policies—the results are illuminating. When she abandons this focus—as with the description of the Cambridge Swedish Festival which does not even involve a colossus—her discussion loses all point. The reader is left with the impression (confirmed by the book's many excellent photographs) that there is a wonderful subject here, but that the author does not really know how to deal with it.

The Colossus of Roads could have explored questions such as the evolution of advertising devices for capturing the attention of new high-speed automobile travelers and the struggle of small communities to gain notice in a mass society which increasingly bypasses them. These are important and very time-specific, place-specific questions. Rather than settle for an entertaining look at the use of distorted proportion through the ages as she did, Marling could have chosen to deal more thoroughly with circumstances of time and place and thereby provided considerable insight on the communities where modern colossi have arisen. These curious twentieth-century roadside structures deserve more substantial treatment. They represent, pardon the expression, a bigger subject than this author has acknowledged.

UNIVERSITY OF AKRON — DAVID KYVIG

Bonds of Enterprise: John Murray Forbes and Western Development in America's Railway Age, by John Lauritz Larson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984. xiv, 257 pp. Notes, maps, bibliography, index. $27.50 cloth.

Railroad Development Programs in the Twentieth Century, by Roy V. Scott. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1985. xi, 231 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. $24.95 cloth.

John Murray Forbes was born in 1813 into a prominent Boston trading family. He was introduced to the merchant's world at the age of eight when his brother sent him a shipment of Chinese trinkets, which John Murray is reported to have sold to his neighbors. By the 1830s, Forbes was deeply involved in the China trade himself. Despite his deep admiration for the mysterious Hong merchant Howqua, from whom he acquired his first precepts of business conduct, Forbes disliked China and the cutthroat practices of those who supplied the Canton traders. Forbes returned to Boston and, in the best tradition of Boston capitalists, soon launched another new career. Railroads and land speculation were the fields that attracted men like Forbes in the mid-1840s.

He first acquired the Michigan Central, a state venture that had become mired in the Jacksonian politics and glacial mud of frontier

Michigan. He turned to his Boston associates for funds and to several able engineers for expertise in railroad building; together they pushed the Michigan Central west from Detroit and secured an entrance to Chicago on May 21, 1852, just one day ahead of their competitor, the Michigan Southern. The railroad rivalries developing around Chicago inevitably drew the attention of Forbes and his fellow investors and soon he was involved in construction plans for the trans-Mississippi lines.

The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy was created in 1856 from two predecessor companies that had lines from Chicago to Burlington, Iowa, and from Galesburg, Illinois, to Hannibal, Missouri. Forbes showed his Bostonian prudence at the outset by taking an interest at the termini of both branches of his road: the Burlington & Missouri River, across southern Iowa, and the Hannibal & St. Joseph, across northern Missouri. This might suggest some uncertainty on Forbes's part as to which section of the country was going to dictate the course of the Pacific railroad. Clearly, however, there was no doubt in his mind as to the proper outcome of the Civil War that would temporarily draw his attention away from railroad matters.

One of the most intriguing aspects of John Lauritz Larson's account of these activities is his chapter on Forbes's role in the Civil War. The Boston entrepreneur turned from building a southern Iowa railroad to bankrolling the Yankee settlement of Lawrence, Kansas, and later directing the building of battleships for the Union forces. By 1862 he had formulated a detailed plan for financing the war with long-term bonds. One imagines that, had the war dragged on long enough, Forbes would have had it turning a profit, just like the Burlington Railroad. Although Forbes's association with the Burlington is well known from earlier accounts, such as Richard C. Overton's *Burlington West* (1941) and Arthur J. Johnson and Barry E. Supple's, *Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads* (1967), his progressive involvement with the sectional crisis has not been well told before. It is in the war years that one sees the generic Forbes approach, the same as that taken in the China trade, the Michigan Central, or the Burlington: bold and decisive action based on sound judgment carried the day.

The focus of Larson's argument is to contrast the likes of John Murray Forbes, whose interests were continental or global in scope, with those of Iowans who, presumably, had more local interests. Larson thus is able to tie the arrival of the railroads with the end of localism and, given that this happened around the early 1870s, he can further interpret the rise of the Granger movement and its program of railroad regulation as a local reaction to the loss of control to impersonal, outside forces. What this distinction misses is the scale of economic rivalry within Iowa itself, and Larson documents it well. Rivertown merchants were against railroads for their own reasons; cities like Council Bluffs had many railroads and enjoyed artificially low rates while many other cities had a single line and were interested only in controlling monopolistic rates. Railroad regulation would appear as a single, localized idea only to someone who viewed the goings-on from afar, such as from Boston.

When Iowa's Granger law fixing maximum rail rates took effect in 1874, Charles Perkins (a cousin of John Murray Forbes) had risen to prominence on the Burlington, and he denounced the law in a stiff-necked proclamation: "'communism in any form [is] . . . utterly inconsistent with civilized progress'" (151). Perkins ordered the Burlington's employees simply to ignore the rate law, but this disturbed the older and wiser Forbes. When the localities had their day in 1889, under the regime of Governor William Larrabee who pushed rate reforms even further, Charles Perkins had acquired a new perspective on the matter and he complied immediately.

Larson sees in Charles Perkins the beginnings of the modern corporate manager, ascendant over both the patient, paternalistic Forbes and the naive moralist Larrabee; the latter, with his political views rooted in a past of localism, could not survive in an age of industry and national-scale enterprise. It is an intriguing idea, but here Larson rests his case, firmly refusing to take sides with any of the nineteenth-century protagonists. To do so, Larson says, would be to limit us to their limited perspective. He concludes by emphasizing the "dynamic exchanges," "ambiguity," and "uncertainty" inherent in his subject that supposedly justifies denying himself a meaningful synthesis. It is a limp finale to an otherwise brilliantly told story.

Charles Perkins and John Murray Forbes held an idea of a theoretically perfect railroad system. It was to be long but not very wide, with important branches extended here and there toward great centers of commerce. They sought to develop a belt perhaps fifty miles wide along their lines. In fact the Burlington grew into a much larger system than that (partly as a result of the Forbes-Perkins attempts to preserve key traffic gateways in their struggle with Jay Gould, and partly because a web of branch lines grew in the Mississippi and Missouri valleys). It seems clear that Forbes envisioned for the Burlington the same plan he put into practice on the Michigan Central, that the railroad's scale should "fit the natural growth of the territory and not run too far ahead of local demand" (40).

Beliefs such as these seem unexceptional among railroad builders of the era. The idea that the territory would develop with the railroad was, furthermore, a key to the rationale for making grants of land to transportation companies. Contemporary beliefs held that an evolution from backwoods to agriculture to industrial city was reasonable to expect almost anywhere the railroads had reached. Yet it must have been clear to most railroad men by 1900 that the hoped-for economic growth did not necessarily follow the building of a line. There were thousands of miles of track in the United States that generated little traffic and produced scant profits, if not outright losses, for the stockholders.

The solution on many railroads was to hire development agents whose job it was to stimulate further economic growth. This has remained a little-known facet of the railroad business, but now it has been amply documented in Roy V. Scott's fact-filled *Railroad Development Programs in the Twentieth Century*. Scott chose to base his account largely on the pamphlets, circulars, and tracts which railroad development departments issued to advertise their work. He is aware of the bias this lends his account, although he provides fairly little critical commentary to offset the statements of what were, after all, public relations experts employed by railroad companies.

Some programs were aimed at changing regional habits: diversification away from cotton in the South, livestock herd improvement in the West, or irrigation schemes in the Far West. Railroad efforts to change the regional economic pattern differed in no important ways from what government agricultural scientists and extension agents were promoting at the same time, however. The railroad development agent's true domain was the local, small-scale business, such as finding towns along the line that had suitable clays, promoting them as potential sites for brickyards, and then assisting would-be brickmakers in locating their factories. Anything that could be grown or made could be shipped, and the railroads knew no town too small or farm too poor to attract their interest in stimulating new business. Items that were costly to transport, especially perishable fruits and vegetables, were most often singled out for promotion.

It does not seem likely that these development schemes had much of an impact on the overall economic geography of the nation, nor does Scott enter a claim to that effect. The commodity most directly affected was the production of fruit in the Mississippi valley. A half-dozen railroads operating out of Louisville, Chicago, St. Louis, and Kansas City had field men seeking farmers who might be encouraged to grow strawberries or peaches or apples. They often chose hilly areas, where other kinds of agriculture were unprofitable and the microclimate was suitable for fruit. They organized growers' coops, drew up express freight schedules, and regularly delivered the product into the terminal markets. It seems to have been an entirely wholesome activity, as beneficial for those who consumed the products as it was for the hill farmers who profited from the crops. It was a typical railroad development effort as well.

Railroad Development Programs reveals a minute-scale patchwork of economic development efforts that continued from 1900 until the interstate highway system began turning the logistics of American transportation inside-out in the 1960s. That such agencies were necessary for so many years after the railroad laid its tracks, sold the farmer his land, and then carried him in with all of his possessions, probably would have amazed John Murray Forbes. The real role played by railroads in national development continues to unfold, and, as these recent works by Larson and Scott show, it is in the corporate strategies—the principal actors and their designs—that we are likely to learn the full measure of what the railroads wrought.

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Second View: The Rephotographic Survey Project, by Mark Klett, Ellen Manchester, JoAnn Verburg, Gordon Bushaw, and Rick Dingus, with essay by Paul Berger. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984. ix, 211 pp. Duotone plates, maps, illustrations, notes. $65.00 cloth.

The concept for *Second View* is elegantly simple. A group of photographers set out to imitate in every conceivable way photographs made in the late 1870s by the various government survey photographers. These new photographs would ape the originals in location, vantage point, focal length of lens—literally duplicating the originals, save for the passage of time. In lesser hands the simplicity might have been brainless, for there is nothing of particular worth in the simple exercise of relocating a given site and making a parallel picture. But this book, and the project that led to it, had conceptual underpinnings that transform a simple idea into a powerful experiment.

The book is deceptive in that it is really not about the pictures. Rather, it is about the nature of photography and, by corollary, time. Divided into four major sections, it first reports on the project concept and methodology in a preface by Mark Klett, the project's chief photographer, and in an essay by JoAnn Verburg, the project coordinator. The mechanics of determining the precise location, camera height, lens, and arrangement of camera standards was, in itself, fascinating. Moreover, the staff's precision casts new insights into what the original photographers were seeing and feeling about what they were photographing. These insights alone make the book valuable to those study-