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MAJOR-GENERAL G. M. DODGE.

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One of the first responses to the patriotic impulse inspired by the fall of Fort Sumter was from a young civil engineer of Council Bluffs. He was probably as well equipped for the business of war as any man who entered the service from Iowa. He was an earnest patriot. He was thoroughly in sympathy with the administration of President Lincoln. He possessed the industry and tenacity of a New England ancestry. He had a taste for military studies, and love for military drill and tactics. He had graduated at a school of civil engineering, and subsequently at a private military academy. He had been employed in the location of railroad lines, and in the construction of railroads. He had a trained eye, capable of taking in a strategic situation at a glance. He had been engaged in freighting upon the western plains, until he was physically hardened and prepared for the deprivations of the camp and the hardships of the march. He was self-reliant when intrusted with discretionary power, and had the instinct of military subordination when acting under the immediate command of a superior officer. He was a disciplinarian, and yet thoroughly in sympathy with the democratic instincts of the volunteer soldiery. He was alert, active, enterprising and untiring. Such are the attributes which constitute the ideal soldier, and these were elements in the character of General Grenville Mellen Dodge, of whose career the following pages are an imperfect recital.

He was born at Putnamville, Danvers, Massachusetts, April 12, 1831. When but ten years old an ambition to obtain an education became the ruling passion of his life. To secure advantages beyond those offered by the common school, which he had been able to attend during the winter months only—with the same force of character which distinguished him in after life—he for a time drove a butcher's cart; then for three years had charge of the fruit and vegetable farm of Mrs. Edward Lander, the products of which he marketed in Salem. During the time that his summers were occupied in this severe toil, he was engaged in the winter months as a clerk in a small store at South Danvers, to which the postoffice was attached, and where his father was the postmaster. Even whilst his time was thus occupied, he found occasional leisure hours, especially during the long winter evenings, to devote to study.

In the winter of 1845-6 he attended the academy at Durham, New Hampshire; and in 1846 entered Norwich University of Vermont, in the scientific department. In 1850 he graduated from this school as a civil engineer; and in the following year from Captain Partridge's Military Academy. Immediately after his graduation, armed with his diploma as a civil engineer, he left for the West and located in Peru, Illinois. Here he was engaged for a few months in city and land surveys; and during the closing weeks of 1851 was employed by the Illinois Central Railroad Company in making a survey for that road between Dixon and Bloomington.

Following this, he secured a position as civil engineer under Peter A. Dey, at Tiskilwa, Illinois, on the Chicago and Rock Island Railroad; and was entrusted with the survey of the Peoria branch. He remained with Mr. Dey, with headquarters at Iowa City, until the final location of the Mississippi & Missouri River Railroad across the State from Davenport to Council Bluffs, and was the assistant engineer during the construction of this road from Davenport to Iowa City. Early in his connection with these surveys he wrote a letter to his home in Massachusetts prophesying the building of the Pacific Railroad, and indicating the very route upon which

eighteen years afterwards he was chiefly instrumental in locating it. The Pacific Railroad enterprise grew to be an ever present project in his active and restless mind. So, in 1853, he made a reconnaissance west of the Missouri river, and up the Platte, with the view of determining its probable location. And from 1853 to 1861, as he could secure the leisure from his other exacting business enterprises, he continued these explorations. Whilst they were largely the voluntary pastimes of his projective mind, yet he was always aided and encouraged by Mr. Henry Farnham and Mr. Thomas C. Durant, who were his early and constant friends.

November 11, 1854, he settled in Council Bluffs, and in addition to his engineering projects, engaged in the business of freighting across the plains, in which he was more or less interested up to 1860; having visited in connection with his business, and for traffic with various Indian tribes, the valley of Cherry Creek, at the very point where Denver now stands, and many of the settlements in New Mexico. He was also instrumental in establishing the banking house of Baldwin & Dodge, which was afterwards merged into the Pacific National Bank, of which he became president. It is now the Council Bluffs Savings Bank, of which his brother, N. P. Dodge, is the president. With all these enterprises engaging his attention, he found time, in 1856, to organize and drill a military company, known as the Council Bluffs Guards, of which he was elected Captain, and which maintained its organization until 1861.

When Fort Sumter was fired upon, and the call for 75,000 troops was issued by the President, he immediately tendered his own services, and, with the approval of his men, that of his independent company, to the Governor. His services were declined, as the Governor did not deem it wise at that time to draw any military forces from the western border of the State. Governor Kirkwood, however, appointed him to a position on his staff, and sent him to Washington to obtain arms and ammunition with which to arm the independent companies of the State, in order to be in readiness to repel any attempted inva-

sion upon the Missouri border. Notwithstanding the failure of the Congressional delegation to secure these arms, upon his representation to the authorities of the dangers threatening the southern border of the State, and of the propriety and practicability of committing its defense to the State, he procured an order for 6,000 stand of arms and the required ammunition.

The military judgment and resolute persistency with which he pursued his purpose while at Washington convinced the War Department that he possessed the characteristics to make a useful officer in a military command. He was accordingly tendered a Captaincy in the Regular Army. This he declined, not because the offer was not a flattering recognition of his zeal and ability, but because he had tendered his services to the Governor of the State, and had been entrusted with an important mission which he regarded as binding him in honor to cast his lot with the military fortunes of Iowa. Upon his declining the Captaincy, the Secretary of War was so impressed with his natural military capacity that he suggested by letter to the Governor that it would advance the public interest to give him the Colonelcy of a regiment. Immediately upon his return from Washington he was appointed Colonel of the Fourth Iowa Infantry, and adopting his independent company, of Council Bluffs, as the nucleus of the organization, he entered upon the duty of recruiting and organizing a regiment. To comprehend fully the difficulties that confronted him in this undertaking, it must be understood that the regiment was recruited after the first flush of enthusiasm at the beginning of the war had abated, and was largely drawn from the Missouri Slope, then but sparsely populated, by pioneers who had just begun the struggle of laying the foundations of new homes in a new country. But the military service had now become the absorbing thought of his intense mind; and night and day he pursued the one purpose until he was ready to mount his horse and give the command to march. Before he had assembled the entire command and had fully completed the organization, with his natural alertness and enterprise he

began to look about for somebody to whip. During the summer Colonel Poindexter, a Confederate partisan, had been hanging about the northwestern border of Missouri, threatening the settlements in southwestern Iowa, and particularly breaking into the traffic of the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad. So Colonel Dodge took such of his Regiment as were available, drove him into southwestern Missouri, and for the time being broke up his command. He then returned to Council Bluffs and completed the organization of his regiment. His success in recruiting had secured the enlistment of a larger number of men than was necessary for a single regiment; so he asked and obtained authority to organize in connection with it a battery of artillery, known as Dodge's Battery, but appearing in the Iowa Roster as the Second Iowa Battery. As the time approached for moving with his command to report for duty, difficulties thickened and annoying delays resulted from the apparent impossibility of securing, in presence of the overwhelming demands upon the Government, the necessary equipments and supplies for his regiment and battery. These obstacles, however, he overcame by pledging his own credit for their necessary outfit.

In August, 1861, he reported with his regiment and battery to General Fremont, at St. Louis, and was ordered to Rolla, Missouri.

He had now reached a position where the unwearying activities of his mind could find employment. His fitness for independent discretion was soon recognized, and he was assigned to the command of the Post. Missouri at this time was a harvest field of partisan border warfare. While the State did not attempt by formal action to secede from the Union, a large minority at least of its population were Secessionists. It supplied to the Confederate Government a good-sized army, and a convention of Secessionists in some remote hiding-place had even adopted a rebel constitution and had put in operation a traveling State government. George G. Vest, one of the present United States Senators, was sent as a Senator to Richmond. The hostile sentiment, dividing the

population which remained at home, made the State a rich recruiting ground for active rebel fugitives who possessed too much brigandism to enter the regular rebel service, in which to some extent the principles of civilized warfare were enforced. They, therefore, remained in the State and called around them adventurous followers who sympathized with the Rebellion, and whom they organized into semi-military commands with which they went trooping through the country preying upon any of the population known to have Union proclivities. And whenever they could fall upon a small detachment of Union soldiers, remote from military support, they would if possible lead them into an ambush, where, in the language of the day, they could "bushwhack" them. The social condition of the State is illustrated by a circumstance related to me by a neighbor of mine in Fort Dodge. At the beginning of the war he lived in Missouri. In the spring of 1861 he went with his brother-in-law to hunt cattle which they supposed had strayed into a rough and unsettled portion of the State, and were absent from home when Fort Sumter was fired upon. Whilst returning, they met a man from the settlements who had heard the news and who told them that the President had called for 75,000 men with which to put down the Rebellion. "Well," said my neighbor's brother-in-law, "if that is the case, I am going with the South." The other said, "I shall stay by the old flag and the old Government." And without dismounting they shook hands, bade each other good-bye and parted, not to meet again until after the close of the war. The spirit of treason and ruffianism had been schooled and hardened by six years of turmoil in the vain attempt, by armed interference and invasion, to force slavery upon Kansas. Colonel Dodge was of the right mould to deal with a population composed of these chaotic elements. He had the judicial mind which enabled him to weigh and balance causes; and yet he was firm and unbending in his devotion to the Union and its friends.

In war as in other avocations men are fitted by temperament and character for the various requirements of the service. A

man may be competent to command a regiment or a brigade, and as part of a larger command would be a most gallant and reliable officer. But give that very officer an independent command, and he might have neither the enterprise nor alertness to discover and guard the exposed points of his command, to explore the roads which should be picketed, or to meander the streams and sound the fords which should be watched. But the man who, when a civil engineer of the Mississippi & Missouri Railroad, had found time to explore the unsettled and Indian-haunted region between the Missouri River and the summits of the Rocky Mountains, impelled solely by the activity and energy of his nature, was not the kind of a man to be caught napping in an enemy's country. He could divine the purpose of an enemy because he knew what he would be doing himself, if he was in the place of that enemy. Col. Dodge's command at Rolla illustrates his metal. By personal inspection, and through his scouts, he explored every road and meandered every stream for miles around; acquainted himself with the geography of the country; knew the movements of every partisan guerrilla chieftain; and was informed, and furnished information to the commander of the Department, of the various movements connected with the organization of the Rebel army in southwestern Missouri. During the time he was in command at Rolla he brought order out of chaos in the territory over which his jurisdiction extended.

When General Samuel R. Curtis organized the army of the southwest, Col. Dodge was assigned to command the First Brigade of the Fourth Division, commanded by Acting Brigadier General Eugene A. Carr. In the movement to drive Price and his army from Missouri, which resulted in the battle of Pea Ridge, he led the advance upon Springfield, where it was supposed Price would offer battle. In this connection General Carr, in his report, relates a somewhat amusing incident. On the morning of the day the command marched into Springfield, his division, with Dodge's brigade in advance, arrived at a point about five miles from the town before daylight, where

he ordered a halt, to give time for the other divisions to come up and deploy. But one company of the Fourth Iowa, which had been thrown forward as skirmishers, did not get the order and pushed forward into Springfield, which had been evacuated during the night, capturing quite a number of prisoners and a large quantity of stores.

The Army of the Southwest scarcely halted at Springfield, but pushed on into northwestern Arkansas, whither Price had fled. As Price fell back he was joined by various detachments from Arkansas; and as his army was augmented by these reinforcements, he would half resolve on giving his pursuers battle. Finally, at Sugar Creek, he made quite a determined stand, but after a brisk skirmish, led by the Fourth Division, in which Col. Dodge's brigade took a prominent part, a cavalry charge was ordered, when the enemy again retreated. Price now moved to the vicinity of Boston Mountains where he was joined by General McCulloch with eleven regiments, and by General Pike with five regiments; which gave him an army of 30,000 troops. To oppose these, all told, General Curtis had but 12,095 men. With these he had to protect his long line of communications by leaving garrisons at Marshfield, Springfield, Cassville, and Keetsville; thus reducing his force to barely 10,500 infantry and cavalry, with which to meet and repel this enemy. General Van Dorn was in command of the combined Rebel army. General Curtis had necessarily spread his command over quite a wide territory in order to secure forage and supplies. His first and second divisions, commanded by Sigel and Asboth, were four miles from Bentonville. The fourth division was at Cross Hollow, where also was the headquarters of General Curtis, and Col. Vandever with his brigade of the fourth division was at Huntsville. On the 5th of March the commanding General learned that the entire Rebel force was marching from his rendezvous near Boston Mountains to offer battle. General Curtis immediately dispatched couriers to the division commanders with orders to march to Sugar Creek, where Col. Jefferson C. Davis, in command of the third division, was in position. The fourth division, at Cross

Hollow, twelve miles from Sugar Creek, immediately took up the line of march at 6 o'clock P. M., and arrived on the chosen battle-field at 2 o'clock A. M. The field selected by General Curtis was on the bluffs and projecting points overlooking Sugar Creek, a stream running through quite a wide valley, along which ran the main roads from Fayetteville by Bentonville to Keetsville, and also from Fayetteville by Cross Hollow to Keetsville. In the rear was a somewhat broken plain called Pea Ridge, extending back in the direction of Cross Hollow. About three miles to the rear of this position was a road running nearly parallel with Sugar Creek and with the proposed line of battle.

General Curtis anticipated, as did his subordinate officers, that the rebels would be likely to march across his flank, with the view of reaching this road in his rear. He therefore ordered Colonel Dodge to proceed to this road, and by falling the timber in reach of it, obstruct as far as possible the advance of the enemy in this direction. As was his habit this order was performed thoroughly. His command worked unceasingly until long after midnight, cutting every tree available to make a thorough obstruction. As was anticipated, daylight found the Rebel force making a flank movement to gain this road. This necessitated a change of front, which was accomplished about half past ten A. M., of the 7th. The advantage to our army of the work of General Dodge and his command in obstructing this road is thus told subsequently by General Van Dorn, in his official report: "I halted the head of my column near the point where the road by which I proposed to move diverges, threw out my pickets, and bivouacked as if for the night. But soon after dark I marched again, moving Price's division in advance, and taking the road by which I hoped before daylight to reach the rear of the enemy. Obstructions, which he had hastily thrown in the way, so impeded our march that we did not gain the Telegraph road until near ten A. M., of the 7th." Immediately after the changes which this disposition of the enemy necessitated, the new right (which before the change of front had been the left) near Elk Horn

Tavern was fiercely assailed. This was the position occupied by General Carr; and the extreme right, near Elk Horn Tavern and beyond, was the position of Colonel Dodge's brigade. Here ensued and continued with little cessation for seven long hours a most fearful engagement. At times, as the enemy would attempt some new movement in his endeavor to turn the flank of Dodge's Brigade, it would become a desperate conflict. But here the Division stood with its face to the foe; Dodge, being on the extreme right, was in the exposed position, really occupying the objective point of the enemy. General Carr asked for re-enforcements early in the day, immediately upon his discovering that with some 2,500 men he was holding at bay 10,000 or 12,000 of the enemy. But as a severe conflict was in progress in the center, where General Jeff C. Davis was in command, most of the re-enforcements that were available were diverted to the center, whilst General Curtis sent his aid to Carr, with a message which in its brevity and almost despairing tone was absolutely pathetic: "I can only ask you to persevere." And Curtis says in his report: "He did persevere, and the sad havoc in the Ninth and Fourth Iowa regiments and Phelps' Missouri and Weston's Twenty-fourth Missouri, and all the troops in that division, will show how earnest and continuous was their perseverance." Finally at 2 o'clock in the afternoon he learned that the left, occupied by Sigel and Asboth, had not been under fire during the day, whilst, in the language of his report, "the enemy had melted away in the brushy center;" and he says: "I had now resolved to bring up the left and center to meet the gathering hordes at Elk Horn Tavern." General Curtis himself accompanied General Asboth. It was about five o'clock in the afternoon when the advance of General Asboth's column reached the vicinity. The Fourth Division was nearly out of ammunition, and was slowly falling back, but fiercely contesting every inch of ground. General Curtis says in his report "that the Fourth Iowa was falling back for cartridges, in line, dressing on their colors in perfect order." He says: "Colonel Dodge came up explaining the want of cartridges, but being informed of the

reinforcements at hand, and that General Asboth was planting his batteries in the road, from which he soon opened fire, the Fourth and Ninth regiments, with fixed bayonets, though without cartridges, made a charge, driving the enemy from their front." And he says: "These two regiments won imperishable honors on that day." The batteries continued a tremendous fire, but their ammunition was finally exhausted, and darkness put an end to the conflict. The infantry lay on their arms during the night with their dead and wounded comrades scattered about them, and the following morning the conflict was opened with renewed force. General Curtis had re-adjusted his lines during the night. In the morning he confronted the enemy with a continuous line on open and comparatively unbroken ground, which admitted easy evolutions to meet the enemy at exposed points. The enemy occupied the broken ground and gorges at the head waters of Sugar Creek. The ground he occupied was not suited to movements to the right or left to reinforce points of attack. Our troops felt their advantage. The extreme right was occupied as the day before, by Dodge's brigade. After the contest had been continued for some time, the right and left wings had so far advanced as to threaten an enfilading fire upon the flanks of the enemy, when he broke and fled from the field, seeking safety in precipitous flight through gorges of the hills.

The losses tell the story of the battle. Loss of the First Division (Sigel's), 144; the Second (Asboth's), 119; the Third (Davis'), 329; the Fourth (Carr's), 701. I have always thought—and reviewing these reports thirty years after the battle has passed into history, I am confirmed in the opinion—that Sigel's efforts to reach and reinforce the Fourth division, after two o'clock on the second day of the battle, were, to say the least, not very enthusiastic. He took a circuitous route and made a leisurely march when he knew that the right of the army was holding its ground against fearful odds and at fearful cost. General Curtis in closing his report, after commending the division commanders, says: "I also again present commanders of brigades, Colonels Dodge, Osterhaus, Vandever, White,

Shaefer, Patterson and Greusel. The three first named I especially commend." General Carr says, speaking of the fierce contest on the right, the second day: "During all this time Colonel Dodge had sustained a constant engagement with the enemy. He placed himself on the hither side of the field near Clemon's house, and though immediately outnumbered and in point blank range of grape, held his position until his ammunition gave out, when he retired a short distance, waited for the enemy's approach, gave him a last volley, which checked and turned him, and then marched off the field with colors flying, and bringing his wounded men along. Colonel Dodge had three horses shot under him, one of them being struck with twenty balls, and was wounded himself, though not so severely as to leave the field."

Thus closed with a complete victory the battle of Pea Ridge. It was Colonel Dodge's first "baptism of fire," and fixed his place in the army as a cool-headed and level-headed fighter. For his service in this battle, upon the recommendation of General Halleck, he was appointed Brigadier General. Owing to his wound and hard service, after the battle of Pea Ridge, he was compelled to take a short respite from the duties of the camp and the hardships of the campaign. As soon, however, as he had recovered he was assigned to duty at Columbus, Kentucky. Here he had before him a task suited to his genius. The Mobile & Ohio Railroad had been greatly impaired, a large number of the bridges destroyed, and much of the rolling stock had been burned and made way with during the campaigns in western Kentucky and Tennessee. When Corinth was finally occupied by General Halleck's army, this railway as a line of supply became a necessity. To its reconstruction General Dodge brought his experience as a railroad engineer and railroad builder. Whilst thus engaged he found employment for his military skill in guarding the entire line from the constantly threatened raids of the guerillas. In these efforts he met and captured General Faulkner, near Island No. 10, and whipped Villipigue on the Hatchie river. And finally overcoming all obstacles, on the 26th of

June, 1862, trains were running continuously from Columbus to Corinth.

On November 15, 1862, General Grant assigned him to the command of the Second division of the Army of the Tennessee, then stationed at Corinth, Mississippi. This division originally was organized by General Grant at Cairo, and had remained under his personal command during the earlier months of his great career; and it was with this division he proved to the country his metal as a soldier. Some time after this General Dodge was assigned to the command of the District of Corinth. July 7, 1863, he was assigned to the command of the left wing of the Sixteenth Army Corps, with headquarters at Corinth.

Whilst in command at Corinth he perhaps rendered service to the Government more far-reaching—combining his military and executive duties—than any other corps commander during that period. He held the important strategic position which Corinth then was from a military standpoint: being at the junction of the Mobile & Ohio and the Memphis & Charleston railroads. It was midway between the great armies commanded by Grant, which were thundering at the gates of Vicksburg, and the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Rosecrans, with Chattanooga as the objective point. This gave General Dodge a wide opportunity for the exercise of his versatile and inexhaustible resources as a commanding officer. He was engineer and railroad manager. He organized a corps of observation, and a system of scouts, through which he kept himself informed of all the movements of the various Rebel cavalry commands which hibernated in northern Mississippi and western and middle Tennessee. Through these sources, he collected news which he furnished both Grant and Rosecrans, and which was acknowledged by both of them to be of inestimable value. On three occasions these Rebel cavalry commanders came so near Corinth, in their excursions through the country to replenish their supplies and pick up a relay of fresh horses—with the ulterior purpose of capturing any weak and unsupported detachments which they

might chance to surprise in an unwary hour—that he marched out to meet and drive them out of the country. On one occasion he moved up into Henderson county, Tennessee, and drove out the combined forces of Forest and Ferguson, who were threatening Gen. Sullivan at Jackson, driving them with loss of men and material; they barely escaping capture by fleeing east of the Tennessee river. Again, marching up the Tuscumbia valley, he drove back Forest, Van Dorn and Roddy, keeping them employed and diverting their attention until Col. Straight got fairly off upon his raid into northern Georgia. Then pushing the enemy to Town creek, he swept them from his front. In this expedition he again illustrated his unselfish interest in the entire military service, and in a brother officer. When Col. Straight arrived at Tuscumbia, after a long march from middle Tennessee, many of his horses were broken down and disabled, so General Dodge stripped his own cavalry, and his transportation teams, of every horse he could spare, and turned them over to Colonel Straight, trusting to his diminished transportation to supply his command. He also marched up the Tennessee river in the rear of Bragg's army, going as far as Decatur, and laying waste the country, to aid Gen. Rosecrans in his Chattanooga campaign; and on returning from this campaign he was followed by several hundred refugees, white and black. Whilst thus constantly employed in keeping his military fences in repair, he originated an enterprise which could only occur to an officer of his practical mind. In northern Alabama, especially in the mountainous counties, a large percentage of the population were loyal to the Government. Many of these people, when the attempt was made to draft them into the Rebel service, fled from their homes, and hiding in swamps and among the mountains, were fed by trusted friends not subject to military duty, thus eluding the Rebel authorities for weeks, and some of them for months. But late in the summer and fall of 1862, the system of espionage by the Rebel government became so thorough that they knew their hiding-places would be discovered and that they would be forced into a service, for a cause, which

they hated. So thousands of these people fled to the Union lines, and hundreds were sent north, where they either found employment, or were cared for by the Union people until the war closed. Several hundred came into the Union lines at Corinth. A great many fell in with Gen. Dodge's command when making its various campaigns to meet and repel Rebel raiders. Some of these refugees were people of social standing in the South, many of them were illiterate, but all of them had the instinct of loyalty, and a love of liberty born of the mountain air in which they had lived. Among those who came into Corinth were three brothers named Smith. The elder, Wm. H. Smith, had been a Judge of the court in northern Alabama, and after the close of the war, was for two years Governor of the State. From these refugees Gen. Dodge determined to raise a cavalry regiment. Procuring authority from the War Department, he secured the enlistment of such as were willing to serve in the army, then at Corinth; and as fast as others came into our lines, able-bodied and of suitable age, he gave them the choice of enlisting or going north. Thus he raised a full regiment which he officered largely from trained soldiers who had been either privates or officers in northern regiments. For the colonel he took Captain Geo. E. Spencer, who was his assistant Adjutant General. For the lieutenant colonel he selected George L. Godfrey, the Adjutant of the Second Iowa Infantry, who had proved himself a most gallant and reliable officer. For many of the company officers he selected privates from northern regiments who had proved their qualities as soldiers. After he was assigned to the command of a corps in the field, Col. Spencer was detailed as his Chief of Staff, leaving Lieutenant Colonel Godfrey in command of the First Alabama Cavalry, which became a most effective and gallant regiment.

He also while at Corinth, and during his occupancy of middle Tennessee, organized and put into service five regiments of colored soldiers. He was a pioneer in the organization of colored troops, and pushed forward the experiment, even while the proposition to arm the colored men was unpopular in the

army. There was a large number of able-bodied colored refugees within our lines at Corinth, and of course a practical, common-sense officer like General Dodge would begin to consider how he could utilize able-bodied people whom he had to feed and yet were of no service to the Government. So he organized a regiment of laborers to be used in loading and unloading cars, in working on the railroads, as repairers, in policing the camp, etc. He officered them and organized them into a command similiar to a regiment. And as soon as the authority to enlist and arm them as soldiers was granted, it was not twenty-four hours until General Dodge had them equipped and in readiness for the muster and the drill. The writer remembers, at the beginning of the experiment in raising colored troops, hearing General Dodge talk with an officer who was skeptical in regard to the wisdom of enlisting the colored man as a soldier. Of course this opponent of arming the negro argued that he would not fight—that putting arms into his hands was equivalent to turning them over to the rebels, because the rebels would eventually capture the colored soldier and his musket. The reply of General Dodge will never be forgotten, as it was so emphatic and complete. Said he: "You need not tell me the negro will not fight. His nature is to fight. The African tribes in their native barbarism are in a constant state of war. Occasionally one village or tribe will swoop down upon another and literally wipe out the inhabitants at the cost of more than half the lives of the combatants on both sides. Give these people the confidence which the drill and the use of fire-arms inspire, and put at their head brave and intelligent officers, and I'll take the chances on their fighting." How literally true was this diagnosis of the negro soldier. There was not during the War of the Rebellion a more heroic charge than that made by Col. Shaw at the head of the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Colored Infantry upon Fort Wagner.

There was another branch of the military service at Corinth which was perhaps more important and difficult of proper performance than anything else with which General Dodge had

to deal. It was the sort of semi-civil government he had to administer over the citizens in the hostile territory. This authority he exercised with unbending firmness, and yet was careful to refrain from an unnecessary and harassing show of military interference with the individual. In this connection one of the most embarrassing matters which came under his jurisdiction was the Treasury permits to certain civilians to deal in cotton, paying to the Government a royalty on purchases. General Dodge had so much trouble with these Treasury agents, by the information the enemy were constantly securing through their employes and agencies, and the whole business withal was so demoralizing in its tendency, that he finally determined to ignore all Treasury permits. These recommendations for permits would come from the Treasury Department to General Grant, and he would send them on to Dodge, who would refuse to let the agents pass through our lines. Then complaints would be made to Washington, whence they would be sent back to Grant, who in turn would send them to Dodge, without suggestion or recommendation. Finally the speculators undertook to influence General Dodge himself; which is said to have been the foundation for the story that he wrote Grant asking to be relieved from the command, as he was afraid the cotton speculators would reach his price.

Another incident illustrates the character of General Dodge and his manner of intercourse with his officers and men. He had a habit, when considering any proposition, of picking up a piece of paper from his desk and slowly tearing it in strips; and as his mind worked towards a conclusion the faster he would tear off the strips of paper. In the autumn of 1863, after the fall of Vicksburg, there was something of a lull in military activity in northern Mississippi, and of course officers and soldiers, who did not foresee the campaign to middle Tennessee, and Chattanooga, became somewhat restless and anxious for furloughs and leaves of absence. Among others Captain Farran, of the regular army, who was then serving on General Dodge's staff, was anxious to get a leave. He told

the writer that he intended to apply for a leave, and afterwards that he had done so; but without avail. Upon being asked why he did not argue the matter with the General, "Oh!" he says, "I did try to convince him that it was the proper thing to do; and he listened patiently for a few minutes, but after awhile he began to tear paper, and I knew the jig was up."

Finally, in the fall of 1863, General Dodge, with the left wing of the Sixteenth Army Corps, bade adieu to Corinth and the surrounding country, over which he had marched and counter-marched for more than a year. He followed immediately in the rear of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, which had gone forward to Chattanooga to take part in one of the most brilliant achievements of the war, resulting in raising the siege of Chattanooga and putting Bragg and his army to flight. General Dodge's command, on leaving Corinth, of course supposed their destination was Chattanooga. But on arriving in middle Tennessee he was halted by an order of General Grant, and making his headquarters at Pulaski, stretched his command along the railroad extending from Nashville to Decatur. Here General Dodge was given the opportunity to bring into play the marvelous versatility of his mind. General Grant with his immense army in and about Chattanooga had but one line of communication with the rear, and but one line of supply for this army; and that was the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad—a single slender thread. This road was greatly overworked, and there was the constant danger of raids by the enemy which might interrupt even this line of supply for some days. So General Grant determined to open another line, by rebuilding and re-equipping the railroad from Nashville to Decatur, where it formed a junction with the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, over which communication could be continued east to Stevenson, where the Nashville & Chattanooga and Memphis & Charleston railroads formed a junction.

Whilst General Dodge was engaged in this work he had to protect the country from the invasions of raiders, and supply the subsistence for his army from the country. The land between Nashville, Tennessee, and Huntsville, Alabama, although

quite broken and cut up with small streams, is a most beautiful and fertile country. The farmers along the valleys of these streams were more thrifty than in any portion of the South the writer had ever seen. They raised corn and hay and oats, had extensive orchards, and many of them had quite large herds of cattle, horses, sheep and hogs. Every few miles there was a grist mill; and as General Dodge had to supply his army of 8,000 men, and their necessary horses, from the country, the resources of these farms were seriously taxed. The mills were run night and day; corn and wheat were gathered and brought to the mills, whilst cattle, hogs and sheep were driven together and slaughtered. For all these supplies, vouchers were issued to the owners, leaving the question of loyalty to be settled afterwards. Thus General Dodge supplied his army from the resources of the country; and of the manner in which he rebuilt and re-equipped the railroad, General Grant, in his *Memoirs*, gives a most vivid and appreciative description, which I know the reader will thank me for here inserting:

Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery and trains all to be supplied by the single-track road from Nashville. All indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying Burnside's command in east Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the same route. A single track could not do this. I gave, therefore, an order to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command of about 8,000 men at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from Decatur north toward Nashville and to rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width and with valleys far below the road-bed. All the bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. All the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. All bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis & Charleston and the Nashville & Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the army. From Bridgeport a short distance further east the river supplements the road.

General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. He had no tools to work with except those of the pioneers—axes, picks and spades. With these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the enemy. As he had no base of supplies until the road should be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to consider,

after protecting his men, was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. He had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. When these were not near enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. Blacksmith shops with all the iron and steel found in them were moved up in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axmen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should be completed. Car builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars. Thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command itself furnished. But rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full capacity. There were no rails except those in use. To supply these deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten. I also ordered the troops in west Tennessee to points on the river and on the Memphis & Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the roads except the Memphis & Charleston to Nashville. The military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material. General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. The number of bridges to re-build was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms. The length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles.

(To be concluded in January number.)

THE TWENTY-FOURTH IOWA VOLUNTEERS.

FROM MUSCATINE TO WINCHESTER.

BY THAD. L. SMITH.

(Concluded from July number.)

AFTER THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

There is one remarkable circumstance connected with this brief siege, viz., while within 35 miles of Black River, whither the cars were running, and having an almost unobstructed communication to the rear, at no time were we supplied with half rations by the Government. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps had passed through this region while en route for Vicksburg, and left but little in the country. The army

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