

1820 and again in 1828, he was elected one of the presidential electors of Ohio. In May 1832, at Baltimore, Maryland, he presided over the first democratic national convention,—that which nominated Andrew Jackson for his second term as president, and Martin Van Buren for vice president. In 1832 he was elected Governor of Ohio, and re-elected in 1834 (defeating Darius Lyman, who ran on the anti-masonic ticket), and declined a third nomination for the same office.

It was while he filled the executive chair that the perplexing and angry controversy arose between Ohio and Michigan concerning the boundary line between these states, and it is a singular coincidence that during Gov. Lucas's administration as Governor of Iowa, the very same controversy, as we shall hereafter see, should have arisen between Iowa and Missouri, to be settled finally, as was that between Ohio and Michigan, according to the claims and views of Gov. Lucas.

Gov. Lucas's early residence, as we have before mentioned, was at Portsmouth, Scioto county. From here, in 1816, he removed to Piketon, Pike county, which continued to be his home till his removal to Iowa in 1838.

(To be continued.)

REPORT OF CAMPAIGN AGAINST MAJOR GENERAL STERLING PRICE IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1864.

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., January 28th, 1870.

Sir:—I am requested by Inspector General Ed. S. Schriver, to inform you that by direction of Gen. Wm. W. Belknap, Secretary of War, a copy of the official report of Major General S. R. Curtis of his last campaign against General Sterling Price in 1864, has been copied from the records of the War Department and forwarded to your address by express, for publication in the Annals.

By this action of General Belknap a valuable contribution to the war history of Iowa officers and soldiers has been secured, and one which has hitherto remained unpublished. At the time General Curtis completed the manuscript of this report and transmitted it to the War Department, the events which it describes were already old. Lee had but recently sur-

rendered, and the press was crowded with the closing details of the war. Hence the report has hitherto escaped publicity as news, until it is now for the first time to appear in print as history.

Very truly yours,

SAM'L PRENTIS CURTIS.

F. LLOYD, M. D., Editor Annals of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS, }
FORT LEAVENWORTH, January, 1865. }

GENERAL: I present a general and full report of the circumstances connected with my recent campaign against the rebel General Sterling Price, believing the dangers, incidents, conflicts and final success, deserve a special record.

The former conflicts which I have had with Price's force, made me familiar with his purpose, often declared to his followers, of making another effort to establish himself on the Missouri river.

His recent success on the Red river and at Camden, in Arkansas, inspired him with new energies, and induced him to attempt this design, by following up his campaign through Louisiana and Arkansas, by operating through Missouri and Kansas. He therefore moved northward through Arkansas, with an army of about fifteen thousand men and twenty pieces of artillery, augmenting his forces by conscripting and by voluntary acquisitions induced by a prospect of plunder and revenge. His force was all mounted, and except his conscripts, very well equipped.

I had taken most of my troops far west of the Missouri border, where I had been in pursuit of Indians on the plains, and I had ordered Maj. Gen. Blunt to continue the search beyond Fort Larned, returning myself to these headquarters on the 17th of September, 1864. Most of my forces were therefore engaged in active operations several hundred miles west of the portion of Kansas threatened by Price's movements.

On the day of my arrival I telegraphed yourself, Gen. Rose-

crans and Gov. Carney, the substances of the dispatches concerning Price's movements which I found on my table, from Gen. Thayer and others on the Arkansas, "that Gen. Price with 15,000 men had crossed the Arkansas river near Dardanelle," and suggested to the governor that I might "again have to ask the militia of southern Kansas to aid in checking rebel approaches."

Some field works had been erected on the eastern border of Kansas, and I directed these to be armed and others immediately constructed, making the towns of Lawrence, Olathe, Paola, and Fort Scott, much more secure against raids, and therefore allowing me to use volunteers and militia that would otherwise be needed to guard these places against bushwhackers. I also sent orders to Gen. Blunt to stop his pursuit of Indians and come with all possible speed with such troops as could be spared, to Council Grove, so as to be available against rebel invasion.

The 2d Colorado regiment, stationed in the edge of Missouri, headquarters at Kansas City, had been ordered to report to me, but at the request of Gen. Rosecrans, and in view of their convenient location, I allowed them to remain where they were. The 15th, 16th, and 11th Kansas regiments volunteer cavalry, and fractions of the 3d Wisconsin, were distributed in south east Kansas, convenient for concentration at any time and place.

The battallion of Col. Drake's one hundred day men, whose time was nearly out, and a portion of a new negro battery, all amounting to about four thousand men, was about all the available volunteers that I could command. Fortunately, I had a large number of mountain howitzers attached to my cavalry regiments, and also three or four batteries of field guns, which were ordered forward and in readiness, so that in view of the coming crisis, I had upwards of thirty pieces of artillery ready for any field, and so equipped as to move with the usual rapidity of cavalry. Heavy siege guns were distributed and well arranged at Fort Leavenworth, Leavenworth, Lawrence, Olathe, Paola and Fort Scott.

These preparatory arrangements were in full progress when I received your dispatch of the 24th September, directing me that all my available force not required against western Indians should be thrown south on the Fort Scott routes, and adding:—"Large reinforcements have been sent to the Arkansas to cut off the enemy's retreat."

My reply to you dated the 26th September, informing you that "my main dependence must be on militia if Price's force come westward," was predicated on the well-founded supposition that I could not draw troops from the remote districts of my command (Upper Arkansas, Colorado or Nebraska) in time to meet the probable crisis arising from Price's onward march. Fortunately I had, through the active exertions of Gov. Carney, secured and distributed arms and equipments for a large portion of the militia.

But another difficulty presented itself. The whole country was engaged in the great national and state political campaign, the very crisis of which seemed to culminate with Price's progress through Missouri. Motives, measures and men, were all distrusted. The senators and governor and people, commanding, composing and controlling this militia reserve, were all fiercely engaged in this political strife. No time for using the militia could be more unfavorable. The ballot-box, not the bayonet, was the weapon sought by the militia, and it required the greatest exertions to draw attention of officers and men from the political, to the military necessities of the hour. The work of organizing, arming and mobilizing an army in thirty days, under these circumstances, was therefore a most difficult and perplexing duty, requiring the exercise of responsibilities which I hope will receive the approval, or indulgence of my superiors, to whom I reported by telegraph almost daily.

The enemy steadily advanced from his crossing of the Arkansas on the 8th of September, moving north-east through the state, striking the rich valley of Black river, where he increased and improved his forces by devastating that region of country. Following up that valley through Pocahontas, he

entered Missouri near the south-east corner, and moved north through the Iron mountain defiles, meeting no resistance until he reached the vicinity of Pilot Knob, Missouri. Here, on the 28th of September, he met a gallant resistance by Gen. Ewing, who repulsed his attack on the fort at Pilot Knob, but subsequently evacuated and fell back, allowing Price to move on to Franklin and Washington, striking the Missouri river at the latter place.

This intelligence of the progress of the enemy came to me through Maj. Gen. Rosecrans, commander of the department of the Missouri, Gen. Thayer, who commanded at Fort Smith, Arkansas, and also from scouts sent out by Col. Blair, who commanded at Fort Scott, keeping me fully informed.

During the period to which I have referred, I was annoyed by a rebel approach under General Gano, who came within seventy miles of my southern line with a large force, and captured a large train at Cabin creek, belonging to Gen. Steele's department. The Indians on the plains also continued to occupy my troops on the overland routes, and alarm the people throughout the territories and western portion of Kansas. As the enemy at Washington, on the Missouri, had reached the turning point of his northern movement (crossing the Missouri not being rational), leaving most of our federal forces in his rear and right flank, his movement westward towards my department seemed inevitable.

Gen. Rosecrans was reinforced by troops under Gen. Mower, Gen. Smith, and hundred day regiments from Illinois, but all these being on the other side of Price, the greater their number the more certain and expeditious would be the movement towards my department. The crisis as to the direction of the enemy's movement occurred about the 2d of October, and I telegraphed Col. Ford, who occupied the district of Kansas City (and therefore my front in view of the approach of the enemy), to send forward scouts and keep in constant intercourse with Gen. Brown, whose district extended down the Missouri, on the south side of the Missouri river. On the same day I was informed that Gen. Fisk had moved from the

north side with a considerable force to save Jefferson City from the enemy. On the 4th I received the following dispatch from Gen. Brown:—

JEFFERSON CITY, 2:50 P. M., October 4th, 1864.

MAJ. GEN. CURTIS:

The rebels are on the road between me and St. Louis, and have cut off all communications. They attacked Herman last evening and had three pieces of artillery. They have captured railroad train and three locomotives. It is said they also captured four steam ferry-boats. If you support me it must be by direct movement down the river as quickly as possible. Am doing all I can to be ready to defend the place, but the situation is bad. I want infantry and artillery. The rebels have a large force. The appearances are that the enemy are moving up the river.

E. B. BROWN, Brig. Gen.

At 3:55 P. M. he added that "Gen. Fisk's commands are moving to my support; when he arrives I shall have six thousand men and eight small pieces of artillery." I telegraphed this intelligence through various routes to Gen. Rosecrans, but lines being down could get no intelligence through. I took the liberty to suggest to Gen. Brown, that "Price should be checked at the Gasconade river bridges, and boats on the Gasconade and Osage should be beyond all possible use to him. Destroying an eastern span of railroad bridge may be necessary. River too low and boats too scarce for my movements. Rains will raise streams and Price must be captured. Do not allow your force to be captured. If too small, better fall back, but stand as long as you can safely."

On the 5th of October, learning that Price had crossed the Gasconade, I wrote the Governor of Kansas, urging the immediate call of the militia, which letter was subsequently made part of his proclamation, and will be set out in this report.

CHAPTER II.

MOVEMENT TO FEEL AND EMBARRASS THE ENEMY.

Gen. Fisk advised me of his junction with Gen. Brown at Jefferson City on the 5th of October, and also desired me to send him a battery. On the 6th he reported his advance, in

skirmishing had met with some loss, and the enemy was coming forward. Gen. Rosecrans telegraphed as follows:—

HEADQUARTERS, ST. LOUIS, Oct. 6th, 1864.

MAJ. GEN. S. R. CURTIS:

You will wish to know our latest. Ewing blew up Pilot Knob and made good retreat to Rolla with his battery, losing only killed, wounded and stragglers by the way. Price was reported crossing the Gasconade yesterday, on the old stage road to Jefferson City. McNeil and Sanborn, finding their aim, moved their mounted forces to Jefferson City, and will hurt Price directly.

W. S. ROSECRANS, Maj. Gen.

Col. Chester Harding, with four hundred and fifty men, arrived from St. Joseph on steamer West Wind, and I directed Maj. S. S. Curtis to take the steamboat Benton and assist in the effort to get this force forward, reconnoitre the country and bring away stores from Lexington.

All boats were directed to protect their pilot houses and engineer's rooms, and these boats were especially guarded and directed to move with great caution if they proceeded below Kansas City, which they did. This movement was retarded by low water, and rebel force in front checked their further progress at Glasgow, where Col. Harding took the command and tried to hold the position. Meantime the enemy moving west of Glasgow, Maj. Curtis, with the Benton and a few soldiers and the crew, fought their way back, reporting the position and progress of Price's army. The report of Maj. Curtis marked "A," shows the thrilling incidents of this expedition, when several of the enemy were killed and wounded, and we saved the boat and crew with only one man wounded.

On the 7th I received the following from Gen. Fisk:—

JEFFERSON CITY, October 7th, 1864.

MAJ. GEN. CURTIS:

We have fought the enemy sharply from the Moreau bridge on the Bolton Ferry road, doing them considerable damage. Our loss as yet inconsiderable. We are withdrawing into the trenches. A large force investing. No news of reinforcements. Will give them the best fight we can, and may God give us victory.

CLINTON B. FISK, Brig. Gen.

On the 8th I wrote Gov. Carney, urging the proclamation

calling out the militia. He had personally urged the reasonable probability that the force under Gen. Rosecrans would be sufficient to overwhelm Price before he could reach us, and very earnestly hoped that the great expense and inconvenience of a general call of the Kansas people might be averted. But the advance of Price continued, leaving Jefferson City on his flank, without any great effort to take the gallant troops that held it, and on the 9th of October the governor of Kansas issued his proclamation, which I immediately promulgated in the following general orders:—

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS, }
FORT LEAVENWORTH, October 9, 1864. }

General Order }
No. 53. }

Governor Carney has issued a proclamation calling out the militia of the State, as follows:—

PROCLAMATION BY THE GOVERNOR.

STATE OF KANSAS, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, }
TOPEKA, October 8, 1864. }

The state is in peril. Price and his rebel hosts threaten it with invasion. Kansas must be ready to hurl them back at any cost. The necessity is urgent. The extent of that necessity, the subjoined communication from Maj. Gen. Curtis to me will establish:—

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS. }
FORT LEAVENWORTH, October 5th, 1864. }

HIS EXCELLENCY, GOV. THOMAS CARNEY:—

The rebel forces under Gen. Price have made a further advance westward, crossing the Gasconade, and are now at the railroad bridge on the Osage, about fifteen miles below Jefferson City. Large federal forces about St. Louis and below, tend to drive him towards Kansas. Other motives also will induce his fiendish followers to seek spoils and vengeance in this state. To prevent this and join in efforts to expel these invaders from the country, I desire that you will call out the entire militia force with their best arms and ammunition, for a period of thirty days. Each man should be provided with two blankets or a buffalo robe for comfort, and a haversack for carrying provisions. No change of clothing is necessary. I want this force assembled on the border mainly at Olathe, as soon as possible. For that purpose let farmers' teams, with provisions and forage, be employed to hurry them forward.

I will do all in my power to provide provisions and public transportation, but hope every man will be as self-sustaining as possible, and ready to join me in privations, hardships and dangers, to aid our comrades in Missouri in destroying these rebel forces before they again desolate the fair fields of Kansas.

It is necessary to suspend business and labor until we are assured our property and earnings are not within the grasp of unscrupulous marauders and murderers. Confidently believing, governor, that your excellency and all loyal citizens will concert with me in the propriety of this very important demand, and give me your hearty co-operation and assistance, I have the honor to be,

Your very obedient servant,

S. R. CURTIS, Maj. Gen. Com'd'g Dept.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH, }
FORT LEAVENWORTH, October 8, 1864. }

To Gov. CARNEY:—

The line is now cut this side Sedalia. This indicates a rebel move by somebody west or south. Hurry up the militia.

S. R. CURTIS, Maj. Gen.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH, }
FORT LEAVENWORTH, October 8, 1864. }

To Gov. CARNEY:—

I request that you issue the call. Let the militia turn out; if not needed they will of course be discharged. Their call and collection would enable us at least to give an impetus to Price's departure. In your prompt responses to my requests heretofore, I am sure we have saved the state from desolation; let us do it now. The enemy is now near Sedalia, and a fight is expected there to-night. They have burned Syracuse, Lamine and Otterville depots to-day. You see they seem moving westward—delay is ruinous.

S. R. CURTIS, Maj. Gen.

Kansas, rally! You will do so as you have always promptly done when your soil has been invaded. The call this time will come to you louder and stronger, because you know the foe will seek to glut his vengeance upon you. Meet him, then, at the threshold, and strike boldly—strike as one man against him.

Let all business be suspended. The work to be done now is to protect the state against marauders and murderers. Until that is accomplished we must lead a soldier's life and do a soldier's duty. Men of Kansas, rally! One blow,—one earnest, united blow, will foil the invader and save you. Who will falter! Who is not ready to meet the peril! Who will not defend his home and the state! To arms, then! To arms and the tented field until the rebel foe shall be baffled and beaten back!

THOMAS CARNEY, Governor.

N. B. Maj. Gen. Deitzler will lead the brave men of Kansas and issue the necessary orders. Commanding officers of brigades and battallions will see that their respective commands are in readiness for immediate service.

THOMAS CARNEY, Governor.

MAJ. GEN. DIETZLER'S ORDER.

In pursuance of this call of the governor, the militia of Kansas will turn out and rendezvous immediately as follows :

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT KANSAS STATE MILITIA, }
TOPEKA, KANSAS, October 9th, 1864. }

General Order }
No. 54. }

In pursuance of the proclamation of the commander-in-chief of the 8th inst., the militia of Kansas will turn out and rendezvous immediately at the points indicated below :—

Doniphan, Brown, Nemaha and Marshal counties, at Atchison, under Brig. Gen. Byron Sherry.

Atchison, Leavenworth, Jefferson, Jackson, Pottawattamie, Riley, Davis, Waubunsee, Shawnee, Douglas and Johnson counties, at Olathe, under Brig. Gen. M. S. Grant.

Wyandotte, at Wyandotte, under Maj. E. S. Hubbard.

Miami, Osage, Franklin, Morris and Lyon counties, at Paola, under Brig. Gen. W. H. M. Fishback.

Linn, Anderson and Coffee counties, at Mound City, under Brig. Gen. S. N. Wood.

Bourbon, Allen and Woodson counties, at Fort Scott.

Commanders of brigades and regiments will promptly prepare their respective commands for active service for thirty days, unless sooner discharged, and see that each man is supplied with two blankets, a tin cup, knife and fork, and a haversack, and also a coffee-pot and frying-pan for every five men.

Let each regiment and detachment bring its own transportation and all the rations possible, but there must be no delay on any account.

The general government will undoubtedly pay all proper charges for such transportation and supplies, and will furnish rations and forage as far and as soon as possible, at the points indicated in this order.

Let each man come with such arms as are at hand, and a full supply of ammunition. As this campaign will be a short one, no change of clothing will be necessary.

Until further orders the headquarters of the militia will be at Olathe, to which point all returns and communications will be sent.

By order of

GEO. W. DEITZLER, Maj. Gen. K. S. M.

JOHN T. MORTON, A. A. G.

All federal officers in this department will aid in giving circulation and success to this effort to concentrate troops for immediate service. Quartermasters and commissaries will aid to the utmost of their abilities to have requisite provisions accumulate as fast as possible. An earnest and united movement should animate officers and men, volunteers and militia.

Let business and personal strife be suspended, partisan discussions and

political animosities avoided; and instead of impatience, fault-finding and detractions too common among raw recruits, let every man display the fortitude, patience and endurance, which distinguish the patriotic soldier engaged in the defence of his home and his country.

The sooner this call is met, the more certain will be its success, and the general earnestly appeals to soldiers and citizens to unite all their moral and physical energies in this effort to stifle the fiendish hordes that again threaten the people of Kansas and the peace of our country.

By command of Maj. Gen. Curtis.

C. S. CHARLOT, Asst. Ad't Gen.

OFFICIAL: Asst. Adj't Gen.

Some defects in the militia law had on former occasions troubled officers in the enforcement of their calls. There was also a large colored population, and many of certain ages that were exempt from the militia organization. I therefore determined to strengthen the force and effect of the governor's call, by proclaiming martial law in Kansas, and in the neighborhoods where I expected to confront and pursue the enemy. For it is proper for me to say that my experience in a former campaign against Price, made under your immediate orders in the winter of 1861-2, induced the theory and execution of my plans for confronting and pursuing him on this occasion, and although my force seemed irregular and inadequate, I was inspired with singular confidence in the manner and matter of my success. In further efforts therefore to rally an adequate force, I issued the following order declaring martial law:—

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS, }
FORT LEAVENWOTH, KANSAS, October 10, 1864. }

General Orders }
No. 54. }

The better to carry out the object of the governor's proclamation issued this morning, and to secure prompt and united military organization and action, martial law is proclaimed, to extend throughout the state of Kansas and the country occupied by the troops moving therefrom; and all men, white or black, between the ages of eighteen (18) and sixty (60) will arm and attach themselves to some of the organizations of troops, for temporary military service.

In all the principal cities and towns business houses will close as directed by the governor's proclamation, except where general officers may give leave to such houses and special establishments as may be considered necessary for the public subsistence and health.

As this order is only designed to continue while danger of invasion is apprehended, the proper functions of civil officers will not be disturbed, and especially courts of justice, and their processes will not be interrupted by the military authorities.

All troops, volunteers and militia, are clothed with the powers, and are subject to the duties and penalties prescribed in the articles of war, and soldiers and citizens must expect very summary punishment of crime; and burning, robbing and stealing in the field, will be severely and promptly punished. Private property and peaceable citizens must be protected. Our object is Price and his followers. His forces are now reported as retreating from Jefferson City in this direction. My advance to meet him is already moving. Let troops of every organization press forward to join in his repulse and pursuit.

By command of Maj. Gen. Curtis.

(Signed)

C. S. CHARLOT, Asst. Adj't Gen.

OFFICIAL: Asst. Adj't Gen.

These efforts aroused the whole people. Business was immediately suspended, and militia everywhere began to move and organize. All intelligence of the enemy's movements was published, and the excitement was intense and universal. I ordered Col. Ford to take position at Pleasant Hill, sending scouts forward in all directions, to determine the position of the enemy. Gen. Blunt was ordered to Paola to take command of the district and in the field. I also sent you the following dispatch by telegraph:—

FORT LEAVENWORTH, October 10, 1864.

MAJ. GEN. H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:—

Being informed by General Rosecrans that the rebel Gen. Price is coming from Jefferson City, Gov. Carney at my request has called out the militia, and I have declared martial law, to secure prompt organization and unity of action. Telegraph lines are interrupted east of Independence, but my pickets in advance of that, report only scattering foes. Shall soon have large force on the border or be moving beyond. Will take the field to-morrow, but will try to keep within telegraph communication.

S. R. CURTIS, Maj. Gen.

I also informed Gen. Rosecrans that the militia were collecting, and my purpose to give Price a warm reception if he comes this way. In further preparation of field operations I published the following order announcing staff officers, and also gave special directions to Brig. Gen. T. J. Davis, concerning the completion of certain defences in his district, which in

cludes this post, and the country north of the Kansas river, with directions to remain in his district and guard against dangers in my rear, which some thought would be assailed by a rise in north Missouri, aided by a portion of Price's troops that had crossed to the north side of the Missouri, and taken Col. Harding's force at Glasgow:—

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS, }
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS, October 10, 1864. }

General Order }
No. 55. }

The following temporary assignments to duty are published to the command. They will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

I. Major F. E. Hunt, chief paymaster, is also appointed acting aid-de-camp, and will take charge and command of all artillery in and near the county of Leavenworth, consistent with the general arrangements of district commanders Gens. Blunt and Davies.

II. Maj. Henry Almstedt, in addition to his duties as additional paymaster, will report to Maj. F. E. Hunt, for artillery duty.

III. Hon. Jams H. Lane having tendered his services to the Major General commanding, they are accepted and he is assigned to duty as volunteer aid-de-camp.

IV. Capt. James L. Rafety, 2d Kansas colored, having reported for duty, will take charge of the general organization and command of persons of African descent. All of proper age and ability are included in the proclamation, and will be organized as other troops, for immediate service.

V. Capt. J. M. Mentzer, 2d Kansas volunteer cavalry, reports being here *en route*, and unable to reach his command. He will report for temporary duty to Brig. Gen. F. A. Davies, commanding district north Kansas.

VI. Rev. J. B. McAfee, chaplain 2d Kansas colored, having reported for duty, will have charge of contrabands in the field, and will also report to Capt. Rafety as acting adjutant, in the organization of troops of African descent.

By command of Maj. Gen. Curtis.

(Signed)

C. S. CHARLOT, Asst. Adj't Gen.

OFFICIAL: Asst. Adj't Gen.

The governor and Maj. Gen. Deitzler called on me to ascertain my purpose as to taking the militia out of the state, expressing apprehensions of difficulty on that point if such was my purpose. They also informed me that expressions of some of my officers had led them to distrust the whole matter of the militia movement, supposing it might be a political scheme, gotten up by some around me to transport the people

beyond the convenient exercise of their elective franchise, which would come off early in the next month. These were shocking enunciations. I assured these officers that in all human probability we might have to go beyond the state lines, and I considered my proclamation of martial law and call, sufficient to cover the legal point as to the militia going beyond the border; but the raising of the question was of itself a great element of discord and danger. As to any attempt to defraud the ballot-box, such an idea had never been mooted in my presence or entered my brain, and I pledged my honor that the militia should go no farther than necessary to repel or avert the approaching danger to the state. My manner and matter appeared to assure these officers, who, by their position and influence held, as I conceived, the destiny of the state and department, within their own hands.

I name this not to complain or reproach these officers, but because such sentiments were the natural offspring of the political crisis and separate state organizations of all our militia. These difficulties, candidly presented by these high state authorities, were material, formidable obstacles, which I and they had to encounter. They are inherent objections to the military organization of national forces, and I report them as developments incident to the events of this revolution, and important in the progress of this campaign against the rebel Gen. Price.

Being assured of my purpose, these officers promised hearty co-operation, and gave immediate orders for the militia to proceed to points designated near the border. I also ordered the immediate concentration of the federal troops which had been previously prepared, to unite in the campaign. My arrangements for collecting an army were thus completed on the 10th of October, but none of the forces were fairly in the field.

CHAPTER III.

MOVEMENTS IN THE FIELD.

I present a skeleton map of the country extending from the Missouri to the Arkansas river, through which I moved

with my command, showing also the movements of the enemy in his approach and retreat, and the positions of the military posts and towns that were near the lines of operation. This map, carefully prepared by my engineer from notes taken in the field, also shows the state and department lines, and the lines followed by the main forces, red representing federal and blue the rebel movements. Flanking operations by both belligerent forces extended on either side, but are not laid down. Cross sabres represent the places where battles occurred, and the whole map gives a true representation of important places, without the confusion of irrelevant details.

On the 11th of October, accompanied by a portion of my staff and escort (company "G," 11th Kansas, commanded by the gallant Capt. Gove), I started on the campaign. Passing through Leavenworth and south of the city, I saw the militia mustering and moving, and other matters of business generally suspended.

October 12th, at 12 o'clock, I arrived at Olathe, where most of the troops were ordered to assemble, but none had yet arrived. I also found water and wood so scarce I determined to take a more advanced position, nearer the state line at Shawnee, and therefore so directed forces of all kinds.

Forces at Paola under Gen. Blunt were ordered to move towards Hickman's mill, in Missouri, and to "send out due east from Paola sixty miles or more, to know whether Price moves south." The militia from Leavenworth and Lawrence came up towards night, the former having overdone themselves, and from all directions the news of moving militia was reported.

Maj. Gen. Deitzler, commanding the militia, joined and accompanied me to Shawneetown, where we arranged the militia camps in that vicinity fronting towards the Missouri line, and extending as circumstances required. Turkey creek was especially convenient for a line of defense, and was occupied as such. This rendezvous was very near the state line, in a thickly wooded country near the Kansas river, and in this and other respects a strong and convenient position, where the

Kansas militia were on their own side of the line. I moved my own headquarters to Wyandotte.

On the 13th I received a dispatch from Col. Eno, informing me that Gen. Rosecrans had taken the field the day previous, *en route* to Jefferson City. Price's forces were between Boonville and Lexington, still moving westward. The same dispatch reported the enemy as having moved 2,500 men north of the Missouri river, to attack the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, and another report came from the west that Standwatie with 5,000 men was near Humboldt, threatening southwest Kansas.

These reports were calculated to check the movement of the militia and greatly embarrass the organization of my army. I pronounced the first improbable, and the latter as "undoubtedly a roorback," and so telegraphed to north and south districts of Kansas, where much excitement was induced by the rumor. Here senators Lane and Pomeroy had both joined me as volunteer aids, and I found both of these men of great service in giving correct intelligence to the wavering public mind, and in suppressing false impressions.

Pursuant to the foregoing preliminary movements, the militia were collected at and near Shawneetown, the left wing under Maj. Gen. Deitzler, K. S. M. Volunteers and other militia constituting my right wing, under Maj. Gen. Blunt, U. S. V., at Hickman's mill. The former was directed to demonstrate towards Lexington and the latter towards Warrensburg, so as to feel the enemy's approach.

My own headquarters were generally at Wyandotte and at camp Charlot, near Kansas City, but I made a reconnoissance of the country in person, through Independence and Hickman's mill, ascertaining to my own satisfaction that the Big Blue should be a first main line of battle, Kansas City a second, and finally, if overpowered, Wyandotte on the north side of the Kansas river, connected by a floating bridge, would be a dernier resort.

I directed my chief engineer, Lieutenant Robinson, to con-

struct field works at each of these positions in view of this plan, and attend to the proper organization of guns and light garrisons, which could be spared for these positions.

Colored troops and citizen guards of Kansas City and Wyandotte, made efficient and proper troops for this purpose, and Lieut. Robinson, assisted by ——— ———, civil engineer of Kansas City, deserve special commendation for their efforts and success in these defenses.

Lawyers, doctors, divines and merchants, entered the service, and I found them working faithfully on these field-works about Kansas City and the Big Blue.

I here present another map showing the country near Kansas City, where troops and camps were located on both sides of the state line.

But a few days of delay while forces were coming and Price approaching, were sufficient to weary some, and induce doubts in the minds of many. A report was circulated that Price had gone south from Warrensburg and escaped, and some of the militia actually turned homeward. Some severe measures and much remonstrance was necessary to retain those who came first, till those who came last had fairly arrived. Some of the newspapers took up the theme, and denounced the call, and especially martial law, which suspended business and forced citizens to the field without equipments, at an inclement season when there was no occasion.

To meet this complaint and retain the militia, I made great efforts through my volunteer aids to diffuse correct intelligence, and I also distributed blankets, and camp equipments to some extent, thereby administering a little to the wants and real suffering of men exposed to the rain and cold without covering. I also published dispatches from Gen. Rosecrans and others, showing the steady approach of the enemy towards Kansas, and his declared purpose to take Kansas City and Leavenworth, and devastate the country everywhere.

This is one of Gen. Rosecrans dispatches:—

JEFFERSON CITY, October 14th, 1864.

MAJ. GEN. CURTIS:—

Our cavalry is pursuing the enemy north-west of Georgetown, who is reported moving towards Lexington. We shall occupy Sedalia with infantry to-morrow night. If you could move by Hickman's mill and Pleasant Hill, or by Independence to Lone Jack, it would greatly increase our chances of damaging Price, whose columns are of such length when on one road, as to be very vulnerable. If he does not halt he will reach Lexington to-morrow night.

W. S. ROSECRANS, Maj. Gen.

I reported to you by telegraph, as follows:—

ARMY OF THE BORDER, HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, }
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, October 14th, 1864. }

MAJ. GEN. HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.:—

My forces are being concentrated in this vicinity. The enemy has approached to Independence, burning bridges beyond, but he has not occupied in force. I occupy Hickman's mill, Missouri, and Shawneetown, Kansas, with fighting force and scouts forward. Shall move slow to allow my rear to close up. Have not an operator with cypher, and therefore abstain from giving numbers and particulars.

Price is reported near Lexington or Booneville, moving this way. I denominate my forces "the army of the border," and will do all I can to make it felt by the foe.

S. R. CURTIS, Maj. Gen.

My purpose to move further forward in accordance with this dispatch and Gen. Rosecrans' suggestion, was prevented so far as the main force of the militia was concerned, in consequence of the aversion many of them expressed as to going beyond their own state line. Hearing that boats below had aided the rebels in crossing troops, I directed the following order:—

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS, }
FORT LEAVENWORTH, October 15th. 1864. }

General Order }
No. 56. }

Commanders and owners of steamboats and ferry boats on the Missouri river, in this command, will see that their boats do not fall into rebel hands, in a condition for rebel service, under the sure and swift penalty of the loss of boat and the forfeit of the life of the commander and pilot.

By command of Maj. Gen. Curtis.

W. H. STARK, Acting Asst. Adj't Gen.

OFFICIAL: Asst. Adj't Gen.

I was thus prepared and ready for the enemy's approach. Gen. Blunt was directed to demonstrate towards Pleasant Hill and Warrensburg, Gen. Deitzler towards Independence and Lexington, each sending out cavalry to ascertain the line of his approach, and harrass his advancing columns.

My own movements at Kansas City and Independence gave me convenient opportunities to observe the movements in advance, and also supervise the main forces arranged on the Big Blue and the border.

Maj. J. N. Smith, of the 2d Colorado, advanced with about three hundred cavalry on the telegraph road from Independence, dashing into Lexington on the 17th, a little after sunrise, but found the town unoccupied, the enemy's pickets having fallen back before, and on the occasion of his approach. Sending out scouts he found the enemy's pickets about six miles south-east, which was attacked, killing one and wounding two. This and other important intelligence of the presence of the main force of the enemy, was reported by this gallant officer on the 18th, through his proper commanders. He fell fighting at Little Blue, two days after, and I submit this, his last report, marked "C," as a reminiscence of a gallant soldier whose character is displayed in this daring advanced movement, and expressed in this, his last report.

On the day previous Gen. Deitzler reported at Independence the murmurs and doubts of the militia and their refusal to cross the line, until he made them a speech, assuring them that they "should not be ordered too far into this state," and Col. Blair reported that some of the militia regiments at Hickman's mill, believing that Price had taken another route, had actually started homeward, but were checked by prompt, stringent orders, enforced by Gen. Blunt.

I also received the following dispatch from Gen. Rosecrans:—

JEFFERSON CITY, October 18th, 1864.

MAJ. GEN. CURTIS:—

As I telegraphed you last night, division of infantry occupy Sedalia. Our cavalry at Duncksburg on the Black Water. As soon as they get ra-

tions they will move forward. Price reported to have stayed night before last at Waverly. Mower's division will be at Lamine bridge to-night, with its batteries probably fit for action. Sanborn will have received supplies to-day, by 12 M., and will move his right by Elmwood and Elkhorn, and his left by Cook's store, towards Lexington.

With these dispositions combined with yours, it seems to me we can push the old fellow and make him lose his train. His horses' feet must be in bad order for want of shoes.

W. S. ROSECRANS, Maj. Gen.

I directed publicity in the newspapers, of most of this intelligence, to convince the militia of what they considered very incredible—the advance of Price towards my command; and I insert them here, not to reproach anybody, but to show why I was obliged to stand on the border or near it, rather than go forward with my whole force to meet Price, as I would have preferred to do, in the vicinity of Lexington, Missouri. I also do it to show that even among ardent, loyal militia, state lines and state sovereignties greatly embarrass military operations.

The evidence brought by Maj. Smith, showing clearly the presence and progress of the enemy near Lexington, was not clear enough, and some of the newspapers of the 19th came out denouncing the whole thing as a fraud or fallacy, and expressing a belief that Price had left the country.

In the mean time Maj. Gen. Blunt had advanced with about two thousand cavalry and several pieces of light artillery (mountain howitzers), arriving in Lexington on the 18th, the day after Maj. Smith had occupied the place. He had followed the Warrensburg road until he was confident that Price was not coming that way, and therefore he moved northward, where his presence was ascertained. Sending forward scouts from Lexington the enemy was felt on the 19th, approaching on different roads in great force. Our troops offered a stern resistance, falling back slowly and in good order, fighting several hours and doing considerable damage to the enemy with small loss on our side. The enemy displayed his main force, and this stubborn and gallant stand by Gen. Blunt developed the strength, position and progress of the enemy so clearly,

that its publicity throughout our lines on the 20th, assured and re-animated the militia, and secured me that unity of sentiment and will which before I had failed to secure in the "army of the border."

For full details of this battle of Lexington I respectfully refer you to the report of Gen. Blunt who was in command, and to the reports of his subordinate commanders, Cols. Jenison and Moonlight, and also Hon. Senator Lane, of my volunteer staff, who accompanied and participated in this first conflict between my forces and the enemy. Gen. Blunt, as directed by me, fell back to my headquarters at Independence, leaving Col. Moonlight, who had covered the retreat, to remain as a picket at the Little Blue, with arrangements to burn the bridge on the approach of the enemy, to embarrass his progress.

BATTLE OF LITTLE BLUE.

It was not my intention to give battle on the Little Blue, as will be seen by my letter of instructions to Gen. Blunt, as follows:—

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE BORDER, }
INDEPENDENCE, October 20th, 1864. }

GENERAL:—

I have not time to explain. Your troops must take position here where dry corn and provisions are arranged. The militia will not go forward, and the Big Blue must be our main line for battle. We must not break down our best regiments, 11th, 15th and 16th, and Ford's must have some rest. Leave two howitzers, and, say four hundred men, at the Little Blue and come back yourself with the remainder.

Probably Moonlight had better be left in command of that point, not to fight a battle, but to delay the rebel approach, and fall back to our main force. I will now be able to bring forward to Kansas City a respectable force. We must pick our battle ground where we can have united councils as well as a strong position. This we are securing at Big Blue and elsewhere.

The blow you gave the enemy is doing good in the rear. It is crushing some of the silly rumors that had well nigh ruined my prospects of a successful defense.

Truly yours,

S. R. CURTIS, Maj. Gen. ^v

To GEN. BLUNT, in the field.

This was in response to Gen. Blunt's dispatch dated "Nine miles east of Independence, 8 o'clock A. M., October 20th," in which he suggested other arrangements.

Gen. Rosecrans was fully informed and responded from Sedalia, 5:40 A. M. the 20th, saying,—“Your dispatch of 4:30 received. I will push my forces on Lexington with all possible speed.”

About 9 o'clock in the morning of the 21st, I received intelligence that the enemy had attacked Col. Moonlight at the Little Blue, where he was resisting their passage of the stream, although by some accident he had failed to destroy the bridge.

I immediately proceeded with my escort to reconnoitre the premises, giving permission, rather than ordering, that Col. Ford's regiment, McLain's battery, and a portion of the regular cavalry under Gen. Blunt, might accompany me to the front, expecting to meet Col. Moonlight in retreat. But this gallant officer stood his ground until we arrived, and developed most of the force I have named.

I directed Capt. McLain to form his battery behind the crest of the hill so as to fire over, and against heavy artillery firing of the enemy, that passed high over our heads, but did some damage to troops deploying in our rear.

Col. Jennison's brigade and that of Col. Ford, soon occupied advanced positions and made a desperate resistance to the rebel advance, which had by this time began to deploy on the west side of the stream. Gen. Blunt and my staff were active in directing a proper disposition of forces. By this means we checked and drove back the enemy's advance, but as he soon began to outflank us on both sides of the road, I directed the force to fall back, designating positions for the artillery to make a stand at the various and elevated angles of the road which passes through a timbered country. Many incidents in the conflict are detailed by my subordinates and those of Gen. Blunt.

Maj. R. H. Hunt, chief of artillery, took direction of my escort and four howitzers, doing signal service in the hottest of the fight, and only fell back by my orders when I saw we

were being outflanked. The details of his report deserve repetition. He says,—

“By your direction I placed McLain’s battery in position and opened fire on the enemy, with what result I cannot state. I also placed two mountain howitzers, connected with your body guard, in position in the open field, but finding it too much exposed to the enemy’s sharpshooters, I directed an advance with two additional howitzers of the 11th K. V. C. They took position in shelter of a friendly house, supported on the right by Col. Ford—had no support on the left. As I met the 11th retreating, and saw Maj. Ross, and begged him to have Col. Moonlight to retrace his steps and support me, which he did. Artillery opened on the enemy with canister and spherical case, at short range, and drove them back like sheep. Here is where Maj. Smith sacrificed his life in behalf of his country. Col. Ford asked when I would retreat; I replied, when he would. He remarked, although we drove the enemy from our front, they were flanking us. At this juncture I received from the commanding general orders to fall back, which was just in the nick of time.

We retreated firing, keeping the foe at a respectable distance. Lieut. Gill, of your body guard, lost fifteen horses out of forty, and Capt. Johnson, of the 11th K. V. C., lost several. * * * The last artillery firing was by Lieut. Gill, supported by cavalry portions of your body guard, and commanded by the lamented Capt. Gove.”

Although sick, Capt. Gove remained in command of my escort till entirely exhausted, reluctantly leaving me after our subsequent victory at Westport, where he soon fell a victim to his disease, the result of his extraordinary exertions and gallantry.

Col. Ford, speaking of the conflict in his brigade, says:—

“Left Independence at 10 o’clock A. M., and reached Little Blue in about one hour. I there received orders to place the 16th Kansas cavalry on the left of Col. Moonlight’s brigade, the battery near the centre of the line, and the 2d Colorado

on the right. We immediately dismounted and advanced into the bluffs and became at once engaged, the enemy having crossed the stream before our arrival.

“We held our ground, advancing slightly for some time, and at one time drove the enemy in great confusion, but his forces being too overwhelmingly large, he threw a large body to the right, which compelled our right to give back slowly.”

Col. Jennison, who also commanded a brigade, reports concerning this affair of the Little Blue, as follows:—

“On the 21st of October, the enemy having advanced from Lexington, met the 2d brigade at the Little Blue, at an early hour in the morning. The 1st brigade was therefore ordered to the front, and immediately from Independence to the field, where it arrived about 11 o'clock A. M., taking position on the right. * * * In this engagement the 15th regiment, Lieut. Col. Hoyt, and the 3d Wisconsin cavalry, Lieut. Col. Pond, were dismounted and disposed in advantageous position, which had hardly been accomplished when the lines were fiercely assailed by the enemy at all points, and the contest became extremely spirited, though from the nature of the ground and the protection of our timber, the casualties were not heavy. For some hours the engagement was maintained with varying results, our lines alternately falling back and advancing, the howitzer battery being actively, and apparently effectively engaged, until it became evident that the enemy was numerically superior to such an extent that it would be impossible to hold the ground, and a retrograde movement was commenced in the direction of Independence.”

Col. Jennison speaks very favorably of the conduct of Lieut. Col. Hoyt and Maj. Laing, and deserves much credit for his own gallantry during this day's contest.

Col. Moonlight, who was left to retard the movement of the enemy, and therefore began the fight at the Little Blue, reports as follows. After stating his force, only ten companies, he says,—

“It was no very easy matter to hold an enemy so numerous and active, all being cavalry. Maj. Anderson, of the 11th, with two companies, had command of the bridge, which he set on fire and held until it was fairly burning, after which he fell back on the hill and joined the command, who then opened on the enemy. Capt. Greer with his company, “I,” 11th, had been stationed at a ford one mile below the bridge, with instructions to hold the enemy as long as possible. He retired without firing a shot, but claims that it was impossible to do otherwise, as the enemy were crossing at all points.

“Being thus menaced on all sides, and the object for which I was left accomplished, the command slowly fell back two miles, fighting. A favorable piece of ground here presenting itself, a new line of battle was formed on the left of the Independence road, and we slowly began to drive the enemy back over the ground again, dismounting every man for the purpose of shelter, behind stone walls, fences and houses, some of which were then held by the enemy, who after a vigorous assault were dislodged, thus affording us an advantage, which accounts for the few killed on our side compared with that of the enemy, who suffered terribly.”

Col. Moonlight covered the retreat, even skirmishing after dark, in and west of Independence. His conduct throughout the day was exceedingly gallant. Lieut. Col. Plumb, Lieut. Col. Walker, and Maj. Ross and Anderson, Capt. Gregg (who was severely wounded), and other officers named by the colonel, deserve the commendation he awards them in his report.

During the day I noticed a company of Missouri volunteers from Warrensburg, under Capt. George S. Grover, to which I assigned position, and they did good service. Also some of the Kansas militia under Capt. McDowell, reported for duty and did good service in guarding and delivering the ammunition supplies.

Major Charlot, Maj. McKenny and Maj. Hunt, of my regular staff, and Hon. Senator Lane, of my volunteer staff, took an active and prominent part in the conflict, and displayed much coolness and gallantry, under the fire of the enemy.

All the troops showed the greatest coolness and courage, always ready to rally, re-form and attack, during the slow retreat over only nine miles, which consumed the entire day.

At Independence I received and announced to the citizens and soldiers the news of Sheridan's glorious victory in the Shenandoah valley; at the same time publicly explained the nature of the day's operations and my arrangements for making a main stand on the Big Blue, where my main forces were being fortified.

I had thus delayed and seriously embarrassed the enemy without demoralizing any of my forces, with the use of only a small portion, and at a small loss in killed and wounded.

Gen. Blunt was very active and efficient during the whole day, and his full report should be read to do him justice.

BATTLE OF THE BIG BLUE.

After a personal inspection of the surrounding country on the 18th October, I ordered Col. C. W. Blair, who commanded a brigade of mixed troops, to take position on the west bank of Big Blue, six miles east of Kansas City, Missouri, and arrange matters for making that stream a stand-point to confront and repel Price's approaching forces. My engineer, Lieut. G. T. Robinson, was directed to survey the stream and lay out such field-works as seemed expedient to resist the passage of cavalry and artillery. These officers engaged in these duties with great energy and sound judgment.

On the morning of the 21st, before going forward to the Little Blue, I directed Maj. Gen. Deitzler, with what militia he then had at Independence, to fall back to the Big Blue, take general command of matters there, and bring up all the available forces in the rear and arrange them for battle on that line. This order was also carefully and zealously executed. All doubts as to the approach of Price were dispelled by constant sound of our guns at the Little Blue, and Governor S. Carney, Gen. Deitzler, and all the militia, entered with fresh zeal and energy upon the work of bringing up and deploying the Kansas and Missouri militia. At the close of the contest

of the 21st near Independence, I ordered all of Gen. Blunt's, and detached troops to move back and join the forces at the Big Blue, where I also repaired, establishing my headquarters on the main road leading from Independence to Kansas City, which is also a central position of my line on the Blue, which is nearly at right angles with this road. The country is rough and thickly timbered, and the streams bordered by precipitate banks which render it generally impassable for cavalry and artillery. I divided the forces, distributing them so as to form a line more or less continuous according to danger from the Missouri river, to the crossing of the Blue near Hickman's mill, a distance of fifteen or sixteen miles. Roads on the west side were convenient for concentrating these forces, and with the immense display of abattis and other field-works which had been erected under the supervision of Gen. Deitzler, Col. Blair, and my staff officers, I was ready to receive the enemy on the 22d.

I assigned Gen. Blunt to the command of the right wing, including all south of the road, and to Gen. Deitzler the left wing, which includes all north of it. Militia, volunteers, artillery, and a considerable colored force which had been collected by Capts. Hinton and Rafferty, amounting all together to about fifteen thousand, were thus arrayed resolved to check or defeat the long continued progress of Price's army of thirty thousand; for his officers and men taken prisoners, generally reported the enemy's force at from twenty-five to thirty-seven thousand, and boasted of constant accessions by volunteering and conscription.

On my arrival at the Big Blue I telegraphed you as to my conflict at the Little Blue, and my designs for the 22d, and also telegraphed Gen. Rosecrans as follows:—

HEADQUARTERS BIG BLUE, }
5 o'clock P. M., October 21st, 1864. }

GEN. ROSECRANS:—

I am confident I can stop Price at this crossing, and hope you will come up in his rear and left. He cannot get out by Hickman's mill. If you can get that position we will bag Price if I succeed as I hope to do. My losses

have been considerable, but my troops are in good order and ready to make a stand at this place.

S. R. CURTIS, Maj. Gen."

He telegraphed me of same date as follows:—

"CAMP NEAR COOK'S STORE, 1 P. M., October 21st, 1864.

MAJ. GEN. CURTIS:—

Our cavalry reached Lexington at 10 o'clock this morning. The infantry will reach this evening and push forward. Rear division left Sedalia yesterday morning. Orders will be sent to push the enemy to the utmost.

W. S. ROSECRANS, Maj. Gen."

During the morning of the 22d, the enemy approached Gen. Deitzler's wing and drove in our pickets at an early period, but finding the army in that quarter too strong he avoided an attack. Col. Ford sent forward a battalion to skirmish on the main road, but the enemy found our centre also too strong, and signal officers reported a movement of the enemy southward, evidently designed to flank us.

I moved my headquarters back to the intersection of roads bearing from Hickman's mill, and sent a dispatch to the extreme right, as follows:—

"SATURDAY, 9 A. M., October 22d, 1864.

GEN. GRANT, commanding militia near Hickman's mill:—

Price is making very feeble demonstrations in front. Look out for your position. Send scouts out on road towards Pleasant Hill and also towards Independence, to see if he is moving on my flank. Send me report every thirty minutes.

S. R. CURTIS, Maj. Gen."

I also sent my aids, Maj. McKenny and Lieut. Roberts, to give warning to the right of Gen. Blunt's right wing, but before they reached Gen. Grant, the intermediate ford at Col. Jennison's point called Byram's ford, had been attacked, and forced so the enemy had penetrated to the west side. News of this attack at Byram's ford reached me at 2 o'clock P. M., and I immediately directed Gen. Blunt to hasten reinforcements to that point, and also sent similar orders to Gen. Deitzler, whose left wing was no longer menaced.

Col. Jennison resisted the enemy for some time, but ulti-

mately and before reinforcements reached him, had to fall back in good order before overwhelming numbers.

This break in my line severed the militia that were under Gen. Grant near Hickman's mill, and many of them were captured, including a twenty-four pounder canon which belonged to the state. Meantime the reinforcements ordered to Byram's ford joined Col. Jennison's and fought the advancing column of the enemy till dark, when our forces drove back the advance some distance.

But the enemy had penetrated and broken my extreme right flank, held Hickman's mill and all of the Blue south of Byram's ford, and taken position south of my headquarters and Kansas City, to which point I now moved my headquarters. Only a small portion of my troops had been engaged, when night closed the scene and displayed the enemy's camp fires over a vast field south and south-east of Westport.

Some of the details of this day's contest are thus presented by my comrades in command. Gen. Blunt says,—

“Early in the morning of the 22d, I directed the first brigade under Col. Jennison, to proceed up the Big Blue a distance of four miles to Byram's ford, to defend the crossing at that point, and for the same purpose I sent the second brigade under Col. Moonlight, to Hinkle's ford, about two miles above the main crossing.

“At about 9 o'clock A. M., a small force of the enemy advanced on the main road from Independence to Kansas City, which proved to be only a feint to divert attention from the movements on our right flank in the direction of Byram's ford. At 1 o'clock I heard artillery firing on my extreme right, from which I inferred that Col. Jennison's command had been attacked, and immediately dispatched a courier to Col. Moonlight to reinforce him with the second brigade, but before Col. Moonlight had time to arrive on the ground, Col. Jennison was forced to retire, and the enemy had flanked our position on the Big Blue and was crossing that stream in force. The first and second brigades kept up on their flank, and when near the state line attacked the right of their column, turned

his flank and punished him quite severely. The fighting continued until dark.

“Finding the position of our army at the Big Blue flanked by the enemy, and in the absence of superior authority, I directed Maj. Gen. Deitzler, in command of the Kansas state militia, to withdraw his command to Kansas City, and dispatched orders to Cols. Jennison, Moonlight and Ford, to remain with their commands in front of the enemy in the vicinity of Westport.”

Maj. Gen. Deitzler reports:—

“The entire army of the border was now in position on and along the north side of Big Blue occupying every passable crossing of that stream from its mouth to Hickman’s mill, a distance of about fifteen miles, and presenting a formidable appearance.

“Price’s army entered Independence on the 21st, and on the morning of the 22d his cavalry made demonstrations at several points in front of my position (the left wing), in several instances driving the pickets in under cover of our artillery. About noon, having received reliable information that a heavy column of the enemy was moving against the right of our line, I ordered Lieut. Col. Walker, commanding the 16th Kansas volunteer cavalry, with two pieces of artillery, to reinforce that position. Subsequently the 12th K. S. M. and Capt. McLain’s battery were also withdrawn from my line to reinforce the right under Gen. Blunt.

“The enemy having forced a passage of the Big Blue at Byram’s ford about 3 o’clock P. M., and my position being threatened from the rear, I quickly withdrew my command in perfect order, and retired to Kansas City in obedience to instructions from Maj. Gen. Blunt. Just as the troops commenced moving from our works on the Blue, a detachment of rebel cavalry made a furious dash upon the left centre of my line occupied by the 19th regiment K. S. M. under Col. Hogan, who received the charge with the greatest coolness and gallantry, completely routing the enemy, killing twelve and capturing ten, without loss on our side.”

Speaking of the operations of Gen. Grant, who commanded the militia on the right of Gen. Blunt's command, the General adds:—

“A strong detachment of the enemy moved up the Blue under cover of the timber and attacked Gen. Grant, throwing his command into some confusion, killing thirty-six and wounding forty-three, taking about one hundred prisoners, capturing one piece of artillery and compelling Gen. Grant to return to Olathe. There was not much fighting on the left wing of the line, but Gen. Deitzler acted with good judgment and great promptness in his duties. The militia generally did well, and the disaster of Gen. Grant's detachment was mainly owing to the overwhelming numbers of the enemy that moved upon them.”

Col. Jennison, who commenced the fight and stood the brunt of it during the afternoon, thus reports his operations:—

“On the morning of the 22d, I was ordered with the brigade to Byram's ford of the Big Blue, some eight miles from its encampment of the night previous. Arriving there we were joined by a detachment of K. S. M. of Col. McCain's command, which rendered valuable assistance in obstructing the ford of the river by felling timber, etc. About 10 o'clock A. M. the enemy's advance made its appearance at the ford, attacking our outposts and attempting to force a crossing. The ford was so effectually obstructed however, and in its condition wholly impassable for artillery, that for some hours little progress was made, the attacking party being repulsed each time it appeared in the front, which was defended by a strong skirmishing line securely posted, and one section of the howitzer battery then in charge of 2d Lieut. H. S. Barker, company “G,” 15th K. V. C., to whom the command was transferred on the morning of the battle of Little Blue.

“The first brigade held the enemy effectually in check notwithstanding his great superiority of numbers, until about 3 P. M., when it became evident that he had succeeded in crossing considerable bodies above and below, and was rapidly flanking us both right and left.

“ Upon this intelligence (word of which was sent to the general commanding), with the additional report that the main body of the rebels was apparently in front and determined to effect a crossing at Byram’s ford, it was determined to retire in the direction of Westport or Kansas City, towards which it was evident the efforts of the enemy were directed. Our lines at the ford having been forced back, the rebels succeeded in crossing a considerable force of dismounted cavalry, a portion of which was employed in removing obstructions in the river, while the others were deployed on either side of the road and advanced towards us. Then with a strong body of rebels pressing on our rear and in constant expectation that our flank would be attacked, the brigade commenced the retreat towards Westport, contesting every foot of ground until the enemy gave over the action, and retired to the front. Reaching the open ground some four or five miles, between Westport and state line, a large body of troops was discovered on our left advancing in a northerly direction from the timber of the Blue. Upon reaching the line road we were joined by Col. Moonlight’s command, when the first and second brigades were rapidly pushed forward upon the prairie to resist the advance of the enemy under Shelby, who had evidently crossed the ford four miles above Byram’s. Skirmishers were immediately deployed from both brigades, and in a few minutes the action was commenced along the entire lines with small arms. A body of K. S. M. coming up soon after, it was formed in line of battle immediately in rear of first brigade, when the rebels being closely pressed by our skirmishing lines, wavered a moment and then began to give ground. Upon this a general advance of the first brigade was ordered, and the lines rapidly advanced towards the enemy, who after a slight resistance fell back in confusion to the cover of the timber, some two or three miles distant, closely followed by our forces, until, as the sun went down, not a vestige of the rebel Shelby’s division beyond its dead and a few wounded, was to be seen on the field. Maintaining our lines for some time with no further demonstrations from the recent exultant and confident

enemy, our columns were turned towards Westport, which we reached about 7 o'clock in the evening, going into camp between that place and Kansas City, where the army of the border was mostly concentrated, and as the night wore on we seemed encircled by the camp fires of the rebels, which gleamed menacingly from the woods."

Col. Moonlight's report presents that—

"At the Big Blue on the 22d, the second brigade was ordered to hold Simmon's ford and report the movements of the enemy. None coming, and the first brigade at Byram's ford retreating, the second brigade in double quick whipped around by Westport and met the enemy on the state line, checked his advance into Kansas, and by the setting of the sun drove him back into Missouri. The fight continued until dark, after which the pursuit was abandoned and my command moved up to Shawnee, Missouri, for the purpose of procuring forage and rations. * * * In this fight company "G." of 11th K. V. C. escort for Maj. Gen. Curtis, joined my command on the occasion and participated in the fight, as also the howitzers under Maj. Hunt, chief of artillery."

Col. Blair, who was first ordered to take position on the Big Blue, gives more detailed and correct intelligence of the militia forces, which he arranged in line. He reports as follows concerning his position on the Big Blue:—

"Before I had the brigade equipped I received (on the morning of the 18th) an order from Gen. Curtis to move towards Independence, and to come by Westport to complete my supplies. At 8 o'clock A. M. I was on the march, and passing through Westport camped on the west side of the Big Blue, on the road from Kansas City to Independence. I spent the whole of the night and part of the next day in procuring subsistence, arms, blankets and tents, for the command. While engaged in this duty I was instructed by Gen. Curtis not to move camp until further orders from him.

"On the morning of the 20th, Lieut. Robinson, chief engineer on the staff of the commanding general, arrived from the front with orders to fortify the line of the Big Blue, as Gen.

Curtis intended making his stand on that line. The 20th and 21st were spent in examining the country, felling trees, forming abattis, obstructing fords and strengthening the defences as much as possible.

"During the 21st, the 4th regiment K. S. M., Col. McCain, and the 19th, Col. Hogan, reported to me by order of Maj. Gen. Deitzler, K. S. M., and were assigned to duty in my brigade. Capt. Dodge's 9th Wisconsin battery had also been assigned to my command in place of McLain's, taken to the front. In the evening of the 21st, all the troops having fallen back on this line, I established my command in its position of battle, where they supped, slept and breakfasted the next morning, their horses, together with all of the transportation having been sent back to Kansas City to avoid unnecessary incumbrances.

"My line of battle occupied a front of six miles, with one regiment (McCain's) still higher up at Byram's ford, where the crossing was finally effected. Two hundred and fifty of Hogan's regiment held the cavalry ford at the mouth of the Blue, three miles from the main body of the regiment, which formed my left. Next came the colored militia and the 6th regiment of K. S. M., Col. Montgomery.

"Dodge's 9th Wisconsin battery, and the colored battery, occupied a fine artillery position in the centre, cut out expressly for the occasion, supported on the right by Col. Colton's 5th regiment K. S. M. and Eve's Bourdon county battalion. At the ford two miles above was stationed Lieut. Knowles' 2d Kansas battery, supported by the 10th regiment K. S. M., while still above at Byram's ford was stationed Col. McCain's 4th regiment K. S. M. To this point Jennison's brigade was ordered, and at 11 o'clock A. M. the sound of the guns showed that the battle had commenced on our right. The 16th Kansas cavalry, and McLain's battery, which up to this time had been in my rear, were ordered off to the right to support Col. Jennison.

"I remained in position until 4 o'clock P. M., when I received orders to fall back to Kansas City. As Col. Hogan's

regiment was leaving the line to bring up the rear of the brigade, a rush was made upon him by a party of the enemy who had been concealed in the brush to his front across the creek. They waded the creek, pushed through and over the abattis of fallen trees clear up to Hogan's line, where after a short, sharp little skirmish, some twenty of them were taken prisoners and the rest driven off."

Maj. T. J. McKenny, A. A. G. and inspecting officer of my staff, reports his active efforts in the action, from which I present the following extracts:—

"Oct. 22d. On this day was fought the battle of Big Blue. The general commanding being fearful that a sufficient force had not been stationed at Byram's ford, directed me to order Maj. Gen. Deitzler to send the greater part of his force to Col. Jennison, holding that ford. Gen. Deitzler said that he could not see the necessity as there were already the 15th and 16th Kansas besides one hundred and fifty infantry, also some other troops, with four guns, at that point, but that he would send more.

"I designated an independent company numbering about one hundred which I had that day armed on my own responsibility, with arms taken from wagons going to Kansas City, as a proper force to be sent. It was understood these would be a part of the force sent. * * The general commanding being desirous of information from the front, particularly Hickman's mill, despatched me to see what could be learned. Taking the wrong road I came near Byram's ford, and there found Col. Jennison slowly falling back, and observed the enemy in his front, and a large body of men on his right flank, supposed to be the enemy. Retraced my steps and got on the Hickman's mill road, when I met this same body of men, which proved to be Col. Johnson's militia in rapid retreat. I stopped them and caused them to go to the rear slowly, at the same time I sent Col. Jennison notice. I now proceeded on my road, but had not gone far when I became satisfied that I would soon be cut off, as the enemy were already rapidly advancing, having captured many of the militia near Hickman's

mill, besides one gun. I now rode rapidly to the rear. Overtaking the militia I placed them in line of battle in the edge of the timber, with directions to hold their ground and retard the enemy's progress.

"Gen. Fishback was present and manifested the greatest willingness to meet the enemy. I afterwards learned that this regiment did good service. Night now closing in found us in a rather doubtful position.

Our forces being pressed fell back to Kansas City, where most of them arrived about 10 o'clock. The 2d Colorado, with the exception of two companies, with the 11th, 15th and 16th Kansas, remained on the field confronting the enemy."

Maj. Charlot, A. A. G., who noted the time and generally drew up my orders and reports, says, concerning this day's operations:—

"At this time (11 o'clock) Jennison was holding Byram's ford, and Moonlight, Hickle's ford. Col. Ford reported that heavy columns of the enemy were moving in direction of these fords. Gens. Deitzler and Blunt were both ordered to send forward reinforcements."

Maj. Hunt, my chief of artillery, reports of his operations:—

"The general sent me out with body guard to reinforce. Reached a distance of about two miles from town (Westport), met the militia falling back in confusion. Halted them and made them go back. Sent a messenger to Col. Jennison asking him where I could render him the most service. He informed me that the enemy was flanking him on the right and left, and for me to fall back on the Westport road to keep the enemy out of town. I did so. Met Col. Moonlight passing west to check the enemy from going into Kansas. Soon the 15th, under Col. Hoyt, also came. We all marched in double quick until we reached the Kansas prairie west of Westport. Here we deployed in line, met the enemy square in the face. I turned over the command of the body guard to Capt. Gove, and gave my services to Col. Moonlight. The enemy opened

two pieces of rifled artillery upon us at the distance of a mile, supported by Fagan's or Shelby's division. They drove us steadily from about 3 o'clock until nearly dark, when our skirmish line was reinforced. I assumed command of it and drove the enemy back some two miles, capturing several prisoners, among them a lieutenant, whom I delivered to the commanding general in Kansas that night. Col. Moonlight, Lieut. Col. Plumb, Col. Jennison, Lieut. Col. Hoyt, and other officers and men, deserve special credit for their soldier-like conduct."

Lieut. Cyrus M. Roberts, acting aid-de-camp, was ordered to carry communications to Hickman's mill, and being thus detached, reports:—

"On the 22d of October, in the afternoon, when Col. Jennison's command was attacked at Byram's ford, you ordered me at Westport, Missouri, to go to Hickman's mill, Missouri, and order all the forces that might be there, to immediately reinforce Col. Jennison. Arriving at the mill, I found Maj. John M. Laing in command of a part of the 15th K. V. C., and delivered him your order. His command was feeding. I saw also the 21st K. S. M., which was just ready to mount. I delivered your order to the colonel (Lowe) commanding, and his regiment moved forward immediately at a trot. *

* * When we arrived at the bank of the hill descending to the Big Blue, we saw right ahead of us and as far as the eye could reach, clouds of dust along the road, and knew it must be the main column of the enemy advancing. In a very few minutes, perhaps five, the 21st K. S. M. had dismounted and formed in line of battle along the brink of the hill. Those of the 21st regiment who could see the enemy, commenced firing. Their advance immediately fell back out of sight and formed in a body, but in a few minutes came forward with a yell. The 21st fired a volley into them and they fell back out of sight.

"While this was going on, Maj. Laing's command came up where the horses were held, but instead of rendering the

militia assistance they turned immediately back, leaving the militia to get out the best way they could. Several of the militia followed, but Lieut. Col. Robinson, Col. Lowe and myself, drew our weapons and kept the militia who were going away, to the front. The enemy appeared very much demoralized and did not seem to want to give us battle after this. Holding our position twenty or thirty minutes without another attack (the skirmishing still going on), we concluded to mount and pass around the enemy to the west, and join you. It was getting late, and darkness came on before we had gone a mile."

It is proper to say in this connection that I arrested Maj. Laing when this affair was reported to me, but upon explanation and in consideration of his gallantry elsewhere, I directed his release.

This report of Lieut. Roberts shows the operation in the vicinity of Hickman's mill, and also the movement of the enemy westward, at the close of the day's fighting.

This repulse by the militia was a gallant affair and must have greatly annoyed the rebels, who found resistance on all sides of them. Other staff officers, Maj. Weed, Maj. Curtis, Capt. Meeker, of the signal corps, Surgeon Davis, Lieut. Robinson, were all active in carrying out my orders. My volunteer aids, Hon. Senators Lane and Pomeroy, were earnest and very efficient in the field. Senator Pomeroy was especially active in bringing the militia forward and correcting their impressions as to the movements, while Senator Lane's experience in former campaigns in Mexico and upon the Kansas border, enabled him to be of much service in the field everywhere. Col. Crawford, Col. Roberts, Col. Richey and Col. Cloud, of my volunteer aids, all of whom had experience and zeal to stimulate their exertions, were active, efficient and useful throughout this and other days of this campaign. Surgeon Davis and Surgeon Harvey were active in their care of the wounded.

Reference to the accompanying map will show the scope of operations during the day, and the general result.

Our left and centre had not been moved by the enemy, and although our extreme right had been pressed back, our closing efforts were encouraging. The enemy now having possession south of us, after night concealed our movements I ordered the main force to take position within the lines of fortifications which surrounded Kansas City, where they could get rest and supplies, to which place I moved my own headquarters.

About 6 o'clock of this evening I also received verbal intelligence of the arrival of Gen. Rosecrans' advance, under Maj. Gen. Pleasanton, with cavalry at Independence, where it was stated he had struck Gen. Price's rear. This intelligence came about 6 o'clock in the evening, and being circulated among my forces, inspired new hopes and energies in the army of the border.

BATTLE OF WESTPORT.

Night closing the battle of Big Blue on the 22d, I ordered my troops under cover of the darkness, to concentrate within the lines of field-works that enclosed Kansas City, Missouri, only a small force remaining in front of Westport near the long line of camp-fires that marked the position and vastly superior numbers of the rebel forces. The citizens and soldiers had so improved the natural strength of Kansas City as to make this position almost impregnable, and being well furnished with food, forage and ammunition, I replenished exhausted stores and secured my weary soldiers a few hours repose, which after so many days of marching, watching and fighting, we all very much needed. But in view of to-morrow, my officers were put to a new test of their power of endurance.

The enemy had halted south of Westport, and some five or six miles south of Kansas City, where he could either turn my new right flank, which rested on Turkey creek, or attack in front at his leisure. I therefore determined to renew the offensive on his own ground with my main force, leaving heavy artillery, unmounted militia and the home guards of the city, to hold the line of entrenchments to fall back upon if occa-

sion required. A despatch from Maj. Frank Eno, St. Louis, October 22d, informed me that Gen. Rosecrans was at 1:30 P. M. to-day, fifteen miles from Lexington, but a scout from his cavalry advance reported Gen. Pleasanton at Independence, only nine miles from Kansas City. Militia also came in to reinforce me, and compensate for the considerable losses of the day.

I directed Gens. Blunt and Deitzler to personally supervise preparations, and have the troops to commence moving at 3 o'clock in the morning; and all of my staff not then engaged locating the troops for the night were also directed to assist in notifying and replenishing the militia for the proposed attack of the enemy at daylight the next morning. A verbal message was also sent to Gen. Pleasanton giving him information of my purpose. Gen. Pomeroy volunteered to locate troops at the crossing of the Kansas river, so as to apprise me of any movement around my right flank. The officers all heartily united and labored most of the night in efforts to have everything ready for a united, powerful attack on the rebel camp at daylight.

Our regular volunteers with the artillery, moved early in the morning of the 23d, and were deployed into line of battle two miles south of Westport and Brush creek, which is shown on the map accompanying this report. This stream lies east and west, and is skirted by a dense forest some two miles wide. This advance of Gen. Blunt was soon attacked by overwhelming odds and gradually fell back. The militia came up and deployed under Col. Blair on the right, but not sufficient to maintain the advanced position. Our troops fought desperately and sometimes repulsed the enemy, but gradually fell back to the north side of Brush creek.

After directing Gen. Deitzler and Col. Cotes (who commanded the Missouri militia) to put the whole male population about Kansas City on duty in the trenches of that place, I pressed forward all the mounted forces and joined Gen. Blunt at Westport at half-past seven, where I found our forces as last mentioned.

The enemy had advanced his skirmishers so as to occupy the timber south of Brush creek, while our troops occupied the timber on the north side. As the militia were coming forward I ordered a reconnoissance to the left and front, also sending Maj.¹ Curtis in that direction with orders to find and report matters to Gen. Pleasanton, and directed also the further extension of our lines to the right. From the roof of the hotel, where I found Gen. Blunt, we could see beyond Brush creek the rebel forces deployed in endless lines on the open prairie.

McLain's battery was on the brow of the north bank of Brush creek, and near the road; Dodge's 9th Wisconsin battery to his right. We also had about twenty other pieces of artillery, mostly mountain howitzers, with cavalry, taking positions as their supporting squadrons came into line. Meantime continued firing was kept up by skirmishers and artillery on both sides with but little damage to either after taking position named, on opposite sides of Brush creek.

About 11 o'clock I went myself to the right of our lines and led the militia forward as skirmishers. I tried to get through the timber with Dodge's battery and two little howitzers of my escort, but the roads were not favorable and I left the further movement of the right to Col. Blair, who was soon after joined by Gen. Deitzler. I was directed by an old man, a Missouri patriot of seventy-five years, through a narrow defile to Brush creek, with Dodge's battery and other forces. With trembling, sinking steps, the old man directed us to a position where we immediately began to demonstrate against the enemy that occupied the inclined plane and wooded heights on the south of Brush. The weary veteran refused to ride, but sunk down with delight and exhaustion when he saw the success of our guns. Like many other brave Missourians of that day, he saw the rebellion vanishing before him, and his home and country free.

Moving further down Brush creek to the left, I found Cols. Ford and Jennison skirmishing fiercely, and evidently successfully, pressing the enemy back. Thinking it a favorable time

I immediately ordered a cavalry charge, one by the main road and another by the road leading to the left and front, supported by advancing skirmishers and second lines. At the same time I directed Gen. Blunt to advance in support with McLain's battery and other artillery. The cavalry charges led by Lieut. Col. Hoyt and Capt. Thompson, dashed forward with a terrible shout, carrying the heights and stone fences, which were immediately occupied by our main forces, and I soon saw our main line extending far away on my right, emerging from the dark forests of Brush creek.

The enemy was soon overpowered, and after a violent and desperate struggle, fell back to another elevation on the broad prairie, and opened their artillery and cavalry to their utmost ability in a vain attempt to check our general movement.

Our militia continued to come swarming out of the forest, displaying a length and strength of numbers that surprised me. Their movement was steady, orderly and gallant. Every piece of artillery, especially the little howitzers, was in active fire, showing artillery enough to represent an army of fifty thousand. This display of force, rather than effective fire, seemed to cause the enemy to increase his distance before us, while we steadily advanced all arms over a beautiful prairie, where both armies were in full view.

It was at this time about half past 11 A. M., I telegraphed you and my anxious friends in the rear that the victory was ours. At about 12 M. the guns of Gen. Pleasanton were heard on our left, and at 2 P. M. his lines were in full and successful co-operation on the left. The enemy's retiring movement was immediately changed to a complete rout, and our troops took up the pursuit at full speed.

I met with Gen. Pleasanton at a farm house on Indian creek, where he related to me his movements, which had also commenced early in the morning, and included active operations most of the day. To give a full detail of matters I submit the reports of my associate officers, but especially the following extracts. Gen. Blunt says,—

“All the night of the 22d was occupied in getting in ammunition and subsistence to my command, with the view of commencing the attack upon the enemy at daylight the following morning. Daylight on the morning of the 23d revealed the enemy in force, on the open prairie directly south of Westport, and about two miles distant. Col. C. W. Blair’s brigade of state militia was ordered out from Kansas City at 3 o’clock A. M., and at daylight my whole command was in motion, moving in columns through Westport and across Brush creek, and soon after sunrise the 1st, 2d and 4th brigades were deployed into line of battle on the south side of the timber skirting Brush creek, where Shelby’s division of Price’s army was advancing upon my line.

Skirmishers were thrown forward, and the engagement with small arms and artillery soon became general. My advance line being hard pressed, I ordered Col. C. W. Blair to advance with the 6th and 10th regiments state militia, to support the right of my line and guard my right flank, which order was executed with great promptness. Time being required to get the militia arriving from Kansas City dismounted and in position, and the contest in front being severe and unequal, I directed my advance line to fall back to the north side of Brush creek. The enemy advanced a short distance, but did not attempt to attack my second line, with the exception of a small force that approached through the timber to attack my left flank. This force was promptly repulsed by the 5th and 19th regiments of the state militia under Cols. Colton and Hogan.

Maj. Gen. Deitzler, K. S. M., reports:—

“On the morning of the 23d I received instructions from the commanding general to remain at Kansas City, and to place the artillery and infantry in position in the intrenchments, and hurry to the front. About 9 o’clock A. M. I directed Brig. Gen. Sherry, K. S. M., to assume command of the works in Kansas City, and proceeded to Westport. There had been some severe fighting all the morning in the vicinity of Westport, and some brilliant charges by the 15th and 16th

Kansas volunteer cavalry, which were received with great stubbornness and resulted in heavy loss to the enemy, but no ground was gained by our side.

“When I arrived at the front the firing had ceased, and I found our forces formed on the bluff on the north side of Brush creek, the left resting on the road leading from Westport to Hickman’s mill, and the enemy on the south side of said creek beyond the woods. The Kansas militia were dismounted and the horses sent to the rear, and as soon as the formation was completed our forces were ordered by Maj. Gen. Curtis to advance with Gen. Blunt on the left, and myself on the right. The personal presence of Maj. Gen. Curtis inspired the men with confidence, and the whole command moved forward in perfect order through the dense underbrush, and as they emerged from the woods on the south side of Brush creek they encountered the enemy in strong force, and after a severe struggle, in which our troops showed great bravery, drove him from his chosen position.

“Taking advantage of the confusion which occurred in the enemy’s line at this time, our victorious force advanced rapidly into the open field, firing volley after volley into the flying rebels, killing and wounding large numbers who were left in our hands.

“Both armies were now in full view of each other on the open prairie, presenting one of the most magnificent spectacles in nature. The enemy made several attempts to stand, but such was the daring bravery of our troops that they never succeeded in rallying and forming their men to offer any considerable resistance. A running fight was then kept up for about four miles, the enemy slowly retreating in a southerly direction parallel with, and about a mile from the state line in Missouri, where Gen. Rosecrans’ advance under Maj. Gen. Pleasanton, made its appearance some distance from the right of the enemy, and opened upon them with artillery. At this point the retreat became a perfect rout, and the enemy running in great confusion southward were soon out of sight. Their course was indicated by dense columns of smoke ema-

nating from their burning of the prairie, hay, grain, stacks, &c. I accompanied the pursuit a short distance beyond the Blue, where we were joined by Maj. Gen. Pleasanton and staff.

“After consultation with that officer, it was decided that the United States forces under Gens. Curtis and Pleasanton, were sufficient to follow the rebel horde and to drive them beyond the states of Missouri and Kansas, whereupon I requested and obtained permission from the general commanding, to order the militia to their several counties, except the 5th, 6th and 10th regiments, all from southern Kansas, who continued with the pursuit to Fort Scott, from whence they were sent to their homes.”

Col. Ford, of 2d Colorado, reports:—

“Early on the morning of the 23d, I was ordered with my brigade through Westport. I formed a portion of the 2d Colorado and 16th Kansas on the hill immediately south of Brush creek, with one section of the battery, but soon after advanced to the edge of the prairie and took up position across the road to the left of Col. Jennison’s brigade, the section of the battery being placed in the road. For a while the firing was exclusively artillery, but the rebels advancing, the whole line was soon engaged, and kept up a very steady and galling fire for two hours and more.

(To be continued.)

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