tion are the author's explanations of how to access the evidence and how Chinese immigrants handled an increasingly intrusive government agency. Also noteworthy are the section on Chinese women, the author's suggestions for future research, and—for Iowa historians—the references to Iowa colleges and universities and missionaries who shielded Chinese students from the INS.

Part two, the bulk of the book, contains selected samples of the files. These are broken into five sections: families, women, students and professionals, public charges, and post-exclusion uses. These revealing samples provide potential users of the files a tantalizing glimpse, including extensive personal photos, of the richness of the resources.

Parts three, four, and five offer additional assistance. Part four should be read with parts one and two for references to Chinese women. Here, examples of information on foot binding, marriage, Chinese female residence, professional affiliations of Chinese women, settlement patterns, and specific individual files of Chinese women are explained. Part three asks basic questions about the INS files and the National Archives; and part five explains a variety of sample documents, such as certificates of residence, applications for return certificates, statements of intent to visit China and return to the U.S., certificates of nativity, and others. The book concludes with a very selective bibliography that should not be considered a comprehensive list of sources on Chinese in the Midwest.

This book is extremely useful to historians who seek ways to access information about Chinese Americans and to Chinese Americans who are searching family histories. Midwestern historical society and university libraries should have this work in their collections.

Rhetoric as Currency: Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Great Depression, by Davis W. Houck. Presidential Rhetoric Series. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press in association with The Center for Presidential Studies, George Bush School of Government and Public Service, 2001. 226 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. $36.95 cloth.

Reviewer Cal Coquillette is adjunct professor of history at the University of Dubuque. He has authored two recent articles in the *Annals of Iowa* on Hoover's strategems to counter the effects of the Great Depression, with particular emphasis on the Iowa banking industry.

When Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan speaks, or so Davis Houck insists, rhetoric becomes currency in a real economic sense. Thus, *Rhetoric as Currency* is a study of language and inflection deployed by Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt to counter the deleterious effects of the early years of the Great Depression, 1929–1933. Historical comparisons between Hoover and Roosevelt in terms of demeanor, political savvy, and government philosophy pervade any study of the transition from the New Era to the New Deal, but Houck focuses on the use of campaign and presidential rhetoric as a substitute for or complement to federal action. He provides ample evidence that Roosevelt—as candidate, president-elect, and president—used the deteriorating economy, the banking crisis of February and March 1933, and the legislative flurry of the first "100 days" to alter his rhetorical strategies as his star ascended and Hoover's descended. Hoover ends up as the forlorn and submissive foil to the charismatic FDR, who frames his rhetoric in "fireside chats" and who speaks of "nothing to fear but fear itself."

J. M. Keynes knew of the crucial relationship between rhetoric and economics, what Houck calls a "macroeconomics of confidence" (18). So did Herbert Hoover. Six months after his inauguration in March 1929, the stock market crashed, signifying the onset of the Great Depression. Hoover opted for action over rhetoric: conferences with business leaders, a tax cut, and increased spending on construction. Only later, when action had fallen short or failed, did he resort to rhetoric. Roosevelt, in contrast, was all rhetoric up until his November 1932 victory, virtually silent until his inauguration in March, and rhetoric followed by unprecedented federal action through mid-June. The key period was the interregnum between November and March, when Hoover pleaded for Roosevelt's rhetoric to stem the escalating banking crisis. Roosevelt demurred, then used the collapse of the banking industry to jump-start the New Deal. The banking crisis, as both Hoover and Roosevelt knew, was a crisis in confidence, temporarily overcome by rhetoric and permanently overcome by a federal guarantee of bank deposits.

The state of Iowa from 1929–1933 epitomized the two sickest industries in the depression's early years: banking and agriculture. The corn/hog glut, the amount of mortgaged farmland, and the number of bank failures, in which Iowa led the nation, can all be correlated. Less easy to quantify is the confidence or lack thereof that uninsured Iowa depositors had in their banks. The Hoover programs to sustain agriculture and salvage troubled banks had not worked, despite the rhetoric of war and battle analogues that he employed. Roosevelt's rhetorical metaphors of sickness and health were later transformed into those of warfare, "a redefinition that greatly facilitated his legislative agenda during [the] first one hundred days" (199). Hoover's old rhetorical battle analogues were recast by the new president, but only after the banking crisis had been checked in March 1933 and hoarded gold and currency had been reconverted to bank deposits. One legacy of the interregnum between Roosevelt's election and inauguration was the decision to inaugurate new presidents in January rather than March. A legacy of the banking crisis and FDR's first 100 days goes a long way toward explaining why Iowans have generally voted for a Democratic president since 1932.

Houck offers an intriguing study of leadership rhetoric and style during the worst four years of twentieth-century American economic history. The problem, which he fails to acknowledge, is that the combination of presidential rhetoric and action was never enough to cure the economic ills of the Great Depression. The nation's economy revived only with the onset of World War II. Indeed, any Iowa farmer or Iowa banker from the 1930s could have told Houck that.

The Strangest Dream: Communism, Anti-Communism and the U.S. Peace Movement, 1945–1963, by Robbie Lieberman. Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000. xvii, 244 pp. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $34.95 cloth.

Reviewer Michael J. Anderson is associate professor of history and chair of the department of history and political science at Clarke College. His research and publications have focused on anti-communism in the 1940s and '50s.

Robbie Lieberman offers insights into the problems and promise of the peace movement during the height of the cold war. She details the interrelationships among communism, anti-communism, and the peace movement during the years between the end of World War II and the start of protests against the war in Vietnam. She claims that a central issue of her book is "the battle that arose over what peace should mean in the postwar world" (13). Therefore she does not offer a precise definition of *peace,* but she uses the term *peace movement* broadly to refer to "groups that opposed cold war policies" (14). Lieberman rejects the idea that American communists were only cynically interested in peace issues as a way to advance Soviet interests. She suggests that the reality was more complicated and that other scholars of both the peace movement and the cold war have ignored this. She admits that there is "some truth" (2) to the charge that communist involvement in the peace movement contributed to making *peace* a subversive term during the cold war, but she argues that American communists made a positive contribution by "calling attention to issues that merited public discussion" (2) and that they sincerely advocated peace as a way to bring "better conditions for people in the United States" (2).