

1863. The first official intelligence apparatus in the U.S. Army, the BMI provided key information—gleaned from Richmond spy rings, newspapers, and scouts—which Grant used to defeat Lee.

A lack of information could make a command inert and vulnerable, as in George McClellan's case. Grant realized early on that all generals, including the enemy, face this dilemma, but instead of endlessly waiting for perfect intelligence, he boldly took the initiative. He made mistakes. At Shiloh, according to Feis, it was Grant's belief that the Confederates were unable and unwilling to attack that led to the disastrous first day, not an intelligence failure. More important was Grant and the BMI's failure to discover and prevent Jubal Early's Shenandoah Valley raid in the summer of 1864. Feis argues that such miscues were often the result of general human failings such as the misperception and wishful thinking that afflict all judgments. More than mere exculpation, Feis illustrates the difficulties of generalship while demonstrating how Grant the man both persevered and excelled.

Feis's pioneering approach sheds light on Grant but precludes much contextual analysis. In other words, Grant is somewhat in a vacuum here. One hopes that Feis will undertake a scrutiny of the intelligence used by other Civil War generals—especially Robert E. Lee—for comparison. But with this portrait Feis challenges the view of Grant as the butcher of Cold Harbor winning only with superior numbers. The lens of intelligence shows Grant as a complex figure calculating with intellect and instinct. Despite Sherman's statement to the contrary, Grant really did "Care a Damn for What the Enemy Does Out of His Sight," to devastating effect (267).

Struggle for the Heartland: The Civil War along the Mississippi Corridor, by Joseph W. Foulke. Pittsburgh: Dorrance Publishing Co., Inc., 2001. 310 pp. Maps, notes, illustrations, appendixes, bibliography, index. \$23.00 paper.

Reviewer Terry L. Beckenbaugh is assistant professor of history at McNeese State University in Lake Charles, Louisiana. His research and writing have focused on Civil War general Samuel Ryan Curtis.

In *Struggle for the Heartland*, Joseph W. Foulke tackles a broad subject: the Civil War in the Mississippi River valley. Foulke argues that eventual Union victory resulted from events in the West, specifically the Federal conquest of the Mississippi River valley. He highlights Iowans' valuable contributions to the war effort, especially in the West.

Unfortunately, *Struggle for the Heartland* is riddled with errors. The work suffers from sloppy proofreading. For example, on page one Fort Sumter is misspelled "Fort Sumpter." Grammatical and typographical errors are sprinkled liberally throughout the text. There are also factual mistakes, beginning on page one when Foulke correctly states that South Carolina seceded first but does not explain why (the election of Republican Abraham Lincoln in November 1860) and then asserts, "In due course other Southern states would succeed [*sic*], eleven in all." This treats the secession of the eleven slave states as one event, when in reality there were two distinct waves. The initial seven states of the Confederacy broke away between December 1860 and February 1861. Only after Fort Sumter and Lincoln's call on the states for 75,000 volunteers to put down the insurrection in April 1861 did four more states secede from the Union. On page 38 Foulke repeats the story of James "Wild Bill" Hickok's role in the Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, on March 6-8, 1862. Yet according to the best monograph on the battle, William Shea and Earl Hess's *Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West* (1992), Hickok did not participate in the battle and did not even belong to the Army of the Southwest. Foulke also does not properly document his sources. It is difficult to ascertain his sources of information due to inconsistent and spotty footnoting. Throughout the text there are long passages that are not common knowledge that go unfootnoted. Foulke also fails to use the latest scholarship. For example, his discussion of Wilson's Creek does not cite William Garrett Piston and Richard W. Hatcher III's fine monograph on that battle, *Wilson's Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It* (2000). This is only a sampling of the major problems.

The strength of *Struggle for the Heartland* is Foulke's research on Iowa regiments, but there are drawbacks there as well. Appendix B lists all the Iowa regiments, when and where they enrolled, and the major campaigns each fought in, yet does not list when and where they mustered out. Perhaps Foulke should have focused on the Iowa contribution to the war effort. There are better general studies on the struggle for the Mississippi River valley, such as Stephen D. Engle's *Struggle for the Heartland: Campaigns from Fort Henry to Corinth* (2001). Although more limited in scope, Engle's work, published one month after Foulke's, holds to a higher standard of scholarship and is still appropriate for a general audience.

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