

struggle against slavery. He might have included among them a number of Ohioans who migrated to Iowa in the early 1850s to continue the struggle here: J. H. B. Armstrong at Cincinnati; Richard Sherer and the other "Free Presbyterians" who founded the Wittenberg Church and Manual Arts College north of Newton; and Rev. John Todd and his followers, antislavery Congregationalists from Oberlin who sought to establish an "Oberlin of the West" at Tabor in southwest Iowa.

Iowa readers may be surprised to read that the brothers Edwin and Barclay Coppoc of the Quaker settlement at Springdale in Cedar County, Iowa, "hailed from the underground stronghold of Salem, Ohio" (124). Actually, they *were* born in Salem, Ohio, and later relocated to Springdale. After Edwin's execution for his part in John Brown's raid at Harper's Ferry, his body was returned to Salem, Ohio, for burial.

Both Griffler and Blight pay tribute to pioneer historian Wilbur Siebert's classic study, *The Underground Railroad from Slavery to Freedom* (1898; reprint, 1968). Blight reminds us that "all students of the Underground Railroad are forever in Siebert's debt" for his vast collection of reminiscences assembled in 38 scrapbook volumes, including three from Iowa (238), but he charges that Siebert used that material uncritically. Blight notes that one of Siebert's Iowa correspondents called the Underground Railroad the new source of romance, sure to "thrill the heart and quicken the pulse" (239). Griffler chides Siebert for romanticizing the heroics of white abolitionists, but notes that no one has done more to shape our historical memory of the Underground Railroad and ensure that these heroic deeds were remembered. Perhaps Iowa historians should take a fresh look to see how late nineteenth-century Iowans selectively remembered their role.

The Union Divided: Party Conflict in the Civil War North, by Mark E. Neely Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. xi, 257 pp. Notes, index. \$24.95 cloth, \$15.95 paper.

Reviewer Jennifer L. Weber is assistant professor of history at the University of Kansas. Her book, *Copperheads*, is forthcoming from Oxford University Press.

For well over a generation now, Civil War historians have accepted as an article of faith the argument that one reason the North won was its political system. This thesis, articulated most prominently by Eric McKittrick, holds that the political parties of the Union were able to channel sentiment, especially dissent. Because the Confederacy did not have political parties, attacks on Jefferson Davis and his government came from all sides. No coalition had to propose an alternative for how to do things, and a lack of patronage (one of the real prerequisites

of power in the mid-nineteenth century) meant there was no way to keep partisans in line or to reward the faithful.

Mark E. Neely Jr. does not buy the claim. In *The Union Divided* he argues that there is little evidence that the party system helped the North win the war; in fact, he says, parties may have done more harm than good. As he accurately points out, the idea of a "party system" is something that did not exist at the time. Americans were still working out what it meant to have parties: How many parties were normative? (Abraham Lincoln, for instance, led a field of four candidates in the 1860 presidential election.) What did one mean by a loyal opposition? Most importantly, could there *be* a loyal opposition during wartime?

This last question is the issue at the heart of this book. Troops from Illinois threatened to march on Springfield in 1863 and toss out the duly elected Democratic state legislature; all they needed, they said, was the nod from either the president or the governor. In Illinois and Indiana, the governors basically put their respective legislatures out of business when they were controlled by Democrats. Republican editors nodded approvingly when some of their Democratic counterparts were imprisoned. (One of the more famous imprisoned editors was Dubuque's Dennis Mahony, who was arrested in August 1862 and wrote about his experiences in the "bastille" after his release. But neither Mahony nor any other Iowan figures into this account.) In Washington, Democrats in Congress had virtually no role in determining the course of the nation, Neely says. All of this considered, how does party make a difference?

It's a fair and provocative question. Neely says at the outset that he is more interested in raising the issue than answering it. That is good, because his efforts to deal with it are disappointing. Most crucially, Neely tends most of the time to deal with the Democrats as a uniform group. They were not. The party was deeply divided on the question of how to fight the war or whether to fight it at all. One could use this evidence to press the argument further about a weak—at best—"party system," but one could also argue that the fact that the party did *not* split supports McKittrick's argument that parties channel dissent. While Neely on occasion acknowledges the division among Democrats, he does not grapple with its implications for his argument. Similarly, he gives a nod to the differences among Republicans—especially those between the Radicals and the moderates such as Lincoln—but he does not really confront the implications of that divide, either. The fact that the dissidents were ultimately brought to heel, sometimes through Lincoln co-opting their ideas and then moderating them, suggests that there is something to McKittrick's argument about how parties function.

Neely succeeds in provoking second thoughts about the "party system" argument. However, he fails to persuade that the time has come to dismiss it.

Vicksburg: The Campaign That Opened the Mississippi, by Michael B. Ballard. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. xv, 490 pp. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. \$39.95 cloth.

Reviewer Earl J. Hess is associate professor of history at Lincoln Memorial University. His latest book is *Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861–1864* (2005).

Despite the size, duration, and significance of the several Union efforts to seize Vicksburg during the Civil War, no one has until now written a one-volume history of these campaigns that combines broad coverage with some degree of depth and modern analysis. The largest study yet published remains Edwin C. Bearss's three-volume *The Vicksburg Campaign* (1985–86). On the other end of the spectrum of size, recent shorter studies of Vicksburg include William L. Shea and Terrence J. Winschel's *Vicksburg Is the Key: The Struggle for the Mississippi River*, (2003), and Winschel's *Triumph and Defeat: The Vicksburg Campaign* (1999). All of these studies offer unique contributions to our understanding of the campaigns.

Michael B. Ballard's new book fills a comfortable and necessary role between the detail of Bearss's three-volume study and the conciseness of the Shea-Winschel volumes. Ballard, university archivist and coordinator of the congressional and political research center at Mississippi State University, has authored the standard biography of the major Confederate commander at Vicksburg, John C. Pemberton, and thus is well qualified to take on a project such as this. He covers Vicksburg in all its aspects, from May 18, 1862, through July 27, 1863. Thus he includes Farragut's attempt to take the city in the summer of 1862, Grant's northern Mississippi campaign in November–December 1862, Sherman's Chickasaw Bayou campaign, McClelland's capture of Arkansas Post, Grant's several efforts to find a way to outflank Vicksburg in the winter of 1863, his brilliant campaign to the rear of the city in May 1863, the first Jackson campaign, the siege of Vicksburg, and the second Jackson campaign.

Ballard gives us our first good one-volume history of this string of events. His primary focus is strategy and grand tactics (it would be impossible to include minor tactics as well). He brings in civilian aspects, soldiers' attitudes toward emancipation, and the postwar history of the battlefield. He offers readers a particularly good summary

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