's exposure to harm, rendering them more or less vulnerable not only individually, but as a group that shares the same racial, social, and economic status, a point that is overlooked in Fineman's theory. Judith Butler makes a distinction between two different dimensions of vulnerability that are mentioned here. She says that while we are all vulnerable due to our existence as embodied beings, our vulnerability is "to a large extent dependent upon

the organization of economic and social relationships, the presence or absence of sustaining infrastructures and social and political institutions” (Puar 170). In other words, depending on the organization and distribution of social and economic relationships, as well as the (non) presence of institutions and structures of support, “[t]he universal vulnerability of all embodied lives coexists with the fact that some groups are deemed far more vulnerable,” as Eunjung Kim writes (Kim 142).

Women in Turkey are a relatively vulnerable group. Violence against women, according to Kader Tekkas Kerman and Patricia Betrus, can be defined as “any acts of behaviors by partner, family, or community that cause physical, psychological, or sexual harm to women” (510). Femicide is the ultimate form of violence against women; it is the killing of women or girls because of their gender. The number of femicides in Turkey is rising each year. In 2019, this number dramatically increased (474 women were murdered by men according to We Will Stop Femicide Platform in Turkey),¹ and according to the 2020 annual report, 300 women were murdered by men and 171 women were found suspiciously dead.² Each year, more than half of femicides happen at home due to the fact that one of the most common forms of violence against women is *intimate partner violence*. The COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns left women even more vulnerable to this type of domestic violence. Even though violence against women affects all countries of the world, it should be noted that there are a number of endemic risk factors: “Turkish family structures and cultural practices such as the bride’s price, forced marriages, honor killings, and virginity testing” (Tekkas Kerman and Betrus 511). According to Tekkas Kerman and Betrus’s research on violence against women in Turkey, these risk factors can be categorized by individual, relationship, community, and societal level. Some of these factors are marriage at a young age, low level of education, poverty, lack of support, lack of employment opportunities, and weak legal sanctions (510). These factors may increase a woman’s risk of being a victim of physical, psychological or sexual harm, and/or of femicide, rendering these groups of women more vulnerable.

One of the most comprehensive attempts of the Turkish government to lessen the degree of women’s vulnerability by addressing most of the risk factors was the Istanbul Convention. The Istanbul Convention, formally known as The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, “is based on the understanding that violence against women is a form of gender-based violence that is committed against women because they are women. It is the obligation of the state to fully address it in all its forms and to take measures to prevent violence against women, protect its victims and prosecute the perpetrators.” In other words, the Convention is a series of measures designed to prevent and combat violence against those who are subject to gender-based violence. According to the Istanbul Convention brochure issued by Council of Europe, the Convention is based on four pillars: Prevention, Protection, Prosecution, and Coordinated Policies.⁴ More specifically, preventive measures include awareness-raising campaigns, education, and promoting women’s empowerment; protective measures involve informing women of their rights, support services, shelters, restraining orders, and reporting violence to authorities; law enforcement and judicial proceedings ensure dissuasive sanctions, effective public prosecution, effective police investigation, and victim’s rights to privacy, information and support, as well as victim protection during investigation and proceedings; and lastly, the Convention includes coordinating policies such as inter-agency co-operation, working with NGOs, human rights-based policies, and research and data collection. In short, the Convention includes policies and

measures targeting specifically women, that aim to prevent, alleviate, and punish violence against women, as well as to provide support and information for victims of violence.

On 2 July 2020, ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) deputy chair, Numan Kurtulmuş, indicated that it is possible for the Turkish government to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention. He stated, “When our people have such an expectation, we cannot stay indifferent to this,” even though the results of the research conducted by KONDA, one of the most prominent and trusted research companies in Turkey, show that “only 7 percent of survey participants are in favor of Turkey's withdrawal from the Convention”.⁶ The Convention has also been criticized by conservative groups for being antithetical to “Turkish family values.” Eventually, on 20 March 2021, the government’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention was announced by the publication of a Presidential decree in the official gazette. In a statement published by the Presidency’s Directorate of Communications the following day, the reason for the withdrawal is stated as, “The Istanbul Convention, originally intended to promote women’s rights, was hijacked by a group of people attempting to normalize homosexuality—which is incompatible with Türkiye’s social and family values,”⁷ indicating that the decision to withdraw ensued from the government’s anti-LGBTI+ position, as well as its family-centered social policy agenda. It also indicates that the government’s main concern in signing the treaty in the first place was to prevent and combat violence against cis-hetero women in heteronormative families specifically. The withdrawal, therefore, can be viewed as an ideological move, and an effort to keep intact the cultural norms and discourses that perpetuate violence against women and act as endemic risk factors (as noted in Tekkas Kerman and Betrus’s article).

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) considers the family an essential social institution for nation building, with its values and traditions in accordance with the party’s conservatism (Engin 847). Family as a primary social unit is essential for preserving the way of life the government approves of and transferring it to the next generation. For this reason, ‘family values’ rhetoric has been dominant in the political discourse, frequently mentioned especially by Erdoğan, since AKP came to power in 2002 (Kocamaner 36). According to Kocamaner, “[Erdoğan’s] frequent encouragement of early marriage and criticism of childless women illustrate an ever-expanding repertoire of conservative pronouncements regarding gender, reproduction and the family” (36). These emphases demonstrate that Turkish family values and traditions are based on heteronormativity, monogamy, and reproduction, which would result in children who grow up to be beneficent members of the country and the nation. The family is considered to be the primary space in which individuals learn about moral values and traditions and are corrected and/or punished for not complying with them. Such a mechanism is seen as an essential part of the government’s conservative agenda. If these values are deteriorating, the need for ‘strengthening the family’ arises, which is undertaken as a political goal by the AKP government (Kocamaner 37). In accordance with this goal, for the AKP government, preserving and strengthening family values is an aim of much more significance than civil rights claims of minority groups such as women and/or LGBTQ+ communities, as proven by the decision to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention. In fact, oftentimes these two agendas appear to be at odds with each other, causing civil rights demands to be overlooked or deliberately suppressed by the government.

The Turkish presidency’s decision to withdraw from the convention encourages factors that perpetuate violence against women, such as the concept of “Turkish family values,” which sanctions male dominance, the policing of women in the name of tradition, and the free pass given on violence against non-heteronormative sexualities and gender identities, leaving women

living in Turkey even more vulnerable than they were before the Convention was signed. The organization of social relationships, politics and institutions upon which these women's vulnerability depends, deem this group, as Butler writes, far more vulnerable through the justification of such crimes and through the lack of support in both preventive and judicial processes.

II. Physical Protests and Vulnerable Bodies

In order to contextualize the Istanbul Convention protests and understand the conditions under which they took place, it is crucial to consider the political atmosphere around recent collective political action in Turkey and its effect on protestors. The atmosphere of fear and uncertainty following the attempted coup d'état had already steered the protesters towards digital activism rather than physical protests, and as the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic were added to these existing conditions, protesters were faced with a set of discouragements from physically participating in the Istanbul Convention protests. In this section, I address these threats against the protesters' bodies in physical protests under two categories: police brutality and COVID-19. By investigating the vulnerability of protestors' bodies, I aim to demonstrate the centrality of the body, both individual and plural, in the acts of protesting and reclaiming space, and to address the consequences of this increasing vulnerability in Turkey.

II.I Contextualizing Activism in Turkey

On 15 July 2016, an attempted coup d'état took place in Turkey. A faction within the Turkish Armed Forces, said to be linked to the Fethullah Gülen⁸ movement, attempted to seize control; but this attempt failed due to the perseverance of Turkish citizens. After this incident, President Erdoğan declared a state of emergency for three months, which then was repeatedly extended for two years until it ended on 19 July 2018, in order to investigate and punish those who were responsible in a quick and effective way.⁹ During this period, the livelihoods of many were destroyed due to court cases, arrests, layoffs (especially of government employees), and exiles. Özge Zihnioğlu writes in her article "The Legacy of the Gezi Protests in Turkey:"

"The extraordinary measures adopted following the failed coup attempt had severe implications for civic engagement. Recurrent bans and restrictions on public gatherings and assemblies under an extended state of emergency significantly narrowed civic space. At the same time, with a large number of arrests and closure of many civil society organizations, the boundaries of what was politically permissible in terms of civil society activities in Turkey has changed. The widespread uncertainty and fear that followed put immense pressure on civic activists." (15)

This situation affected those who had actively joined protests before, and the number of people participating in the protests shrank; as Zihnioğlu puts it, "the impact of street activism waned" (15). When these conditions of extended state of emergency, extreme measures and punishments, and the uncertainty and fear around physical protests were introduced, added to the existing fear of extreme police brutality that was experienced and made visible primarily through Gezi Park protests, protesters increasingly decided not to participate in the physical protests, and

instead became more active on digital platforms that mostly co-existed with physical ones. As participation in physical protests declined, participation in digital protests increased.

For the Istanbul Convention protests, which I'll consider next, it's important to examine the political atmosphere and conditions in order to understand why they became less effective, and to imagine how collective political action may be achieved. Because of the existing conditions, the number of protesters participating in physical protests declined, and a portion turned towards digital forms of activism. It is in this environment that the Istanbul Convention protests arose.

II.II The Istanbul Convention Protests and Exposed Bodies

The Istanbul Convention protests were ignited by the murder of Pınar Gültekin, a 27-year-old university student. She went missing on July 16 2020. Her disappearance was widely covered in the media. On July 21, her body was found, brutally murdered, in the forested land neighboring the city where she disappeared from (Muğla). She was murdered by Cemal Metin Avcı, a 32-year-old married man and the father of 2 children, who, according to her family's statements, constantly stalked and obsessively messaged Pınar leading up to her murder, despite her continuous rejections. Avcı revealed in his testimony that, after he strangled and killed Gültekin, he "tried to remove the trace of murder by burning her body in a garbage barrel," and then "poured concrete on it."¹⁰ This brutal murder prompted outrage on social and mass media and rekindled debates around the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, which cited the lack of preventive and protective measures even when the Convention was in effect. Gültekin's murder became the symbol of and a channel through which women in Turkey expressed their rage about the increased number of femicides in Turkey, and about the government's decision to withdraw from the Convention in spite of these killings.

The protests started the day after Gültekin's body was found, on July 22 2021. Coordinating via social media, hundreds of women gathered on the streets of various cities in Turkey to protest femicides and the government's inaction, with the concurrent potential withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. As women's increased vulnerability was the object of the protests, this vulnerability also appeared as the *means* of protest in a different way. While the violence being protested mostly occurred in the domestic sphere, the protester's body was exposed to the public as a vulnerable body. As Judith Butler puts it, "my body is and is not mine": because the body necessarily always has a "public dimension" ("Violence" 15). In public, our bodies are exposed to other humans and the possible impacts, touches, and other interferences that other humans might cause. Butler writes, "Violence is surely a touch of the worst order ... a way in which we are given over, without control, to the will of another, a way in which life itself can be expunged by the willful action of another" ("Violence" 18). In short, all external impact and interference on our bodies is out of our control and does not require authorization from us. This fact reveals the "public" side of our body and negates our belief that we are the only owners of our bodies and have complete control over them. The "public" nature of the body, which escapes our control, leaves us both vulnerable to outside impact and dependent on other bodies to respect our body's integrity. Accordingly, the protester's corporeal vulnerability is revealed through two main threats against her body in this case: police brutality and COVID-19.

In order to translate the everyday situation of bodies being exposed and becoming public in public space to the situation of the protesters' bodies, it becomes crucial to take the nature of "public" space into account. According to Butler, public space is not "given," that is to say, it is not already "public," but has to be claimed and re-created by the protesters. She writes, "[T]he

very public character of the space is being disputed, and even fought over, when these crowds gather” (“Bodies” 71). In the fight to claim the “public” space as public, protesters’ bodies are faced with a counterforce: the police. Protesters’ bodies, just by existing in proximity and taking up space, lay claim on the public space. The action of occupation is realized through physical bodies, which in turn become a target for the police. The protesters’ bodies are open to the risk of harm because the police employ use-of-force tactics and instruments such as pepper spray, truncheons, water cannons, plastic bullets, etc. to physically force the crowd to disperse in order to reclaim the “public” space in the name of the government.

The police therefore pose the primary threat against the protester’s bodies in this context. For example, during the Istanbul Convention protests in the city of Izmir, the protesters were battered and detained by the police. According to one of the news reports, “[a]s some of the protesters resisted being detained, one of the police commanders was heard instructing his colleagues to ‘break their arms’ should they defy the police.”¹¹ Another report includes video footage of one of the protesters being held by four police officers, while another female officer first puts on gloves and then violently pulls the protester’s hair.¹² The authorities presented no reason or legal basis for this brutal police intervention. This disproportionate physical violence exerted arbitrarily on the (female) protesters’ bodies by the police reveals both the vulnerability of the protesters’ bodies and that this vulnerability is being exploited as a point of pressure and means of control by the police.

According to Castelli, as embodied subjects, because of our shared vulnerability we cannot imagine an individual subject “free from necessity and from any restriction;” our shared condition pinpoints “interdependency, and relationality” (172). In other words, she claims that for each of us, the condition of vulnerability brings with it interdependency and thus the possibility of collective action. She goes on to argue that individual vulnerability is turned into collective strength through a shared vulnerability or presence, which in turn creates opportunities for political change (Castelli 174). Butler, in a similar vein, argues that one way to overcome police power is demonstrations, “especially when those assemblies become at once too large and too mobile, too condensed and too diffuse, to be contained by police power and when they have the resources to regenerate themselves on the spot” (“Bodies” 74). However, with precautions and concerns about the pandemic added to the existing increased fear of joining physical protests after the coup attempt, the protests gained an even more unfavorable status and were held by smaller crowds. These pandemic conditions aggravated the existing increased vulnerability of the protesters’ bodies and left the smaller number of protesters more exposed to police violence, unable to form a collective strength large enough to overcome police power.

Just as we are dependent on other people to form an assemblage in order to lessen our vulnerability collectively, we are also dependent on other people to form another assemblage during the pandemic by keeping their distance and protecting both themselves and us by wearing a face mask. In the face of a virus that is transmitted through close contact, the pandemic becomes one of the major threats against the protester’s body. In her article “Violence, Mourning, Politics,” Butler writes, “The body implies mortality, vulnerability, agency: the skin and the flesh expose us to the gaze of others, but also to touch, and to violence” (15). The pandemic we are experiencing today is a constant reminder of the way our skin is exposed to the (contaminated) touch. The constant threat of being infected with the virus, and by extension, of death, stresses the mortality of our bodies on a daily basis. Fineman adds secondary harms caused by the virus to these concerns, writing, “Our bodily vulnerability is enhanced by the realization that should we succumb to illness or injury there may be accompanying economic and

institutional harms as a result of disruption of existing relationships” (9-10). In other words, the vulnerability of the body in the face of the threat of infection might also bring with it the threat of economic and institutional losses as it interrupts our jobs and social relations, requires savings for both medical expenses and maintaining livelihood, and thus amplifies the protesters’ vulnerable condition.

In a situation where members of a crowd pose danger to each other, individual vulnerabilities come to the forefront. The aim of creating collective political action and eliminating individual corporeal vulnerability through unity against external forces collapses at this point because of the threat that is present inside that unity. Under these circumstances, embodied presence on the streets and among other bodies means exposing one’s body to the virus. As Butler puts it, “No one body establishes the space of appearance, but this action, this performative exercise happens only ‘between’ bodies ... the action emerges from the ‘between’” (“Bodies” 77). As the “between” was already contaminated with the idea of the virus, “plurality” was difficult to achieve. The desire for self-preservation from the virus, which caused individual protesters to view other bodies as “threats,” made it much harder for protesters to mobilize their vulnerability in the service of collective political action. Therefore, it can be said that, as opposed to Castelli’s argument, at this point in time, physical unity and proximity both emphasize individual vulnerability and precarity and increase the risk of bodily harm. Individual bodies are *still* dependent on each other as Castelli suggests, but in a different way: they are dependent on their ability to maintain distance and protect each other from themselves, while keeping their solidarity intact.

II.III Section Conclusion

This section describes the conditions of the physical Istanbul Convention protests: police brutality, the decline in physical participation in the protests because of the fear and uncertainty about what was politically permissible in terms of civil social activity in Turkey, increased vulnerability (both physical and economic) of the protesters, the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic, which foreground the vulnerability of individual protesters, and police violence, which has become even more effective due to the pandemic and decreased numbers of protesters. Considering these conditions, it becomes very hard for the protesters to gather in the streets, mobilize their vulnerability, and create a unified body that can collectively lessen their individual vulnerability because they fear for their bodily well-being, economic status, and freedom of movement. In her article “Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street,” Butler writes about what it means to be a crowd and move through public space. She describes the material environment as part of the action and its seizing and reconfiguration by bodies in their plurality as essential to laying claim to the public (71). This idea points to the need for bodily action in order to disrupt the ongoing dismissal of women as political subjects. These protests should include four key properties in order to interrupt “the way things are:” visibility of bodies, plural action, occupation of public space, and vulnerability. However, due to the factors mentioned above, during the protests that took place across Turkey, these conditions could not be met effectively.

In “Bodily Vulnerability, Coalitions, and Street Politics”, Butler touches upon the inability of political alliances to assemble in the streets in some parts of the world, writing, “In those instances, crowds cannot swell on the streets without risking imprisonment, injury, or death, and so alliances are sometimes made in other forms, ones that seek to find ways to minimize bodily

exposure as demands for justice are made” (100). In Turkey, protesters risk both these bodily harms Butler mentions, *and* social and economic harm whenever they gather in the streets. Therefore, more and more protesters seek and form alliances in alternative spaces that would lessen their vulnerability. What is important in the choice of these alternative spaces is that the four factors that enable a protest to create an interruption are met: namely, visibility of the bodies, plural action, occupation, and vulnerability. Even though physical bodies should be less exposed to violence and impact, this alternative space of protest should still be embodied to maintain these four conditions. In this search, as an already widely used extension of the protests, the digital realm (especially social media) has come to the forefront as one that offers an alternative embodiment for its users.

III. “Challenge Accepted:” A Virtual Protest

Keeping in mind that the issue was urgent for the Istanbul Convention protests—more women were murdered each and every day, most women could not be out in the streets and needed a platform that was accessible and minimized bodily exposure, and the government’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention was a matter of time—social media presented itself as a possible alternative “public” space of protest because of its “immediacy, interactivity, accessibility, affordability, and wide reception by a diverse audience, both nationally and internationally” (Khamis 568). Due to these properties, over the last two decades, social networks have become spaces “for users [especially for more vulnerable groups such as women, certain racial and ethnic groups, and LGBTI+ groups] to empower each other, to establish events and protests and mobilize for political action” (Carstensen 489). But aside from these possibilities—reaching an international audience, empowerment, mobilization—the body had to find a central place in these protests in order to fulfill the principles that could not be fulfilled in physical space at this time. According to Butler, “[A]ction is always supported and [...] it is invariably bodily, even [...] in its virtual forms” (“Bodies” 73). Therefore, the key questions to ask in order to decide whether these protests can be translated into this new media without losing their “embodied” nature are: Are social networks a suitable alternative to locating the body at the center of the protests? Do they provide the protesters with a space that keeps the protesters’ visibility, plural action, bodily occupation, and vulnerability intact? In this section, I will look at the “Challenge Accepted” social media campaign in an attempt to address these questions.

III.I Visibility

As an alternative, non-physical, protest, women started a “challenge” on Instagram (which then expanded to Twitter and Facebook) to post a black-and-white photo of oneself. To indicate what the protest was about, the photos were accompanied by the hashtags “#challengeaccepted”, “#womensupportingwomen”, “#womenempowerment”, and “#istanbulsözleşmesiyaşatır” (or “istanbulConventionsaveslives”) in their captions. After posting, each participant was encouraged to send this prompt to 50 women as a direct message on Instagram:

I was careful to choose who I think will meet the challenge, but above all who [sic] I know who shares this type of thinking, among women there are several criticisms; instead, we should take care of each other. We are beautiful the way we are. Post a photo in black and white alone, writ[e] “challenge accepted” and mention my name. Identify 50 women to do

the same, in private. I chose you because you are beautiful, strong and incredible. Let's [heart emoji] each other!¹³

As emphasized in the prompt, one of the reasons for the challenge to be based on sharing a photo of *themselves* was to make the statement “we are beautiful the way we are.” The challenge is built on the ideas of female empowerment and women supporting women, and therefore, the act of women sharing their own photos is assigned a message: “We own our beauty and strength.” As Carstensen notes, with this campaign, Instagram became a place for women to empower each other through their images.

In her article “Redoing Feminism: Digital Activism, Body Politics, and Neoliberalism”, Hester Baer associates digital platforms with “the transnational mediascape of the Internet, a space encompassing and highlighting difference, in which discussions play out in a disembodied and sometimes anonymous forum,” and local physical protests with “draw[ing] attention to the female body as a site of contention in the politics of gender, sexuality, race, religion, and culture today,” suggesting that female protesters need an “interplay” between the two (19). In other words, Baer believes that female activism requires engagement in two different levels: digital platforms and local protests. According to her, digital platforms are transnational and encompass difference, and most importantly, they are *disembodied*. She differentiates the two sites of engagement through the notion of embodiment, and thus presents local protests, which are embodied, as a complement to disembodied digital platforms. I argue that it would be wrong to establish such a binary relationship between digital platforms and local protests. Digital platforms cannot be thought of separately from bodies as they have become an extension of our “real” lives, and have very real effects on our “real” lives. Through images of the body, the digital space becomes an *extension* of “real life” in which embodiment is also foregrounded, not a separate disembodied realm. Therefore, these digital spaces become *alternatively embodied* spaces. The bodies of the users gain visibility as these images are uploaded and circulated on these platforms by other users. In the “Challenge Accepted” protest, the main requirement of the challenge, the act of sharing one’s own photo on Instagram, draws attention “to the female body as a site of contention in the politics of gender, sexuality ... and culture today” (Baer 19). This renders the protesters’ womanhood visible and creates a system of empowerment and support through shared visibility; via these images, the female body makes a political statement. This practice of sharing one’s black-and-white portrait also functions as a way of displaying the women’s rage against seeing black-and-white portraits of women killed by men every single day on newspapers, TV and social media. As explained by a Twitter user, “The black and white photo challenge started as a way for women to raise their voice. To stand in solidarity with the women we have lost. To show that one day, it could be their picture that is plastered across news outlets with a black and white filter on top.”¹⁴ The black-and-white photos of the women circulating in the media are not just regarded as “images,” because this is not a separate realm, but an extension of “real life.” Each photo signifies an actual person killed by a man, bringing forth the accompanying signification of these women’s bodies and vulnerability of their bodies. Eunjung Kim writes that vulnerability “works as a temporal projection toward the future, capturing it in the present seems impossible” (139). That is to say that vulnerability is very hard to transmit in the present moment as it is always thought of in relation to a potential future harm. Therefore, “to visualize vulnerability and make it manifest in the present one thus must manage this futurity by presenting bodies with asymmetrical power and by coding certain embodiments as evidence or causes of harm” (Kim 139). Accordingly, the underlying message of the photos

shared in the campaign, “one day, it could be our picture”, amounts to “one day, it could be our bodies.” Through sharing black-and-white photos of themselves, the protesters assume the position of the femicide victims. Each picture posted for the campaign on Instagram stands for each of the users’ bodies, and the vulnerability of their bodies in the face of the very same male violence they protest. Consequently, they bring the threat of future harm against their own bodies into the present moment through the relationship of interchangeability which they create with the past victims. The images establish women’s bodies as both the evidence and the cause of harm, since they point at the possibility that each body could be subjected to the same kind of violence in the future, just because they all embody the same gender. The nature and the cause of the protest thus act as constant reminders of the corporeality and vulnerability of the women in these images. The digital platform (Instagram) allows the bodies of the protesters, marked as vulnerable, to become visible by an international audience and as a result, “draw[s] attention to the female body as a site of contention in the politics of gender” (Baer 19).²⁴

III.II Plural Action and Counterpublics

In a very short time, the campaign became popular worldwide¹⁵, spreading from one Instagram user to another through direct messages. As Wiens and MacDonald write of the #MeToo movement, a Twitter campaign against sexual harassment, “[T]he instructions to share and support the hashtag are a response to a suggestion from a friend indicates a network, a community, and a shared act of communication that situates the utterance of ‘me, too’ through these utterances as located in both the personal and the collective” (9). In the context of the Challenge Accepted movement, the fact that women selected a number of women from their social circles and sent the prompt as a direct message, then mentioned the women who invited them to the challenge in their photo captions indicates a very similar network between women. These modes of sharing and spreading both create a virtual community and situate this movement in the personal level. Recalling Butler’s notion of alliance, political action emerges from ‘between’ the bodies in this virtual environment. What makes this a political act is the community and network and the *space* that is created through them. Castelli writes, “Assemblies pinpoint the denied fact that bodies are political, they create politics, they create and act-out public space” (174). In the virtual space of Instagram, through the images of their bodies, Instagram users claim “their right to appear as political actors” once they assemble and become plural. As a result, between the (images of) bodies, a “public” space of political action is created within this “public” space of Instagram in which women can make visible their gender and bodies.

The concept of “the public sphere” as a “space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, and hence an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction” was presented by Jürgen Habermas in his book *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962) and taken up again in his later works (Fraser 110). According to Nancy Fraser, this understanding of the public sphere as a space for individuals to come together and enact political participation, challenging established authorities, needs to undergo some revision as it is built on the assumption of the desirability of a single, overarching public sphere (Fraser 122). According to this assumption, a multiplicity of publics is viewed as a departure from democracy. However, in stratified societies that are made up of unequal social groups, she argues, it becomes impossible to disregard or hinder the effects of societal inequality in the participation of public deliberation processes, and thus the “deliberative processes in public spheres will tend to operate to the

advantage of dominant groups" (Fraser 122). Therefore, members of subordinated social groups such as women, people of color, and the LGBTI+, choose to constitute alternative publics, which Fraser calls "subaltern counterpublics," which invent and circulate counter-discourses (123). She argues that through these counterpublics, subordinated social groups reduce the extent of their disadvantage in official public spaces. As one of those groups, women have always found themselves forming counterpublics in which they create a vocabulary and a set of tools for their representation and expression in the public sphere. Since counterpublics are still publics, they are not distinct from the public sphere; instead, they disseminate their discourses to the other public areas and help expand discursive space (124). Through this process, having a multiplicity of publics rather than a single, overarching one is more democratic.

Counterpublics can be formed within digital "public" spaces via the visibility of other bodies and/or discourses that belong to the same subordinated groups and the relations created amongst them through empowerment and support. These digital spaces, like Instagram, allow for counterpublics to create and circulate counter-discourses that in turn enter and expand the discursive space which normally works to the advantage of dominant groups. One tool of Instagram (and several other social media sites) that brings together and archives counter-discourses and therefore helps form counterpublics is *hashtags*. Hashtags, besides indicating the political engagements of the protesters, also create a space for the posts that contain individual protesters' discourses to gather, interact with each other, and transform into plural action, regardless of location or the time they are shared. The hashtags used in the Challenge Accepted protests bring together both national and international users and create, promote, and contain a counterpublic of Turkish women who stand in opposition to the withdrawal from the Convention and women from all around the world that support women's empowerment and stand up against violence against women.

Although the rapidly acquired support from celebrities such as Natalie Portman, Christina Aguilera, Jennifer Aniston, and others helped the campaign reach a worldwide audience, their posts were taken out of the context of Turkey and the Istanbul Convention. Some of the celebrities inserted an apology along with an explanation of the campaign within the context of Turkey in their post captions after they were made aware of the campaign's origins. This reappropriation harmed the rapid circulation of the campaign's primary goal of creating awareness about Turkey's possible withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention and the high rate of femicide in Turkey. However, as celebrities corrected their posts and Turkish protestors added posts in English under the hashtags, the campaign reached a broad international audience. The counterpublic of Turkish women standing in opposition to the withdrawal from the Convention was able to become visible and accessible to the much larger counterpublic of women from all around the world via the internationalized hashtags "#womensupportingwomen" and "#womenempowerment," thereby forming a wider net of solidarity that extended beyond the local. Through the use of hashtags, solidarity and support were created that transformed international users into coalitions, increasing the visibility of these counterpublic spaces and achieving plural action.

III.III Occupation

Even though posts can be gathered under hashtags, they are also disseminated in the users' Instagram feeds.¹⁶ As the feed allows for scrolling one post at a time, one cannot simply *skip* the challenge posts, but has to get past them to be able to see other posts. With the (world)wide

audience the campaign reached (plurality), this act of getting past the black-and-white portraits of women becomes time consuming, and the chances of being on Instagram and not seeing participants' bodies lessens. In this sense, the campaign becomes an *interruption*; it intervenes in the everyday life of Instagram users. While femicides are already an everyday reality, this campaign makes it hard for Instagram users to look away from this reality and compels them to face it not only through news programs and newspapers, but also through a social media site that is generally associated with leisure and socialization. These images *occupy* Instagram feeds: they force their presence onto the feeds of the people that follow them, and thus women's bodies become more visible through this occupation, especially in their plurality. The black-and-white filter creates a visual consistency which makes campaign posts easily recognizable, setting them apart from the everyday posts that may not be part of the campaign. The dark color scheme (black and shades of grey) dominates and overwhelms Instagram feeds, marking the space of protest the protesters create within the platform. Nevertheless, each and every post remains individual; that is to say, the campaign posts cannot be collapsed into a single image, because every image is of a unique body and signifies an individual.

III.IV Vulnerability

While these posts encourage Instagram users to recognize women's vulnerability, with protestors putting themselves in the position of the femicide victims by applying the black-and-white filter to their own photos, and with the reminder that each photo actually signifies an existing vulnerable body that is rematerialized within the medium of Instagram, creating a different kind of embodied presence within this virtual space, it is important to also consider that the protesters' vulnerability is not isolated to this virtual realm. The protesters are still open to different kinds of violence: mostly psychological, legal, and bodily. This violence is not as visible as physical violence during the physical protests because of its disseminated nature, both online and offline. This quality also gives an illusion that virtual spaces are "safe" spaces in which vulnerability disappears, which is not true. The protesters are still vulnerable in these spaces, as their vulnerability carries over to the digital space in different forms and in different, but still very tangible, ways.

The most common form of online violence that users face is in the form of "cyberbullying activities and other forms of online social cruelty," such as harassment, denigration, outing, cyberthreats (direct threats and distressing material), fraud, and hacking online (Willard 5). These forms of online violence in turn result in anxiety, mood disorders, depression, somatization, and negative self-concept in the online violence victims, and sometimes incur financial loss, loss of digital information, and identity theft, all of which have real impacts on these persons and their lives that go beyond the limits of the virtual (Ildırım et al.). In the Challenge Accepted protest, for example, as the protesters' bodies are exposed and made accessible to the general public the moment they are shared *publicly* on Instagram, they become exposed to unwanted sexual comments and advances as well as negative body-related comments. Given the possibility of encountering such comments, these women are far from experiencing this virtual world as a disembodied one. Even though their bodies are not physically within this space, they have an alternatively embodied presence and still have to experience the perils of living in a body. Their bodies are being attacked verbally, and there is a very big chance of them getting psychologically harmed by these attacks. Although the attack may be disembodied and virtual, the harm it causes is very real ("real" in the sense that it is not contained within the

virtual world), and by extension, can also affect the livelihood and social and economic status of the user. These kinds of violence are not very visible for two reasons: they are generally disseminated and directed towards individuals rather than groups of protesters (either because a specific person is being targeted, or because the platform does not allow for users to create a general response), and because psychological harm is generally overlooked as it does not always present itself with material evidence. Therefore, we should be careful not to discount the protesters' psychological vulnerability in order to avoid ignoring or justifying these kinds of violence.

The threat of detainment or arrest also translates to online protests. After the Gezi Park protests¹⁷ that took place both physically and digitally during the summer of 2013, operations were organized to arrest those who participated in the Gezi Park protests on Twitter, on the grounds that they were “encouraging people to rebel” (Demirhan 284). In comparison to these arrests, the arrests made during the physical protests were much more visible and widely known. According to a press statement the Ministry of Interior published on their website¹⁸ on December 24 2016—roughly five months after the failed coup attempt—in the past 6 months, legal action had been initiated against 3,710 people for provoking hatred among the public, praising and propagating a terror organization, and insulting statesmen, etc. on social media.¹⁹ It is curious that, given such high numbers of arrests over social media content, these arrests did not receive the same amount of media coverage as arrests made during physical protests. One reason for this discrepancy is that the threats that users face on social media are being downplayed by certain actors, such as the Government Spokesman Bekir Bozdağ, who claimed that no one had been arrested for a tweet posted in Turkey²⁰ on August 7 2017 (roughly 7 months after the Ministry of Interior's statement was issued). Although this situation leaves the protesters more open to these threats, it also indicates that the demands and statements made on social media platforms reach the authorities, which means that one of the primary goals of these protests is achieved. Although the number of detentions and arrests is lower than that of physical protests, protests held virtually are still embodied and still pose a threat to the protesters' bodies as well as their livelihoods. Even though a number of detainees are released on probation, there is a very high chance they will lose their jobs as a result of protesting, for example. The vulnerability of the protesters carries over to the digital space, not in a metaphoric sense, but in a very real and physical sense.

III.V Section Conclusion

This section assessed whether the Challenge Accepted movement on Instagram possessed the four essential properties of an effective protest: visibility, plural action, occupation of public space, and vulnerability. In order to satisfy these factors, the digital space should provide a space for the protesters to exist in an embodied state. I argued that Instagram provides an *alternatively embodied* space to the protesters, and acts as an extension of “real” life or physical existence, rather than an alternative to or complement of it. This section also touched upon the illusion of digital spaces as safe spaces to which vulnerability of the protesters is not carried over, and argued that Instagram is an embodied space in which the protestors still face the threat of psychological, financial, and bodily harm. Keeping this in mind, it is important to note that the protesters' vulnerability within these virtual spaces is still less than that of a physical public space, which entails the added threat of injury or death. Therefore, in this section, I demonstrate that visibility, plural action, occupation and vulnerability translate into the digital realm in

different forms and that protesters can exist as alternatively embodied subjects within it in order to achieve collective political action with a lessened level of vulnerability.

Conclusion

Until now, physical protests have generally been paired with social media movements, and physical and virtual spaces have been used simultaneously to complement one another. One example of this kind of hybrid physical-online protest is the Gezi Park protests, during which the online component of the protests turned out to be very effective in community creation, communication, and visibility. As Tierney puts it in her book *The Public Space of Social Media*, the idea was that “Networked publics and physical publics are not separate or competing spheres; they are completing spheres” (19). Physical and virtual protest spaces feed off one another. While the protesters are less vulnerable in virtual spaces than in physical ones, because they are also more invisible and therefore can be dismissed as nonexistent, virtual protests enable authorities to identify and take action against individuals more easily than in a physical protest. At the same time, virtual spaces can offer its users a space to gather and exchange dialogue to an extent that might not be possible during a physical protest, and it more quickly creates international support. Coupling physical protests with virtual ones makes it possible to balance out the consequences that increase the degree of vulnerability of the protesters and increase the protests’ effectiveness.

However, tightened measures, police brutality, and recurring states of emergency following the failed coup made protestors more vulnerable and increased doubt and fear about joining physical protests in Turkey. Concern around the COVID-19 pandemic also discouraged physical participation. As an alternative, many turned to online protests. The embodied act of protest involves the four factors necessary to transform an alliance into political action, as informed by Judith Butler: visibility of the protesters and their bodies, plural action, occupation of public spaces, and vulnerability of the protesters. I argue that unless these four factors are met, protests lose their effectiveness, and plural political action cannot be achieved. Because conditions in Turkey increase the vulnerability of the protesters to a degree that the protesters choose not to participate in the physical protests, (and even if they do participate, they are met with extreme violence and harm), the need for an alternative platform that minimizes harm and lessens the protesters’ vulnerability has become pressing.

Through my analysis, I argue that embodied protests can be translated into digital platforms employing tactics that can be generated from within the platform, which is similar to physical protests in which “material environments are part of the action, and they themselves act when they become the support for action” (Butler, “Bodies” 71). Here, the material environment includes the design of the Instagram feed, hashtags, direct messages, and filters. This analysis of Challenge Accepted is also aimed at pointing at an alternative, less risky way of assembling for political action that is much needed as bodies no longer seem to be able to gather in the streets of Turkey without risking imprisonment, injury, or death. This generates questions for future research about alternative forms of plural political action. Since the beginning of the pandemic in early spring 2020, alternative forms of protest have been thought of and practiced all around the world with the aim of not allowing the conditions of the pandemic to hinder civil society activities. As Kuryel and Fırat write, perhaps these days of the pandemic reveal both the diversity and capacity—and the limits—of existing and inured repertoire of action.²¹ This is a convenient time for observing alternative modes of protest that take place all around the world

and thinking through new paths the virtual world can offer for the future of protests. In this paper, I have provided four properties as essential criteria through which possible alternative forms of protest can be imagined. This pandemic age may help us rethink what protest is and what it *can* be, opening up new ways to reduce the vulnerability of protesters while increasing their social and political impact.

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Notes

1. For more information, see <http://kadincinayetlerinidurduracagiz.net/veriler/2890/2019-report-of-we-will-end-femicide-platform>.

2. For more information, see <http://kadincinayetlerinidurduracagiz.net/veriler/2949/2020-report-of-we-will-end-femicide-platform>.

3. This statement can be found on Council of Europe's website: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbul-convention/about-the-convention>.

4. Istanbul Convention brochure found on Council of Europe's website. It can be accessed through this link: <https://rm.coe.int/istanbul-convention-violence-against-women-brochure-4ps-en/16809ecc93>.

5. "AKP gov't does not rule out possibility of withdrawing from Istanbul Convention" *duvarenglish.com*, Duvar English, 2 July 2020, <https://www.duvarenglish.com/politics/2020/07/02/akp-govt-does-not-rule-out-possibility-of-withdrawing-from-istanbul-convention>. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020

6. "Only 7 percent say Turkey should withdraw from Istanbul Convention" *bianet.org*, Bianet English, 2 Sept. 2020, <https://bianet.org/english/women/230104-only-7-percent-say-turkey-should-withdraw-from-istanbul-convention>. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020

7. "Statement regarding Türkiye's withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention" can be found on Directorate of Communications website: <https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/statement-regarding-turkeys-withdrawal-from-the-istanbul-convention>. Accessed 31 March 2021

8. Fethullah Gülen is a businessman, an influential religious figure, and a preacher. He is the leader of the Gülen movement, an international faith-based Islamic movement, which once aligned with the Turkish government but has been referred to as FETO ("Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation") by the government since 2015 due to political conflict that emerged between the two parties.

9. "Turkey ends state of emergency after two years" *bbc.com*, BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44881328>

10. “Murder of Pınar Gültekin” *en.wikipedia.org*, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_of_P%C4%B1nar_G%C3%BCltekin#cite_note-13. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020

11. “Turkish police attack women’s rally held in support of Istanbul Convention” *duvarenglish.com*, Duvar English, 5 Aug. 2020, <https://www.duvarenglish.com/women/2020/08/05/turkish-police-attack-womens-rally-held-in-support-of-istanbul-convention/>. Accessed 4 Sept. 2020

12. “Kadın polisten kadına şiddet; 4 polis tuttu, o saçını çekti” *t24.com.tr*, T24, 6 Aug. 2020, <https://t24.com.tr/video/kadin-polisten-kadina-siddet-4-polis-tuttu-o-sacini-cekti,31177>. Accessed 2 Oct. 2020

13. The original author of this text is unknown. Some of these messages included short, personalized notes such as “Direnmeye devam!” (Keep resisting!).

14. The image of this explanation by @imaann_patel was widely shared on Instagram, as well. @imaann_patel. “just thought all of you posting these "black and white" challenges should see how tone deaf they actually are xx.” *Twitter*, 28 July 2020, 2:55 p.m., twitter.com/imaann_patel/status/1288080743198068736/photo/2.

15. There are currently 621,000 posts marked with the hashtag “istanbulsözleşmesiyaşatır” (March 2021).

16. “Instagram feed” is the main page of your Instagram account, in which posts (photos and videos) by people you “follow” on Instagram are shown.

17. Gezi Park protests took place in Istanbul, Turkey, during the summer of 2013. The protests started as a small-scale environmental protest against the demolition of Gezi Park in Taksim, Istanbul in order to rebuild the Ottoman-era Taksim Military Barracks. There were not more than 50 protestors on the first day. In several days this number increased to roughly 7.5 million, and the protests transformed into a revolt against Erdoğan’s government and human rights violations, bringing conflicting parts of society together. Because of the disproportionate use of violence, relentless attacks and abuse by the police; several protesters, many of whom were high school and university students, were injured and a number of young people died. Twitter acted as the key communications channel of the protests, via which a community was built. Protesters who could not participate in the physical protests (due to distance, disability, increased vulnerability, etc.) could participate digitally in this platform. The digital component of Gezi Park protests proved to be an essential part of the protests, and therefore began to be more actively employed as both an extension and a complement of the physical protests that followed.

18. Link to the statement: <https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/basin-aciklamasi24122016>.

19. 1,656 of them were arrested, 1,203 were released on probation, and 767 were released from custody.

20. “Bozdağ: Tweet Yüzünden Tutuklanan Yok; İçişleri Bakanlığı: 1656 Kişi Tutuklandı.” *bianet.org*, Bianet, 8 August 2017. <https://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/188926-bozdag-tweet-yuzunden-tutuklanan-yok-icisleri-bakanligi-1656-kisi-tutuklandi>. Accessed 19 Nov. 2020.

21. Original Turkish quote: “Var olan ve kanıksanmış eylem repertuarının hem çeşitliliğini ve dirayetini hem de sınırlılıklarını ortaya çıkarıyor belki de bugünler.”

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